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LFP/vsl 
July 21, 1975 
No. 74-204, Weinberger v. Eldridge. 
The purpose of this brief memo, dictated during the 
summer, is to aid my memory as to the issues presented, and to 
record my quite tentative reaction after a preliminary reading 
of the opinions and briefs. 
*· ***** 
This case (up from CA4), together with Weinberger v. 
Williams, No. 74-205 (up from CAS), present an important ques-
tion for the administration of the Social Security Disability 
Insurance program. In a brief summary, the question is: 
Whether disability benefits under this pro-
gram may be terminated without a prior ad-
versary hearing, but purs~ant to regulations 
which require written notice, opportunity 
for reconsideration, and eventually an 
evidentiary hearing? 
We granted cert in this case (No. 74-204), and I believe 
we are holding No. 74-205. The two cases are substantially 
identical, except the constitutional issue is more sha~ply 
presented here (No. 74-204), since it is conceded that HEW com-
plied with the applicable regulations. 
District courts in both Virginia and Georgia found 
No. 74-204 2. 
Goldberg controlling, and invalidated the regulations. CA4 
and CAS affirmed without opinions. 
The question presented was before the Court in Wright 
v. Richardson, 405 u.s. 208 (1972), but was not decided. As 
HEW changed its regulations, the Court vacated and remanded that 
case to be reconsidered under the new procedures. 
Procedure Under New Regulations 
The SG's prolix and rambling brief (presumably written 
by bureaucracy lawyers in HEW) purports to summarize the pro-
cedure (p. 27 et seq.), and also incorporates-- as Appendix A 
a more detailed description of the procedure, copies of the 
regulations, and certain statistical data. 
As I unde rs tand it (subject to verification by one of 
my clerks), the procedure which may result in termination of 
disability benefits involves the following steps: 
I. Initial Determination. The State welfare agency, 
pursuant to the statute, has the initial responsibility. It makes 
a "continuing disability investigation," requiring periodic 
reports, medical examinations, etc. If there is reason to believe 
disability has terminated, the available evidence is reviewed by 
a "team" including a physician and trained disability examiner. 
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If they believe the worker is no longer disabled, he is notified, 
given a summary of the evidence, and ten days in which to respond. 
At this stage, the worker may be assisted by counsel or friends 
who (according to the SG's brief p. 28) may "examine all the 
evidence in the worker's file, including medical reports." At 
this stage, the worker may submit further evidence in writing. 
The state agency forwards its determination to the Social Security 
Agency's (SSA's) Bureau of Disability Insurance, which reviews it 
for conformity with uniform national standards. SSA rarely 
disagrees with the state agency at this point. If, as it usually 
does, it accepts the Agency's determination, SSA notifies the 
worker in writing, states the basis of the determination, and 
advises the worker of his right to seek further review. 
II. Agency Reconsideration. If the worker requests 
"reconsideration," as he has the right to do, a different team 
at the state agency reviews the record de novo, considering 
any additional evidence submitted by the worker. 
III. Evidentiary Hearing. If the administrative 
decision upon reconsideration remains adverse, the worker may 
obtain an evidentiary hearing before an SSA administrative law 
judge. It is conceded (see pp. 3, 4 of _AFL/CIO!s brief) that 
this hearing meets the minimum procedural due process standards 
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Goldberg. 
Weighing the Competing Interests 
Our cases establish that determination of "what 
process is due" requires a weighing or balancing of the interests 
involved, those of the individual and those of society as repre-
sented by the government. See Cafeteria Workers; Goss v. Lopez; 
Morrissey; Arnett; Wolff. 
In brief summary, the worker is interested in not 
having his benefits cut off unfairly. Under the regulations, he 
receives benefits for two months following the initial determina-
tion of non-entitlement. The SG states that it now takes between 
10 and 11 months for the full administrative procedure to run its 
course, to and including the evidentiary hearing and the handing 
down of a decision. If the decision is reversed, benefits are 
paid retroactively. 
From the government's viewpoint, the principal interest 
is the substantial additional administrative burden -- a further 
enlargement in the .... bureaucracy administering welfare laws 
with consequent expense. Perhaps more important, is the interest 
of society generally in having Social Security -- in all of its 
vast ramifications administered fairly, expeditiously, and 
·~ 
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without undue ' increase in costs and bureaucracy. In this 
connection, federal funds necessarily are limited (eventually, 
at least), and these funds should be preserved for the benefit 
of those who need them most. 
Goldbe~ 
This case is admittedly close to Goldberg. The SG 
emphasizes that disability benefits are not paid on the basis 
of need, and that the need is not necessarily "brutal need" as 
in Goldberg. Respondent contests this. 
I am interested primarily in comparing the nature and 
dependabi~ity of the procedure for termination of disability 
benefits with that which was held to be inadequate as to welfare 
benefits in Goldberg. I would like for one of my clerks to make 
this comparison. 
My tenhative view, at least, is that the procedures for 
terminating disability benefits provide reasonable due process. 
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Gregory K. Palm 
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No. 74-204 ~!S@~ v. Eldridge 
This case, together with Weinberger v. Williams [No. 74-
205], presents the important question whether disability 
benefits under the Social Security Insurance Program can be 
terminated without a prior oral adversary hearing, but pursuant 
to administrative procedures which include written notice, 
opportunity for response and submission of additional evidence 
prior to termination of benefits, and an opportunity for 
reconsideration and finally an evidentiary hearing subsequent 
to termination. The courts below, relying almost exclusively 
on Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), concluded that the 
administrative procedures were inadequate and that due process 
requires the opportunity to have an evidentiary hearing prior 
to termination. Although were it not for Goldberg I would 
find it difficult to conclude that the administrative procedures 
provided here are constitutionally inadequate, this case is 
close enough to Goldberg to make a different result hard to 
justify. Since you are familiar with the interest balancing 
analysis that is commonly applied to determine "what process 
is due" in particular circumstances,as requested in your July 
21, 1975 memorandum this memorandum primarily will concentrate 
on a comparison of the nature and reliability of the termination 
2. 
procedures involved here with those found in Goldberg. It 
will also consi'der in abbreviated fashion what I perceive to 
be the most important similarities and differences between 
the competing interests involved in these cases. 
The challenged procedures for welfare terminations in 
1 
Goldberg are subject to compact summarization. Pursuant to 
§ 353.26(b) of the New York Department of Social Services 
Regulations, the New York City Department of Social Services 
2 
promulgated Procedure No. 68-18. In accordance with that 
procedure a caseworker who concluded that a recipient was no 
longer eligible for assistance met with the recipient and 
discuss ed the reasons for the proposed termination. The 
caseworker then prepared a notice of intention to terminate 
assistance, and forwarded that form, along with the case record 
to the unit supervisor. The unit supervisor then reviewed the 
case record and the termination form. Apparently there was no 
required consultation between the caseworker and the 
supervisor. Their only official contact with regard to this 
matter was the transmittal of the case record and termination 
proposal. If the unit supervisor concurred in the caseworker's 
recommendation, he then sent a written notice to the recipient 
stating the reasons for the proposed termination and informing 
him that within seven days he might request that a higher 
official within the Social Services Department review the record, 
and that he might support that request with a written statement 
prepared personally or with the aid of an attorney or other 
3. 
person. If the reviewing official affirmed the determination 
' of ineligibility, aid was terminated immediately and the 
recipient was informed by letter of the reasons for the action. 
There was thus no provision for a personal appearance by the 
recipient before the reviewing official, for oral presentation 
of evidence, or for confrontation and cross-examination of 
adverse witnesses. There was, however, provision for a post-
termination hearing before an independent state hearing officer 
at which the recipient might appear personally, offer oral 
testimony, and confront and cross-examine the witnesses against 
him. A record was made of this hearing. If the recipient 
prevailed, he received all funds erroneously withheld. Judicial 
review was also possible if the hearing resulted in an affirmance 
of the termination of aid. 
The administrative procedures applicable in the case 
of Social Security Disability Benefit terminations are more 
complex. In order to establish initial and continued entitle-
ment to Social Security disability benefits the worker must 
demonstrate that he is unable 
to engage in any substantial gainful activity 
by reason of any medical!~ determinable physical 
or mental impairment whicli can be expected to 
result in death or which has lasted or can be 
expected to last for a continuous period of not 
less than 12 months •... 
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A). In satisfying this test the worker 
must demonstrate, by means of "medically acceptable clinical 
and laboratory diagnostic techniques", id. § 423(d)(3), that 
he has a physical or mental impairment, as defined in the Act, 
id. § 423(d)(3), that is of such severity that 
he is not ' only unable to do his previous work but 
cannot, considering his age, education, and work 
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial 
gainful work which exists in the national economy, 
regardless of whether such work exists in the 
immediate area in which he lives, or whether a 
specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether 
he would be hired if he applied for work. 
id. § 423(d)(2)(A). The disability insurance program is 
4. 
administered through an unusual combination of state and federal 
agencies performing interrelated functions. The Act provides 
that the determination whether a person is under a di sability, 
when it began, and when it ceased shall be made by the state 
agency administering the plan, 41 Stat. 735, as amended, 29 
U.S.C. Supp. IIIM701 et ~., or by another appropriate agency, 
pursuant to an agreement entered with the Secretary. The Act 
authorizes the Secretary to make the determination concerning 
disability if the state declines to enter into such an agree-
ment, but apparently all states have done so. Brief for 
Petitioner 20 n. 18. The Act permits the Secretary to review 
on his own motion and to reverse a state agency's determination 
find 
that a person is not disabled, or/that the disability began 
later or ceased sooner than determined by the state agency. 
42 U.S.C. 42l(c). He may not, however, review a determination 
that a person is not disabled. The Secretary has delegated 
his responsibilities under the Act to the Social Security 
Administration. See 40 Fed. Reg. 4473, amending 33 Fed. Reg. 
5828. 
5. 
As in the case of welfare, eligibility is dependent 
' 
on the continu'ed existence of facts which satisfy the statutory 
criteria. By far the principal reasons for the termination 
of benefits are that the worker is no longer disabled or has 
returned to work. Brief for Petitioner, App. A, 2a n. 3. 
For auxillary beneficiaries, charges in relationships, 
dependency status or age and completion of schooling are also 
causes of termination. The procedures followed in these latter 
cases are significantly different from those involved here. 
But those procedures are not of direct interest since this 
case concerns solely a challenge to the administrative 
procedures involved in the termination of benefits because 
of medical recovery. Also not involved here directly are the 
procedures for termination in "return-to-work" cases. Those 
cases do not necessarily or usually entail state agency 
involvement mandated by the Act. But since that type of 
termination is one of the two most common under the Act and 
since the return-to-work procedures are in many respects 
similar to those provided in the case medical recovery-i.e. , 
neither provides for a pre-termination evidentiary hearing--
' whatever is held with respect to the latter procedures will 
1~ I also like affect the validity of the former. 3 According to 
petitioner, the principal reasons for making such investigations 
in particular cases are that a medical investigation had 
been previously scheduled (as here), an employer has reported 
earnings by the worker, or the worker has notified the Social 
6. 
Security Administration that his condition has improved or 
' 
he has returned to work. See id. 2a-3a. If there is reason ---- 1 
to believe there has been medical recovery a team consisting -of a PEYsician and a non-medical person trained in disability 
" . 
evaluation reviews the available evidence. The agency com-
municates with the disabled wor~er, typically by mail--in 
which case he is sent an explanatory letter and a detailed 
questionnaire to be completed and returned within 10 days, 
Appendix to Petition 72a-75a [Form SSA-454a], or by telephone 
and asks him to furnish information concerning: his present 
condition, his belief as to whether he is able to return to 
) 
work, any current medical restrictions, the sources of treatment 
for his disability, the nature and extent of his employment 
during the past year, and any vocational services he is 
receiving. SSA Claims Manual § 6705.1 ("CM"); Disability 
4 
Insurance State Manual § 353.3 ("DISM"). The worker is also 
invited to submit any addi tional information that he considers 
to be relevant to his continued entitlement to Social Security 
benefits. The notification letter, see Appendix to Petition 
68a, also invites the recipient to direct any questions o: which 




Unless there is a clear-cut evidence of medical recovery 
the state agency will atiiempt to obtain information from 
medical sources regarding the recipient's current condition. 
DISM § 353.2(B). For example, the investigatory team may have 
7. 
an independent consulting physician perform an ~xamination ~ 
of the benefictary, if there is a conflict between information 
presented by the beneficiary or his physician and that obtained 
from other sources. DISM § 353.4. Upon completion of this 
investigation the state agency arrives at a tentative conclusion 
regarding whether and when the beneficiary's disability has 
ceased. Id. §§ 353.2E, 353.5. Whenever the agency's assess- ~ 
ment of the severity of the beneficiary's impairment conflicts 
with the beneficiary's own assessment, before the agency's 
tentative determination becomes final the beneficiary is 
(1) informed of the proposed adverse action-- ordinarily in 
writing; (2) given a summary of the evidence upon which it is 
7 
based, followed by an opportunity for the worker or his 
representative to review all the evidence in the worker's 
8 
case file, including medical reports, and to respond in writing 
within at least 10 working days; (3) given additional time--
to 30 days--if needed to obtain and submit supplemental 
9 
evidence in support of his claim. Id. § 353.6 
Taking into account any response by the worker the state 
10 
agency then makes its determination. If the determination 
remains adverse to the beneficiary it must be supported by 
specific findings and conclusions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.905(d). 
The state agency then forwards its determination to Social ~ 
Security Administration (SSA) headquarters for review by a 
disability examiner in the Bureau of Disability Insurance for 
conformity with national standards. 42 U.S.C. § 42l(c); CM 
l ) 
8. 
§ § 6 701 (b), (c); Disability Insura"Q.ce Letter No,- II-46, 
' 
Brief of Petitioner 60a-6la. If -as it usually does- the 
SSA accepts the agency determination, it notifies the -
beneficiary in writing, informing him of the reasons for its - --decision, as well as his right to seek reconsideration. 
to. 
20 C.F.R. § 404.907. Because of the two-month grace period 
during which benefits are ordinarily provided even after the 
date the worker has ceased to be disabled, the immediate effect I 
of this determination upon the recipient varys according to 
the relationship between the disability date and the date of 
the SSA determination of cessation of disability. 
) 
J 
By regulation the Secretary has provided that beneficiaries 
may request reconsideration of the initial determination, even 
if no new evidence is to be submitted. Id. § 404.909. See 
generally id. §§ 404.909-.16. A request for reconsideration 
must be submitted within six months of the initial determina-
tion. This period may be extended by the SSA for good cause, 
or other reasons. Id. § 404.911; see id. §§ 404.612; 404.953. 
Reconsideration is initially conducted by the state agency, 
but usually not by the same persons that handled the case 
11 
originally. The beneficiary may submit new evidence. 
Similarly the state may update its file by seeking addi tional 
pertinent evidence such as current physical condition or 
vocational position. Again, the state submits its determination 
to the SSA where it is reviewed in the same manner as the 
original determination. 
9. 
SSA then notifies the beneficiary in writing of the 
basis for its determination, which if adverse to the beneficiary, 
is treated as a "determination" for the purpose of the statutory 
right to a post-termination evidentiary hearing. Id. § 404.917(a). 
~nsideration must thus be sought before there can be 'an 7) 
evidentiary hearing. This notification also informs the ~ 
beneficiary of his reasons for the termination, the right to 
request a hearing, id. § 404.915, such request to be filed 
within six months unless the period is extended. Id. § 404.918. 
At the hearing the beneficiary may submit additional or new 
I 
evidence of disability and the administrative law judge 
'---
considers the record de novo even if no new evidence is sub-
mitted. Id. 404.927. The hearing is non-adversary and the 
SSA is not represented by counsel or other staff. As at all 
other prior and subsequent stages of the administrative process, 
however, the beneficiary may be represented by counsel or 
other representative. Id. § 404.934. The beneficiary is 
'--- --
accorded an array of procedural rights at this hearing. See 
Brief for Petitioners, App. A, 12a. It is generally conceded 
that this hearing meets the minimum requirements of procedural 
due process. If the post-termination evidentiary hearing 
results in an adverse decision, the worker still has the 
right to request discretionary review by the SSA Appeal Council, 
which may review the record de novo and may receive additional 
evidence. After an adverse decision or denial of review by 
the Appeals Council, the worker may then obtain judicial review. - ---
10. 
Unlike all other prior levels of r~view the district court 
is required to treat findings as conclusive if they are 
supported by substantial evidence. 42 u.s.c. § 405(g). 
If, at any point after payment of benefits has been 
terminated, it is determined that the worker's disability 
continued beyond the date of cessation established in the 
initial determination, then the worker is entitled to retro-
active payment of benefits in accordance with the subsequent 
determination. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 423(b). On the other hand, 
if a beneficiary receives any benefits to which he is later 
determined not to ber entitled, the Secretary may reduce any 
other payments to which the beneficiary is entitled, or require 
the payment of a refund, id. § 404(a)(l), unless the beneficiary 
is "without fault" and such adjustment or recovery would defeat 
the purposes of the Act or "would be against equity and good 
conscience." Id. § 404(b). See generally 20 C.F.R. 
§§ 404.501-515. 
Although one can pinpoint certain differences between 
the nature of the procedure for termination of disability 
benefits and the procedure for the termination of welfare 
benefits held inadequate in Goldberg, there are also 
important similarities between the two administrative systems. 
Under the welfare termination procedure the caseworker first 
met the aid recipient and, if he concluded termination of 
benefits was appropriate, he then transmitted the case record 
and a termination proposal on Form M-3c, see Goldberg 
11. 
Jurisdictional Statement, App. D., , A48 (copy attached) to his 
unit supervisor. The supervisor then reviewed this information 
and, if he concurred with the recommendation of the caseworker, 
mailed the Form M-3c to the recipient. Form M-3c would contain 
a statement of the reasons for the termination of aid and 
instructed the recipient that if he felt aid should be con-
tinued, he should check the box requesting review and return 
the form to the Welfare Department. He was also informed of 
his right . to submit additional written evidence through an 
attorney or other representative. If the reviewing official 
affirmed the determination of ineligibility, aid was terminated 
immediately, and the recipient was notifed of the reasons for 
the action and his right to an evidentiary hearing. 
The disability benefit termination procedures differ from 
the Goldberg welfare termination procedures in several respects. 
When the state agency questions the continued eligibility of 
a recipient it sendshim a detailed questionnaire, Form SSA-454~ 
(copy attached), which arguably enables him effectively ..._ 
communicate the types of information upon which the disability 
benefit termination decision is to be based. The questionnaire 
format would seem to enhance the ability of the aid recipient 
to present his "case" in written form. The initial questionnaire 
also informs the recipient that if he has any questions 
regarding the questionnaire he can obtain aid at the local 
SSA office. Unless the worker's information, as well as the 
i nformation provided by his physician or other sources which he 
12. 
lists provides clear-cut evidence of medical recovery the 
DISM provides that the investigatory team must engage in 
further investigation and develop current medical evidence. 
See DISM § 353.4. For example, consultative medical examina-
tions may be required. Id. § 353.4(A)(2). If after engaging 
in this investigation, the team concludes that the recipient 
is no longer eligible he is notified of that fact, ordinarily 
in writing, given the reasons for the disposition, and 
informed that he has the right to submit additional information 
through a representative and to seek review. Most importantly 
j he is also given a qualified right to examine all of the 
} m~ials in'his case file. The only limitation is that, in 
accordance with accepted medical practice for the protection 
of the doctor-patient relationship, the worker is not permitted 
to examine the medical evidence. But his representative is 
lla 
permitted to do so. The ability to review the entire case 
file should make the submission of additional written informa-
tion a significantly more effective means of presenting his 
case since the worker will have a much clearer idea of the 
types and sources of information upon which the preliminary • 
.vtl'f 
decision is based. Under this system it is possible to care-
fully e~·ne and question both the conclusions of the 
investigatory team and the underlying data upon which those 
conclusions were based. 
Still, it is certainly not clear that these perceived 
differences in the nature of the administrative processes are 
/A/-~ 13. ) 
enough to justify a different result here than in Goldberg. 
I 
The Goldberg majority's principal objections to the welfare 
termination procedures would also seem to be in part applicable 
to the disability termination procedures. The central deficiency 
of the welfare procedures was viewed as the failure to allow 
the recipient to appear personally before the decision maker. 
397 U.S. at 268. It was felt that the only means by which 
the welfare recipient might communicate his case to the 
decision maker -written submissions, cr oral communications fun-
nelled through the caseworker- were insufficient. There was 
no . opportunity to confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses. 
Written submissions were viewed as deficient because they do 
not provide the "flexibility of oral presentations" and do not 
"permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues the 
decision maker appears to regard as important." Id. at 269. 
Moreover, the second hand presentation to the decision maker 
through the caseworker was regarded as deficient because the 
caseworker -who usually gathers the information to support 
the ineligibility charge -could not be relied on to adequately 
present the recipient's side of the case. These objections 
also pertain here for the worker is never given the opportunity 
to present orally. his case to the decision maker or to confront 
~ ------..../"'-
and cross-examine adverse witnesses. On the other hand several 
distinctions are possible. First, the written submissions 
here are arguably a much more effective means of communicating 
the recipient's case than in Goldberg. Both the detailed 
14. 
nature of the original questionnaire, and more importantly, 
the right of the recipient to examine the evidence within 
his file will enable him more readily to ascertain "the issues 
the decision maker appears to regard as important." Second, 
unlike in Goldberg none of the information provided by the 
recipient is being funneled to the decision maker through a 
third party whose position and responsibilities in the 
administration of the aid program made his adequacy as an 
unbiased conduit suspect. There is no information in the 
Goldberg opinion as to whether the welfare recipient was able 
to examine his case file. Quite likely he was denied this 
opportunity. Thus although the process in Goldberg, unlike 
the process here, did provide for oral communication between 
the caseworker and the recipient, the benefit of this communica-
tion was sharply eroded by (1) the caseworker's role in the 
termination process, and (2) the fact that the decision maker 
was given the material in the case file even though the aid 
recipient did not have knowledge of its precise content so 
that he was unable directly to challenge the validity of 
12 
any information contained there. By contrast such an 
opportunity is provided him in the context of the termination 
of disability benefits. Since he is permitted access to the 
full case file he is also able to specifically question the 
validity of all information provided to the decision maker, 
including the reports and conclusions of any physicians who 
may have been consulted concerning his current condition. 
15. 
Of course, since his challenge is still limited to written 
' 
responses - there is thus no opportunity for cross-examination -
the adequacy of these procedures under Goldberg is uncertain. 
It would also seem useful to consider whether there exist 
) any fun~ental differences in the nature of the relevant 
1 inquiry--i.e., types and sources of pertinent information--
so as to make it reasonable to conclude that the Social Security 
disability benefit termination cases are relatively more suit-
able than the welfare cases for resolution entirely by an 
administrative process which depends solely on written communica-
tion. The government argues that in contrast to the welfare 
area "the specter of questionable credibility and veracity is 
not present," even though there may be "professional disagree-
ment with the medical conclusions. II Richardson v. Perales, 
402 U.S. 389, 407 (1971). Medical recovery terminations, like 
the initial determinations of disability, rely heavily upon 
"routine, standard and unbiased medical reports by physician 
specialists concerning a subject whom they" have examined, 
id. at 404, the general reliability and probative value of 
which have been "uniformly recognized." Id. at 405. Moreover, 
the government contends that the determination whether the 
disability has terminated is made by a team of dispassionate 
professionals in contrast to the welfare caseworkers who may 
have had adverse personal confrontations with the caseworker. 
Finally, unlike welfare recipients, disability recipients 
generally have substantial recent employment experience. 
16. 
They also generally have more education. The written sub-
' 
missions are t~us not an unrealistic alternative. 
These contentions are not without substance. It does 
seem that the importance of confrontation and cross-examination 
may be less significant in this context than in Goldberg since 
questions of credibility and veracity are substantially less 
important. The decision maker does in large measure base his 
determination upon undisputed facts and there is arguably less 
need for an adversary proceeding in which the conclusions of 
the experts are attacked. This is particularly so given the 
access which the terminated recipient has to his case file. 
Presumably the types of information that he will need to combat 
the medical diagnosis and other information contained there 
will have to be compiled by his own expert and will be equally 
susceptible to written as oral communi cation. Moreover, the 
disabled worker would in general appear better able to 
effectively communicate his case on paper than the average 
welfare recipient. This written communication ability is 
complemented by the detailed nature of the questionnaire form 
sent to the aid recipient. His focus is directed toward types 
of information that are most pertinent to his continued right 
13 
to disability benefits. 
But there are powerful arguments which tend to diminish 
the importance of these distinctions. Many of them are 
contained in Justice Brennan's dissent in Richardson v. Wright, 
405 U.S. 208, 212 (1972), although his argument there is 
17. 
directed more broadly toward all c~tegories of disability 
benefit termination procedures. The Amici Brief makes the 
important point that the disability termination assessment 
turns on several factors, with contested factual matters some-
times being central to their resolution. Id. at 10-13. The 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit aptly summarized the 
factors upon which a decision whether disability has ceased 
may turn: 
[T]here are four elements of proof to be 
considered in making a finding of Claimant's 
ability or inability to engage in any sub-
stantial gainful activity. There are: (1) 
the objective medical facts, which are the 
clinical findings of treating or examining 
physicians divorced from their expert judgments 
or opinion as to the significance of these 
clinical findings, (2) the diagnoses, and 
expert medical opinions of the treating and 
examining physicians on subsidiary questions 
of fact, (3) the subjective evidence of pain 
and disability testified to by Claimant, and 
corroborated by his wife and his neighbors, 
(4) Claimant's educational background, work 
history, and present age. 
Underwood v. Ribicoff, 298 F.2d 850, 851-852 (4th Cir. 1962). 
See also Bi ttel v. Richardson, 441 F.2d 1193, 1195 (3rd Cir. 
1971); Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 1964). 
The Amici Brief cites additional sources which generally 
support the proposition that the "substantive determination 
of disability calls for an individual application of a set 
of necessarily complex medical and vocational facts to the 
definition of disability which is in the Social Security Act 
'' Administration of Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program, Prelim. Rep. Subcomm. on the Administration of the 
I 
18. 
Social Security Laws, House Comm. on Ways & Means. 
' 
It would not seem possible to say with certainty that 
the administrative process here is more or less dependable 
than that in Goldberg. My own conclusion is that the disability 
14 
benefits termination procedures are more "dependable." This 
is primarily because the system does appear to provide the aid -
recipient with a more effective means of communicating his 
"case" to the final decision maker. The written questionnaires 
facilitate the transmission of pertinent data. The recipient 
is somewhat more suited to communicating in written form than 
the typical welfare recipient. More importantly, much of the 
information that needs to be transmitted will come from expert 
sources other than the recipient. These experts presumably 
are capable of effectively communicating through written 
documents. Although, as the Underwood Court pointed out, 
questions of fact and subjective testimony concerning areas other 
than medical opinion are relevant to the question of medical 
recovery, I think that since questions of veracity and 
credibility play a significantly less important role, the need 
for a hearing at which there is confrontation and cross-
examination is less important. Given the recipient's access 
to his file, either he or his representative can prepare their 
own submissions challenging any observations and conclusions 
in the file with which they disagree. This file access permits 
the recipient to ascertain and focus upon the issues the 
decision maker regards as important. Finally, the entire 
19. 
disability benefits termination process appears to be sub-
stantially more thorough and systematic than that in Goldberg 
where the single caseworker played such a critical role and 
appear~to have had more discretion with regard to the nature 
and extent of the eligibility investigation. 
Unfortunately, any conclusions that I might have regarding 
the relative dependability of these administrative review 
processes are not supported by any hard data. In Goldberg 
there was no discussion of the precise accuracy of the pre-
termination evaluation process. The Court merely concluded 
that the stakes were too high for the welfare recipient and 
the possibility of error too great to allow termination of 
aid without affording the aid recipient the opportunity to 
have an evidentiary hearing. 397 U.S. at 266. By contrast, 
here the parties have provided statistical information con-
~ 
cerning the accuracy of the administrative procedures. The 
government cites primarily data derived from initial disability 
cases which it contends are reasonably representative of the 
15 
pattern in termination cases. Brief for Petitioners 31 n. 36. 
For example, in fiscal 1973, there were 575,3000 initial 
determinations adverse to worker's initial disability claims, 
but claims were allowed as to only 61,900 on reconsideration, 
only 24,100 after evidentiary hearings, only 1,918 after 
review by the Appeals Counsel (318 after remand from the 
courts), and only 172 by the courts. Brief for Petitioners 
43 at n. 47. From these statistics the government thus 
20. 
emphasizes that a total of 88,090 claims were allowed after 
post-termination review, which constituted only 15% of the 
claims initially denied that year. The government also argues 
that even this theoretical reversal rate is deceptively high 
since the program is operated on an open-file basis and a 
particular termination may be entirely justified, but later 
be reversed because of the introduction of new evidence. 
Respondents contend that since the Court is being asked to 
decide only whether those disabled workers who request an 
evidentiary hearing are to be granted that hearing at the 
pre-termination stage the only pertinent statistics are the 
reversal rate of appealed denials of benefits after an evidentiary 
~earing. As the amici curiae note in their brief, in 
1973 58.6% of all appealed decisions terminating disability 
benefits were reversed following evidentiary hearings while 
in 1972 the reveral rate was 54.7%. Brief for Amici Curiae 
7-8. Certainly these reversal rates are not insignificant. t( 
Cf. Fusari v. Steinberg, 43 U.S.L.W. 4121, 4122 (January 14, 
1975) (reversal rate of appealed denials of unemployment 
benefits of between 19.4% and 26.1% are "significant"). Of 
course, neither the appealed reversal rate nor the overall 
reversal rate statistics alone provide a meaningful basis 
for assessment of the administrative process. The latter 
statistic fails to take into account the many aid recipients 
who although erroneously denied benefits for some reason fail 
to contest that decision. Similarly the former statistics 
21. 
are no doubt unduely weighted by the fact that a disproportionate 
-r"' ... LL number of recipients with strong cases appeal, while those who J/Yv--
have correctly been denied benefits fail to do so. Viewed in 
combination, however, it is difficult not to conclude that there 
is a significant chance of error in the initial determination. 
Another very relevant statistic is the percent of adverse 
initial terminations which result in reversal after reconsidera-
tion. This statistic is particularly important since the 
reconsideration decision is made much sooner after the initial 
determination than the evidentiary hearing. Presumably then, 
if the bulk of the reversals occur at this stage of the 
administrative process, then the real harm to the wrongfully 
terminated recipients is substantially less. The government 
claims that it has no precise data concerning disability 
terminations, but cites data concerning adverse initial determina-
tions in disability cases which show that the bulk of the 
reversals occurs at the reconsideration stage. In 1973, for 
example, of about 35,000 adverse initial determinations, in 
only about 9,000 (25%) was reconsideration sought; in about 
39.5% of reconsiderations in initial disability cases the 
decision is favorable to the worker. Of the 5,600 adverse 
decisions after reconsideration in disability cessation cases, 
in only about 1,900 (34%) was a hearing requested; after a 
hearing in the initial disability cases in about 40-50% the 
decision is favorable to the worker. Brief for Petitioners 31; 
16 
App. A lOa-lla nn. 21, 24. 
22. 
These numbers are meaningless, however, unless one also 
considers the rapidity of the administrative review provided. 
The Amici Curiae contend that disabled workers who dispute 
their claims must wait approximately 12-15 months for an 
evidentiary hearing and that no benefits are paid during this 
period despite the fact that approximately 55% of those who 
appeal are so disabled that they are unable "to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity." Brief for Amici Curiae 8. 
In Fusari where there existed a 126-day delay between the 
initial decision and administrative review the administrative 
appeal system was noted as "torpid". 43 U.S.L.W. at 4123. 
The delay figures cited by Amici, which were derived from a 
March 7, 1975, letter from the Secretary pertain to all types 
of Title II disability cases, including initial and cessation 
decisions. App. A, 4a. According to his letter individuals 
now requesting o. hearing may anticipate a waiting time of 
between 10 and 11 months. Since the evidentiary hearing may 
only be requested after reconsideration, it is thus quite likely 
that 12-15 months will elapse between the initial decision to 
'j~J terminat he hearing. But this situation is ameliorated 
somewhat by the fact that the mean length of time between the 
filing of a reconsideration request and a decision is only 77 
• ~iaV\ • 
86 days wh~le the Me8ft leng~n of t~me for such an interval 
is only 68 days. In his letter the Secretary contends that 
even these numbers somewhat overstate the length of the delay 
in cases such as this--where the original denial is affirmed 
I 
23. 
and notice thus originates directly from the state agency, 
' 
instead of being prepared by the SSA. In those cases he 
time 
estimates the mean and median/periods are 50 and 46 days. It 
is not clear, however, that these statistics are that illuminating 
since they are based on all Title II programs and all types of 
reasons for termination of benefites, including reasons such 
as attainment of age 18, marriage, or cessation of full time 
school employment. It would appear reasonable to conclude 
that assessment of any of these ~ter factors may be substantially 
less complicated than the inquiry necessary to ascertain 
whether medical improvement has made a particular aid recipient 
ineligible under the disability benefits program. This theory 
is borne out somewhat by the statistics cited by the govern-
ment to the effect that in April, 1974 the median processing 
time for all disability cases (including initial applications 
and terminations) were 74 days for reconsiderations resulting 
in affirmances and 105 days for reconsiderations resulting in 
reversals. Brief for Petitioners, App. A lla n. 22. Based 
on these statistics I think a reasonable estimate of the 
current time required to process a reconsideration request 
would be 2.5 to 3.5 months. Ten to eleven months additional 
time would then be require before an evidentiary hearing 
would be provided. 
Whether these delays are regarded as too lengthy in the 
context of the rather small percentage of cases overall which 
are reversed and the rather large percentage of appealed cases 
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which are reversed either after reconsideration (39.5%) or 
later after an evidentiary hearing (55.0%) is dependent in 
part upon one's perception of the i mportance of the recipient's 
interest in uninterrupted benefits and the coststhat would 
be imposed upon government (society) should an evidentiary 
hearing be required prior to termination of any benefits. 
Even though the figures cited by the government concerning 
the administrative costs that would be involved were it required 
to provide a pre-termination evidentiary hearing upon request 
to terminated disability recipients are inflated, see Brief 
for Amici Curiae 20-23 (failure to account for possible 
elimination of the post-termination hearing or decrease in the 
current 10-11 month waiting time prior to hearing; possibility 
of recoupment of overpayments .... ) a reasonable conclusion 
is that some not insignificant addi tional costs will likely 
be incurred by the government. Still, the respondents and 
amici emphasize the important point that the government's 
sole interest here is increased administrative cost. The 
government interest is thus analogous to that in Goldberg 
and distinguishable from that in cases such as Arnett v. 
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (adverse effects of prolonged 
retention of a disruptive employee) (Powell, J., concurring). 
But while the only interest directly implicated here is 
increased administrative costs it should be recognized that 
other important interests potentially are affected. 
Procedural requirements ent~l 1 the expenditure of limited 
25. 
resources. At some point the benefit to individuals from an 
' additional safeguard is substantially outweighed by the cost 
of providing such protection. Most importantly, the cost of 
protecting those likely to be found undeserving will probably 
come out of the pockets of the deserving, since society is 
unlikely to be willing to allocate more than a fixed amount 
of its limited resources to a particular welfare program. 
Thus in determining what process is due one should not 
depreciate the importance of increased administrative costs 
for any increase in these costs eventually will affect the 
level of substantive benefits provided. While lower 
administrative costs cannot justify an arbitrary decision 
making system, since both society and_ eligible_recipients have 
a valid interest in en suring that qualified recipients are 
not erroneously terminated, due process should be flexible 
enough to permit something less than a full evidentiary 
hearing whenever the government denied the individual some 
benefit. 
The remaining question is the relative importance of the 
benefit provided to the recipient and the potential effect of 
an erroneous denial on his well being. The government contends 
that an evidentiary pre-termination hearing was required in 
Goldberg because of the "brutal need" of welfare recipients 
for uninterrupted benefits. By definition a welfare recipient 
is destitute, without assets or funds. The government argues 
that this rationale is not transferable to the disability 
26. 
benefit context since these benefitp are not pr~vided on the 
basis of any demonstrated need and, in fact, a recipient may 
have substantial independent resources. Alternatively, he may 
be eligible for other forms of social welfare assistance during 
the period in which his disability benefits are erroneously 
terminated. To be sure disabled workers as a class are not 
as bad off as welfare recipients. Still, the respondents and 
amici persuasively argue that most disabled workers are almost 
wholly dependent upon their disability benefits. Amici cite 
the fact that in 1965 the mean income of the family unit of a 
disabled worker was $3,803.00 while in that year the official 
government poverty line was $3,223.00. Moreover, they cite 
studies which show that 90% of the severely disabled workers 
have no earnings whatsoever. Brief for Amici Curiae 14-15. 
Still, the same 1965 statistics also show that the mean 
financial assets of disabled workers' family units was 
$4,862.00-~ile the median for a similar group was only $940.00. 
the existence of this asset reserve makes the disabled signficantly 
more able than a welfare recipient to withstand a two-four 
month waiting period for the reconsideration decision, or 
possibly even the much longer period before obtaining an 
evidentiary hearing. On the other hand, a recipient who is 
wrongly terminated is, by definition, unable to engage in 
any substantial gainful activity. The effect of delay on such 
a person and his family may well be serious. Moreover, as the 
amici note, there is certainly no assurance that a terminated 
27. 
disability recipient will automatically qualify for some 
' 
alternative wel:fare program. Id. 17. Again, his situation 
is likely better than the average welfare recipient and the 
administration procedures here prior to the evidentiary hearing 
are arguably better than those present in Goldberg. But given 
the significant rates of reversal, the proBable importance of 
the benefits to the welfare recipients, and the great emphasis 
in Goldberg on the need for and value of an oral evidentiary 
hearing with the right to call and cross-examine witnesses it 
is difficult to conclude that consistent with Goldberg, the 
administrative review system here satisfied due process. On 
the other hand, there are enough distinguishing features so 
that an opinion could be written which, without explicitly 
overruling Goldberg, would sustain the disability 
termination procedures based on the many distinctions developed 
above. 
Should the Court hold that some form of pre-termination 
hearing is required here I think it most important that it 
consider carefully precisely what type of hearing is demanded 
in this context. The answer, of course, is dependent upon 
whether any other prior and subsequent administrative review 
processes are provided and their content. The chief difficulty 
which I have with the Goldberg decision is not its requirement 
that some type of pre-termination hearing be provided but its 
insistance that the form of the hearing so closely duplicate 
a criminal or civil trial. Due process would seem more 
28. 
flexible than this. See generally Joint Anti-Fascist Committee 
' 
v. McGrath, 34t U.S. 123, 171-72 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 Penn. L. Rev. 
1267, 1277-1305. Although it certainly may be infeasible for 
the Court to lay out precisely what due process will demand 
at a minimum in this context, I think that the point should be 
made that the state is not locked into the trial-type format 





1. Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority contains 
an accurate summary of the termination procedures. A more 
detailed description may be found in the district court opinion 
and the Jurisdictional Statement. See Goldberg Jurisdictional 
Statement 4-5; A8-Al2; A-39-40. 
2. Attached is a copy of that Procedure, as well as the 
written notification forms sent to welfare recipients. 
3. For a summary of the procedures involved in return-to-
work terminations see Brief for Petitioners, App. A, 14a-15a. 
4. If no response is received, an appropriate follow 
up is made (by mail or telephone) within two weeks of the 
initial notification. DISM § 353.33B(l)(a). 
5. Attached is a copy of Form SSA-454a, as well as a 
copy of a model notification letter. 
6. Clea~-cut evidence of medical recovery is deemed to 
exist when a beneficiary who was scheduled for a medical 
reexamination returns to full-time work without any significant 
medical restrictions. DISM § 353.2B. 
7. Such summaries of the evidence are "tailored to 
individual case situations and . . . prepared in such a 
manner as to enable beneficiaries to understand better the 
reasons for cessation." DISM § 353.7A 
8. The state agency is obliged to insure that medical 
source evidence used to establish the absence of continuing 
disability is in writing, with the source properly identified. 
DISM § 354.4C. 
b. 
9. The worker is currently not permitted to examine 
medical evidence, although his representative is permitted to 
do so. CM § 7314. See also 20 C.F.R. § 401.3(a)(2). 
~Q. DISM § 353 specifies the format and content of the 
notification letter. The state is given the option of developing 
its own letter in accordance with the guidelines, or adopting 
the "model letter" which is contained in subsection B. No 
information has been presented as to whether the states have 
generally opted for one alternative in preference to the other. 
10. The government concedes that state agencies generally 
do not interview the worker. Brief for Petitioner, App. A, 
7a n. 15. 
11. Neither the CFR, the CM, or the DSM anywhere 
specifies that the reconsideration determination must be 
performed by persons other than those who evaluated the case 
in the first instance. Petitioner cites an observation by 
Robert Dixon in Social Security Disability and Mass Justice: 
A Problem in Welfare Administration 32 (1973) to the effect 
that different persons usually perform the rehearing function. 
Mr. Dixon made an extensive study, commencing in 1970, of the 
social security disability aid program as a consultant to 
the Committee on Grants and Benefits of the Administrative 
Conference of the United States. 
lla. The importance of this limitation is uncertain. 
~without extert assistance1 
On the one hand,tthe worker. likely wou d be unable to evaluate 
effectively or to refute significant portions of the medical 
c. 
information within his case file. But, assuming that many 
workers will be unable to afford counsel or consultative medical 
experts, they will be denied the opportunity to chal~enge 
certain forms of quasi-medical evidence- i.e., probable extent 
of pain and suffering, or probable limitations on worker's 
ability to engage in certain types of physican activity, 
resulting from a particular medical disability. 
12. Although the parties do not focus upon this issue, 
a subsidiary question is whether the investigation team can 
provide the worker with a "fair hearing" since it necessarily 
performs a dual investigatory/adjudicatory role within the 
administrative system. I think that it can perform such a 
dual role consistently with the dictates of due process. 
But this conclusion is not unassailable since one can draw 
an analogy to the caseworker in Goldberg and argue that there 
is a significant danger that these teams will come to view 
their role more as an investigatory adversary than a neutral 
fact-finding body. 
13. A related point is the fact that unless the worker 
is represented by counsel the value of cross-examination and 
oral confrontation in these circumstances is substantially 
less than in the Goldberg context. As Judge Friendly has noted: 
One wonders how Pedro Pe~ales in his claim for 
Social Security disability benefits could have 
effectively subjected specialists in neurosurgery, 
neurology, psychiatry, orthopedics, and physical 
medicine to the "ordeal of cross examination" 
vaunted in Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent - a task 
shunned by most lawyers without special experience 
and often regarded as unproductive even by them. 
d. 
Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1285 
(1975) (citations omitted). Of course, this same logic can be 
used in support of the proposition that free counsel should 
be provided in these circumstances to workers who cannot afford 
retained counsel. Counsel may be thought particularly important 
since the worker is not afforded access to the medical reports 
in his file. 
14. Alternatively I would contend that if a pre-termination 
evidentiary hearing were added to the administrative process 
here, the marginal improvement in the accuracy of the eligibility 
determinations would be less than that achieved by the hearing 
requirement in the Goldberg context, and the incremental cost 
arguably more. 
15. It is difficult to determine whether this 
comparability assertion is valid. Examination of the Congres-
sional Report from which these figures were derived reveals 
that of the 575,300 cases initially denied, only 362,000 were 
denied for failure to meet the disability test. Staff Rep. on 
the Disability Insurance Program, Connn. on Ways and Means, 93 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) Arguably a substantial majority of 
the other denials were based on the recipient's inability 
to satisfy certain more objective cirteria, and therefore 
the "reversal rate" in those cases might be significantly 
lower than the combined average which is cited by the govern-
ment. As a consequence the reversal rate in the relevant 
category of cases- those involving medical recovery- might 
be significantly higher than 15%. 
e. 
16. Again, these statistics are based on all disability 
' 
cases, not just the limited subject in which we are directly 


































·1 1 to Cummissio11er Goldhcr:;'s A.ffillavit of 1'\111 1 T 
· Juue 14·, 1963-Procedurc I\lo. 68-18 
'l'HE Cl'l'Y OF KE\V YOHIC 
DEP:mTlllENT OF SociAL SER\'ICES 
._. 1 ·1 'l'l. Clic11ts ' Right of He,·icw in Cases of Proposed ,~II I I ' • 
~; 1 :-:pt'JJ:-:ion or Discontinu:mcc of J .. ssistance 
To: Administrative Group Case Unit 
Procedure ~ o. GS-18 .May 21, 1968 
CL1ssification 34 Replaces: P GS-15 (34) 
p, . 1 rilndion: C Effective: In~mediately 
I. INTROD'CCTION 
.\ . I'III'J)()SC: \Vith the approYal of the State Depart-
11 •. til of Social Services this procedure implel11ents the 
~~' 11 St:de 11olicy wllicb insures that the clients; rights 
:1 1 ,. protected in cases where it is proposed that assistance 
1.,. ~ ll~JH:mled or cliscolliinucd. This ne1\· lJOlic~- in no way 
Lrtri b the client's right t:o request a Fair Hearing, in 
/ ;, . nrd:1ncc with existing polie~-, and re(1uirc;,; that assist-
:,:,. ,. ht· eontinned until completion of the adm.inisirativa 
I ,. 1·rcw. 
1\ . l 'ruyram: 
J. 'J' lw State Dcpartrnent of Social Services has pro-
lliltlg·atl'd a. new regulation which assures the client of 
111,. opportunity for a DqmrtmenL review by an employee 
' 1 l1o <H·c:npies a position :mpc1·ior to that of the <:mployee 
"lro approved the vroposed diseontinuance or suspension 
of nssisiance. For lJUrpo ses of this vrocedurc, this 








Appendix JJ . - Nrhibit 1 to C01um. Goldberg's Affidavit 
2. In situations, of11er than those listed below, noti. 
ficn.tion n111st be sent to t1Je dicnt of the intent to suspend 
or c1isconi inue nssistmwe seven (7) cnlcncbr days p1ior 1o 
the plmmecl effective elate of such nciion. 
a. death of unattacheu person 
b. admitted to institution (mental, penal, correctional, 
etc.) 
e. client's request for discontinuance of assistance 
d. client's whereabouts unkno\vn and there is no for. 
warding address 
e. client has left the State vcrmanently 
f. reclassification a.s to category 
3. Upon reecipt of info-rmation that the client requests 
an administrative review, the case shall be forwarded to 
the Review OHiccr along ·with all written material sub-
mitted by the client. 
4. The Review Officer shall promptly review the ca.<:e 
reeord, the recommendations of the Cn se Unit and the 
written material, if any, submitted by the client ·with his 
request for a rev1ew. 
5. Immediately after such rev1ew, the R.eview Officer 
shall make an appropriate written determination as to 
whether or not assistance shall be discontinued, detailing 
the relevant facts and including all evidence submitted at 
the time of the review, ns ,,·ell as any reference to· appli-
cable proYisions of the Social Services Law, Rules of tht' 
State Board of Social Welfare and Regulations of the 






I . f) - l~'.rJ,il;if 7 to Co111m. Golduc1"[;'s Affidavit '/,1 
,.d 011 the delr:J ,,,i11:\tiou of the Review OH-iceT;, I ... 
.. 1 · 11 it :-:lwll tab approprin1e aC'-iion (to close 
' .:, : 11 11 , . ns:-:is1nnce) und 11otify the client of the 
'·, • ,
11 
11 iun l.Jy mC<lllS of tl · · approprin.tc Jetter. 
·' ' .. 




.:\otice of I11icnt to Suspend Case Unit 
or l)j i', ,·()ntinuc Assistance 
Xotiec <•f Decision after R.c- · Case Unit 
v icw I o Con iim1c Public As-
sistance 
K otiu~ of Discontinuance of Case Unit 
Publi\· Assistance 
Decisio11 after Review to Case Unit 
Discontinue Public Assist-
ance 
II. DETAILJ1jU lNSTRUC'riONS 
H• •c· ords, in detail, discussion ·with the client and 
,,. ''l'" for ihl' proposed suspension or tlise:oJJtinunnce 
- i~· Ltllt't', ilt• ·lur1i ng the npprop1·iate closing code. 
l'n·pan · Form M-:·k, "Notice of Intent to Suspend 
1 • · • · <Jd im, , .'\ s~:;jstmwr· ", in tri}Jlicate (iwo copies to 
• 11\ tn i lp· dient rmd one <:opy to be rctnined in case 
·· r<l). .\lnl;cs apvropriate case record entry. 
\ "'': (lJ, F'onn 'M-3c, the dates entered in Paragraphs 
nn d :~ ~hall 11(! identical. 
'. 
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Appenrli.r D - F :rhibit 1 to Collllll. Goldberg's Affidavit 
Caseworker 
3. Forw<nd -. ca.se record ancl all copies of Fonn M-3ct 
together wi1l1 a return envelope identified with cnscload 
number, to Unit Supervisor. 
Unit Supervisor 
4. Reviews case record and Form M-3c. If in agree-
ment, signs case record entry and Form ]\[-3c. Arranges 
for immeLlinte mailillg of two eopies to the client and 
retains one copy in case rec.ord. Controls Forms ~I-3c 
and date of their return on separate Form vV-708, headed 
"Proposed Suspension or Disconiilluance of Assistance~'. 
Unit Supervisor 
5. Heview!' Form \Y-708 daily. If client fails to 
respond to Form ~[-3c, within the seven days provided or 
indicates agreement to have bJ.s case closed, instructs 
Caseworker to prepare the necessary forms for closing 
action in accordance with currc:nt procedure, using Form 
M-3h. 
Unit Supervisor 
6. If the client requests a rev1e1v, makes appropriate 
entry on Form \V -708; immediately forwards the case 
record with any written doc.uments, releYant to the pro-
posed action, submitted by the client, to the Review 
i Officer. 
Nate: '11he Case Unit is responsible for all service to 
the client pending the review and receipt of the deter-
mination from the ReYiew Officer either to close the ease 
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7. Immediately reviews the case record and written 
material, if any, submit ted by the client, and prepares a 
memorandum, ::;etting forth the relevant facts and his 
<.letcrmination to continue or discontinue as::;istancc, in-
clnclillg <my reference to <"])plicable provisions of the 
Social Senice::; Law, Rules of the State Board of Social 
Welfare and Regulations of the State Department of 
Social Sen·ices (sec Appendix), and approved local 
policy. 
a. If thC' determination is that assistance shall be con-
tinued, vrq1a.res the memorandmn, in triplicate. For-
wards ori g i11al copy of memorandum with ca se reeord to 
the appropriate Case Unit; forwards duplicate copy of 
the menwr: lJJ dmn to Center Director; retains third copy 
for own file. 
b. If the determination is that assistance shall be dis-
continued or suspended, prepares mcmorandmn, in quin-
tuplicate. H.Ptains one copy for own file; forwards orig-
inal copy of memoran(lnm with c·ase record to the appro-
priate Cn ::;e Unit; for\\'arcls three copies to the Director's 
office where one copy shall be retained in file, and two 
copies forwrnded to the Fair Hearings Section, Ccntrnl 
Office, one for the Commissioner's file and one for the 
State A1·ea Office. 
) 
Unit Supervisor 
8. On receipt of llctcnnination of the Review Officer, 
makes appropriate entry on Form \V-708. Forwards 
case record nud all material to the Caseworker for 
• appropriate action and controls to insure prompt action. 
... 
--
I I I 
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I 
.· ' A44 
Appellrli:r. D- Ji.,' :J:l1ibit 1 to Comm. Goldberg's .Affidavit 
Caseworker. 
9. Takes appropriate action to conii11ue or discontinue 
assistance; preptncs appropriate letter to client \\ith a 
copy to his attorney or representative, if any, and one 
copy to be retained in ease record; makes case cnt n 
detailing action takes; prepares required forms to carry 
out appropriate action in accordance with cmrent proced-
ure. 
LEGAL BASIS FOR, CLOSING CASE 
State Department Regulation 351.26 requires that aft er 
the review, the reviewing officer's decision shall include ref-
erence to applicable provisions of lmY, rules of the Sbir 
Board of Socia.} \Velfare, regulations of the State Depart-
ment of SociR.l Services nnd approved local policy. 
The Social Services Law, Board of Hule:::; and Depart-
ment regulations giYe tbe Commissioner authority upon 
completion of an inYc:::;tiga.tion to suspei1d, increase, 
decrease or revoke a grant in cases where such action is 
based on the clement of Deed, as follows: 
SOCIAL SEHVICES LAW 
Section 134-" Snell person shall be visited. ., in order 
that assistance or care may be t,ri.ven only in such amount 
and as long as is necessary .. .. " (All catt·gories) 
Section 214 ( OAA)-" ... the amount and mmmer of 
giving assist.anee may be changed or the assistance ma:· 
be withdrawn if such officinl finds that the recipient 's- cir-
cumstances have changed sufficiently to warrant such ar-
tion. It shall be within the power of the social sen-ice~ 
offic.ial at any time to cnncel and re\·oke assi.s1 Ftncc for 
cause, as he may deem proper, ... " 
·or di l'<'oJtlin .,, 
cli('ll \ 11 itlt .. 
any, and !l! ,< 
es ea~e t•nt 1) 
)l111s to c:t l'1) 
nrcn1 Jl l"llt' ' .! 
ASE 
·cs thnt aft.-: 
1ll inc1nt1 l' rl r. 
; of 1lll' ~t.il 
Statc> D,•patl · 
10Jicy. 
:md l)1·par\ 
1ihoriiy npo1 : 
nd, ilH'Il' :l '• t, 
mel! :tl'l ion I· 
'tl 0 I t 1 I' I ., 1 
sueh :tlllll lltt! 
gorics) 
::1. llli\llll\'1' ,1( 
sisi.anct· II J:I~ 
~cipit·Jlt •,.. t' it· 
·ant suelt llt' · 
lcial scn·it't'! 
ssisbJH'l' f .. r· 
.---"' . ... -.r .......--. . . 
A45 
, l/'l'' 11 di.r n !--'.~ l1il;it 1 to Cum111. Go!dbert!'s Aj}idavit 
,. ·'<..;li(:2) (.\13) - -'' 'l'lw :tlllOtmt nncl nature of the 
,.; , . , tllll - · 
' ' _. .. t:tllt't' :tnd ihl' JJJ< lllll l'l' of pro,·idiltg it shall be deter-
;•·. ). I ]J\' j]J(' ~o<'inl f..(•)'\ 'iC'CS omciHl with due· n·garcl to the 
tH t iP'' · . . . • 
lil ion~ e:-:i shng m rnch u1 sc nnd m :t(·.c·orcbnce w1ih 11 • )11 
l 
..... 11 ]-JiioJJ S of the Dq)m·tmcmi." 1 II' It,.., • 
~ .. ·tioll :103, subdivi:"iou (2) (AD) - "'l'h0 :1HJOunt and 
• ,
11 
lll'l' of tlte aiel [tJHl 1hr manner of providing it shall be 
,\ ; krlllill('l1 h~- ih e socird s <~ JTiccs officials with due r egard 
111 tin• t•ontlitions existi11g in the case in nccorclm1ce ·with 
tlw pn1\· i ~ ions of this title, or other proYi ~ ions of t1Jis 
, ) 1:iJ11••r, ihe rules of th e bo~ncl and the regulations of the 
f\ 1•J >:1 rt tnent. '' 
:~ .,·tinn :l:JO, sulx1iYi sion 2 U1DC) - "allowances (a) shall 
~~~ >! ],,. gT;micd for a p0riocl of longer ihan that prescribed 
1! 1 t lw rt1lcs of 1l1e lJoarcl ~md regulation s of the Depart-
11;, 11 t, :-: ulljL~ct to renewal from time to time. 
(l1) ~Lly be imren sed, decren sed or l~eYoked at any 
I i lilt'." 
~~·~·tioJJ i3G5a (1\f:\ )-''The nmount, nnture nnd manner of 
p1 m·iding medwaJ assist an ce for need~- persons sha 11 be 
.t~ · t•·nllinc·tl by 1l1e social se lTices officials .... in accord-
.llll. <' with the lol'nl mcc1ic:nl plan, the proYision of the title 
(I 1), i he rules of the board and regulations of the Depart-
IIH'IIL '' 
BO.:\.RD RULE 
~:!.1 (a) (1) - " Pnblie assistance and care shall be granted 
'lltly so long, and in such form am1 mnount, a.s is necessi-
IH!t-<1 by 1he needs of the recipient in the light of his 
'" ~onrees." (All categories) 
STA'l'E DJ!JP .AR'l'.JIE?\'1' HEGULA'l'IONS 
:: .·,1.~2(c)-"\Yhen an agency Yerifies ineligibility or a 
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Az)pendi:-c D -Exltiuit 1 to Comm. Goldberg's Affidavit 
to reduce, in(·n ·u~;c , or <1i s<.:oJ l1inue ilw grant for ille next 
payment period possible under existing payment.' proced-
ure." (All e:1tcgorics) 
For those closings where there io illcligibility for reasonil 
other t}Jan need, in addition to the foregoing, the follow -
ing referenecs to Jaw, rule or regulation nw.y be included: 
Closing Codes 
40-47 
Soc:ial Services Law 349 
Board Rule 80.1 
State> Department Hegula-
tiom, 369.2, 369.3 
'' Polic·ies Go,'eming ihe Ad-
mini . .;t ration of Public As-
sisl:"mce ", Section 32 
48 and 49 Sorial Services Law 131 (4) 
State Department Regulat -
ions 351.3 and 369.2 (7) 
50 
53 
Social Services Law 131 ( 4) 
State Department Regula-
tions 251.3 and :168.2 
Social Services Law 321, 360 
State Department Regula-
tion 352.8 
"Policies Go,·erning the Ad-
ministration of Public As-
sistance", Chapter VI 
ADC and T-ADC 
• 




























































"Policies Govenling the Ad-
HlinistruJion of Public As-
sistrmce' ', Section 165 
Soeiul Services Law 131 
(5b), 350b 
State Dcpar1ment Regula-
tioDS :~51.3, 369.2(7) 
State Department Regula-
tion 351.1 
Soeia1 Services }_;aW 352 
State Department R.egula-
tion 369.1 (b) 
Contact }.;egal Division 
·where there is a contulUi1lg 
neecl, there is uo legal l)nsis 
for dosiug a case for misnse 
of funds. State Department 
Regulation 352.5 (n) (1) 
provides for c1np1ication of a 
grant in whole or pa.rt when 
the origina1 check or pro-
ceeds were allegedly lost, 
• stolen, or lliveri.ecl to othe-r 
purposes, when the health 
and sufety of the recipient 
would be threatened · by a 
failure to replace. Consid-
eration should be given to 
restriction of a grant, or 
transfer to some other form 
of a.ssistancc or care . 













Appendix; D-- l~'.r l1ibit 1 to Comm. (Joldbag's Affidavit 
(Elll bl<'m) 
(LC'1 1 crhcad of) 
THE Crn.- OF NBw YoRK 
DEPA R.T:\!1~:\''l' OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
NoTICE OF Il\TE:!\T 'l'o SusPE:::\D OR Drsco:!\TINUE 
Pn.!LIC AssrSTAXCE 
Case Number 
This is to advise yon that this Depa,rtment intends to 
0 Suspe11d 0 Di!:>continne your pnblic assistance grant 
, for the followi11g reasons: 
If you feel thnt your public assistance grant should not be 
suspended or discontinued, you may request a revie·w of 
your record by a Re,·ie"· Officer on or before 
You may also submit rmy ,Jatcment or docmnent which 
may establish your neecl for pnl1lic assi stnnce. Yon han~ 
the right to submit this written material through an at-
torney or any representa1 i\·c of your choosing. 
If you wish a review, please mark an X in Box No. 1, 
below. If you clo not wish a review, please rnark an X i11 
Box No. 2, below. If you fail to reply, we will assume 
that you agree with the action the Department proposes 
to take. 
Box ~ o. 1: 0 I request a Review 
Box 1\ o. 2: 0 I do not request a Review 
. . . 





































Jp]H;ndix D -~R:x:hibif 1 to Co111m. Goldbc·rg's Affidavit 
p]L'a~c rdnrn a copy of il1is lei tor in the enclosed self-
:~t1drcssed enYclO]Je <llld k<><'p the o1her eopy of ihis letter 
for your records. 
If, nficr this reYiew, you are still di ssa tisfied with tho 
decision given you, yon may request a Fair Hearing, 
in writing or orally, by communicating wit.h the State 
DL'partment of Soeial Services at 270 Broadway, New 
York, N. Y. 10007, 'relcphone Number 488-6550. 
lliere follows n Spanish Tran slation of the same ] 
( J~mblc'm) 
(LC'tterheacl of) 
Trm CITY oF NEW YORK 
DEPAR'l'~lENT Olr SOCIAL SERVICES 
NoTICE oF DECISION, AFTER REv1p;w, 
To CoNTIKt.:E PuBLIC A ssiSTANCE 
After careful coll sideration of all the factors ;.ml docu-
nwnt.s you prc'sented, \\·e are in agreement that you are 
slill eligible to receive public assistance. 
Please inform your Caseworker of any change in your 
c·ireumstances that affects your need for assistance. 




·-· • . "' ·~ . ... . ... ... ;:;# ,..-; J ... ~ • .,.. ! . ' 
A 51 
(Lettcr1Jca.cl of) 
Tm~ CtTY oF NEW YoRK 
:;o·nc£ oF ]lr<eiSIO~, AJo'l'ER R•vmw, ·ro ]lmco''"~oE 
Pun1Jrc AssJSTANCE 
Case Nu;ubcr 
.I fl <'1' ca refnl conoidera\ ion by a RevieW Officer of all the 
f
0
,·1<>''' ,n>tl clocu>nents you presented, it )Jas been clceidcd 
1 hal e ff<'e.\iv<> iunocdi a\ ely yon arc not eligible to receive 
. ---- ----- for the followi11g reasons: 
Yon"'")' wish to review the plllllphlet which was given to 
~ "" at \1o• \ ime of your up)llication. It e,plaillS the pro· 
v\ , \nns)nulcr w·hich this type of public assistance is granted 
"' "\ yo o ,. r· \ gh Is with respect to review of this decision. 
If yon arc clioeatislied with tllis decision you maY request 
n Fn \ r \1 c arir>g, in writing or orally, by commm>icating 
"\I h tlw S\ a\ c Department of Social Sen·iccs, 270 Broad· 
"oy, ;\ ew York, N. Y. 10007, 'relephone 01 umber 488-6550. 
\'on will soon rccei ve iof o rma ti on con ce ruing your eli<ri · 
I' iIi I Y f u ,. 'on\ i u u ed assist nn ce under the ~1 edical A.ssistar~cc 
I'' "~ rn m n s Jn·ovided by the New York State ~lcdicaid 
\•rogram. 
I\\,.,-,; follows a Sya1rish Translation of the smne] 
l -· 
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Appc11dix !J - R.rhilJit 1 to Counn. Goldberg's Affidavit 
( JGm blvm) 
I 
(Letterhc·ad of) 
THE CnY OF NEw YoRK 
DEPART~II~Xrr OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
NoTICE OF DrscoxnxuAXCE oF PunLrc AssiSTANCE 
(Prepare in Duplic.ate) 
Our investigation shows Umt effective immediately you 
are not eligible to recei-.;-e --------------
for the following reasons: 
You may wish to review i he pamllhlet which ·was given to 
you at the time of your applic:1tion. It explains the pro-
visions under IYhich this t)·pe of public assisinllce is gr<mtetl 
and your rights wiih respect to review of this decision. 
If yon arc dissatisfied with this decision you may ·request 
a Fair Hearing, in writing or orally, by communicating 
with the State Department of Social Seniccs, 270 Broad-
way, New York, X. Y. 10007, 'l'clephone Number 4-SS-G::i:iO. 
You will soon rcceiYe information concerning your eligi-
bility for continued assistance under the :Meclieal Assis1am<· 
Program as proYiclecl by t.he New York State Mcdicajd 
Program. 
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6746. Form S:'A-·15-1 (u) (Socia l Securi ty Di,:tl>ilil)' Dcneficiory R<·J><> rl ) (Sec ~ 6705. 1) 
Refer to 
Socinl f.:ecuri ty I:umber Dat e 
~'hen your dlsability p:!:r.::oe!"lts be.;"n , you .,.:ere notifi~d by the Social 
Security Ad::'lini stri!t jon t~at your cond.i tion ::-.i£}:t L-:.;.rove ar.d your 
claim \.:as scheCuled for a !'utur'! revie'..'. The ~ocial Security 
AC:D.inistra~ion has rec',.J.ested us to dev"'lO'C c\!!'re:;t evi!e:-.ce as to 
wheth-2r yoW" c ur.t!i tio:~ still p ·events y')U~ :'ro:r. ·,•orki!lg . 
To help us d(·terr.:ine .... :-.e~~ . er you are still e;,t~tlec! to di::;ability 
benefits, ,FlcE:se ar:s•.,·er the qu~st:!.ons on tr.e next t':'.ree ;at:es , sigu 
your na:r:e at the 'cott:::., ani :-etU!'n ~~e ~0:"::1 ·.:"it~:n t-:1 r:.c:n u.:;ing th~ 
encl osed envel o;:e \o:hic:;. .req_uires no restage . 
If at any tirr.c ::.o:-di cal e·lid·~ncl! sho·.,s :.h&t your C"::l!'l-!i tion r..e.s L .... prove d 
so r..uch tl:at you fl.te r.o lont;er di:;nbled , you o:il l still receive bene:!'its 
f or ll 3~r..'=>nth ;..eriod c~ aC..ju:;t::-.-ent. This ~er!.od ir..cluC.es t::.'! :r.onth in 
.,:hich your cond.!tio!1 :.::-.;r':'lve s 2.:1d 2 adG.:tio:Jal tr.onths. Eenefits •,.:ill 
t hen be stopped. 
If you ha·te questions c; need help in fill!.::; o'J.t the' :;,·J~stio:-_'1aire , 
please telerhone or vis!.t any s:~cial security office. You can find the 
address in t.ne telep;-..:::;:~ di:rec:ory -.:..'iC..er "Social Security A:.tiinistration, ,, 
or asl-. ut y-:,ur local ;~n·t office. If j'OU visit the sccie..l security office: 
pl ease bring this lett~r ···.'lt.n yvu . 









·.:. .. !.·~c; t~.~ 
f ... _;:::-~v·i 
·; '! b~:~e~!.ts 
:-. .,~::1 in 
:ts wi:!.l 
----~1.:-e • 
-. !'ind the 
-
___.,_... - f' ........ ~-~.~--:~·;J:: 
" •-'t ., 
SOCIAL IECIJ~ITY DII>BILITY BENEFICIARY llU'OKT -------------------
I vnJettlancllhot 1hi1 repof! will be vlf'J to verily ·""Y c:onltn\liM ('li r,p bdi ty lo l..c:,cfd.i and •h o,.ld il be cl~r­
lemined 1hol I om no lonr.~er enti!led, b!"nelits wdl ~ ter M•Ilt 
INSTRlJCTIOIIS FOR COIAPLUING TilE rO RM 
Answ~r ~ach que\ lion as fully as pouible. 
If any qve~lion doe\ not apply Ia you, writo "none" in th• spec• pro ... ided. 
If you nee-d more sp'l C: C to answer u question, uu r&,e ~ck of this form oro separate sheet of popor. If you uu 
o sepa rate sheet of ~per, please be sure to put yovr so cia l security claim nvm~er on it. 
- ----·---·----------------------
Answrr oil ports of the fol!owi ng quutions: 
1. (a) Do you feel youc m~dic~l cor.lition h;as i-. rr:~•ed so dut you uc able to rcl\lrn to w::~cl.:? 
QY" 0 No If No, upf.aia below. 
(b) }-{u your doctN cold you rhat you arc able t':l ret~;trl to wock? 
0He uid Yes 
0 He: uid ~o 
If the anS.,.CC is }"CI, wht.>n? __________ (ti~•t d~td 
Q lfe did not uy 
(c) 1-hs he placed ::Hl)' signi!ic.A r'lt rnrrictions o ."': t~e kir.d of work you may do oc bow ::ca~y r.ours a e..y 
you mJ.y we:\:? 
0Yu HYc:s, uphin below 
Describe below in yoliC o"·n ..,. o:d" rour prcse:-;t condido:'l~ be sure to list • ·hu you bc:lievc- rou :are 
unable to do in terms of lifting, bending, pus:O,ing, etc., that iruccfctC'S with )' OW" "o: l.:.iog av-in. 
33A 








~·~-----------------------------------------~,~.~-~ •• ~ .• ~o~N~<~•~u•~•~•~•--~----
(c)NAMt Ofl' P7<~ ;";;;~·:-;:;-; .. --,-,-,-,-0-.-,-,-,.-,<--·----------------------t:.,-,,-.::,:,-c-_.:-:.,:-,:-:.~.,-.~T~<D:--------
~~u~~.;------------------------------------------~.~.,~.:-:.~ ..~o,~<:C•--u~"-:,~,~.--------
3. lh.vc you 'Wvrkcrl in the pa~c 12 mon1hs? 
0 No 0 Yes I f ''Yr..r," be sru~ to corntJf~tr. all of th~ follou.ing item$. 
ft:i· ... ,;-;:-,-.;;;;.·,;;-;,~~-,;;;;:;;;:; o• '""'"''" (>)"'"" o• •O•• oo;.~-- ----------
jrrr;;;,c: 1'0V J rn.~ "OII:Kt.,C:I 





----~-- - ---------- .. -"" . ... -~ ... .. .. . . .... . ..... - . , 
•. , ... ,u '''· c. I 
L "]No [ J Y•• If 




f':n!er here or,y gddllional inforrn?ri~., tha t yow believ• ; , ;,.,porion! a nd well css•ll il'l
1
ri-• 
tev iew of your continuing en! itl e """" ' to soc ia l u curi ty d•sobility benef1ts Uf )'::IU '"fJ ... ore 
J,pa ct, uu 11 :Jefuuat ~ thrtf o f P"P''· Also, if yo 11 uist, )OM ,G)' tttriiC'b a11y u•!r"'t:t tf.sr 
ahowt )OUr Cllfftflf co,ditir·,r,) 
1-------- -----------------------
1--------------------
6. Do you outhorire any phy JO iciol'l, hospital, oge.,cy, or other Or~oni:.otion IO d i sclose ~0 t l.. e s~.::.cl Se :~.ority 
Adm inistrcl ion or IO the S1 o~ o o;ency thor moy rev ie"" your enr.de~ent for conttr'lui"' g d, s: b:l,ry be•ef111, 
ony med ical rec o rds or other informorion obovt your disability? 
ov .. CNo 
I certify that tho above s tolements ore tru e, correct, ond COI'"" ;ll ete to the but of m'7· J.:,.,Qwle~;e. I lt 'l.o .... t..c t 
onyene ... ho froud ule"'tly conceols or foils to report o dis~uol i fyir.g e v ~ nt or who mo(~s o f=lu 11.1' e- e., t :.r 
repruenlotion o f a mol~rio-1 foc t for Ule in det•rminin; a riv h t to payment vnc~, the So.:•cl Su:wr 't A:· :o .. !d 
be svbjtct too (ine or imprisonment or bo th . 
· ~· vou• •••<" vou u•u'CcY wo<Tt OT I o"t 1•""'' '"""" 
If tho oddrua shown on poge one of this for:-n is incorrect or incomplete pl eou • ., !er yo.Jr ,;:·u~_":' edd·es 1 
below 
NUI.IBtR AHO ITI'IET, AI"AAT ... f.HT .'10,, I",Q, I:IJ', 0" RU ,.. AL. ,..O Y TE 
CITY STAT( 
35A 























67·19. Form SSA--1S·t (Ticpor! of C:onlinuin;; Oi•nllilily Tn!eni•·"') 
I. MEDICAL CAR( AHO lR[ATME t~T 
Ha r tlu tlo;..,.,,. l>con ••o..,;.,.cf, hoe~toJ, o• J..ot.pihliud tinco tJ..o lo•l Gpll'l;cotool\ 01 loti ,,.,,;,..,tnt tlitobilhy 
lnvuti~otlon! Qvts O~o~o (1/'')'u," ro,..pl~lt '~'aut uc-..J 
O.t. Tt ~ Wi"lf:H 
CL.AIIoiAiotf SCC!ol 
)d.,,tifyoll 
10vrcot that ho.,. ~·-----------·------------+--------




l ion o• '""''""';" - ------------·------------+--------
d'tobol.ryo"'·~ "•'''i"'•on, 
:·::~:·::· .. ·~... . ____________________ _J_ _______ _ 
-"' ·"' ....... ---------------------------
11(>/'>t plocot:lbr 
tho clanr,ont' t -------- ------------------~---
pht•• iciafl. I 
~,.~ ~~~·,: :;:~:~ -1---------·---- --------------------
MOI'\I 
o Oct•• 
• c ...... o, ... . 
Clllndtl!on 
II. P ROCRnStON Of CONDITION 
If )'OI, clttc,b o Hll"l! t ho•o been tmy cloon9- 1 "' •r'"'J:tOmt, phytocol lu•H!Ohor>l, ot e>tl•~•l•lt tone• the l o•t i"' <lnoew? 
r..ll yo1tch•ni u Ov u O~>~o 
incondol>on(with 
de~h•) 1ince fo1t 
.......... !--------------------
,o ...... SSA-45• .. .. ., 
44A 
___,......--·~· 
.. ~~ v; 
Yil • 
'\ ,..,... .... 
•o u ( • .,o. 
' i i ' ~ ' ''Y 
.. . ,.\ .... .. 




--~· -··-·r -·----- --------- ............ --- -----
1!1. CU RRnO C OtiOITIO~ 
----·------~------
o., u !W in •h• 
- - - --- ----·---- ------ ------------j~~,;~ ~o~: ~::.ho t 
condi1oon ,.,., . nrlr 
--·--- - ----- --- - - ----- -----·-·------!,nt• •l• ••• w.rh 
hi t cl.ilily lo 
·------------ -------·--·-- ---t"Mk. 
I V. 01t. 'l '!" ACTIVIT IES 
--------- --- --- -------- --- - - - --,!Ou c-r ibe o•.! r th o 
OCi oor it,.lofo 
- - - ---- ------------------ ---------\',':,:: :1 .. !:;.';"' 
.... , •• h., .. ... 
- ---- ---- ----- -------- - - -----------jloor •• pon .. d. 
o PJ,r t i col 
--- --------- -------- - - ------ - - ----i : ~: ~ ::~ ...... 
ot cll l.oo l t • tf • 
,cc••• ct ui• ..:lon 
----- .,- ----------------- - ------,-- - jca rino;;loo P•'" 
,a., o lno od• . 
V. EF f ORT S TO WORK- Hot tJ, o clo; rnonl p u l., rn od .,... , work t inu tho utabl i • hocf on ,.t J!Ste rho! •• not ducr obocf i~ 1h o 
f il o"? 0 YCS 0 "' 0 (lf.,)'u ", U>.., l' l~ u '" OA-0, 11 /II' roclo 10•) 
VI . VOC .t. TIOHAL R FHABILIT ATION- 1, th e lanelocio•y b ~r i ,;9 c:on t • cf ~r r~cf for o rr o c o•v in t • • • ~ ' "' " foo101 o• th1ov9h rho Srot o 
Vo uodo,. ol Rehobol i tottCW"I A9 ' "c:r"? 
0 YU 0 NO (!/ :• ru ," ,.c .. •r! ~ I ) rll r ,....., .. . ,, DJJ· ~" o/ rl r c o~, • rl<>t ""d u•...,ci•l. 
o/fic ~, (1) •-'• l )?f to/ " '"''" h o• t ' ' "'" ' d.) 
VII . OBSER VA TION S - Aro t h ~r o ll e 11 • d impoi rm11'1r{1 ) c b,. r .. ablo"? QYf'S O •o 0 l(l (. PHO~( (.O ~ TACT 
Htetit~a: 0Yu ON• Conlpu·hrt~dtn & Qru {_j '• (hod oach " • "' lo l ho loftto 
lln of tu nd t Bu Athi nt QYu Q !-lo On cl oc a u ... hothor 
.Si a: ht O Y .. 0No t l'ld arm• 0Yu ON• Siui " t o r .. 0 No Ol nOioryd ollo• 
Rudin & Q Yu 0No 1'ritin & QYu ON• 'l'~~olkin t CJ '"" LJNo c .. hy W OI 
Rupondi l'lt 0l'u 0No Spu l in& 0Ycs ON• Othc- t 0 Yu L:J ~· cb•• •., • d. 
·. (l cr;l,.. , ufly 
----------- ---------------- -------- -j . c . n . rol c r p• ••· 
o fhho•i or 
---------------;--~-----------------( o O .. tw o•d 
.. ..... d. 
e Ci•c""''' • nc• • -------------------------------- -1 , .,.,r,..,nd on lll h o 
in• ••" ••• 




September 24, 1975 
No. 74-204 Mathews v. Eldridge 
My Tentative Thinking 
I have reviewed the briefs (although not as thoroughly 
as I hoped to) and Greg Palm's excellent memorandum of 
September 15. The case is close, and I will await the oral 
argument and the Conference discussion before making a decision. 
The "gut" issue is whether this case may be distinguished 
from Goldberg. Absent that decision, I would have no doubt 
as to the constitutional adequacy of the elaborate administrative 
procedure provided to determine whether social security 
disability benefits should be terminated because of an end 
of the claimant's disability. 
I start with the statute which requires, for continued 
entitlement to the benefits, that the worker must demonstrate 
he is unable: 
"To engage in any substantial gainful activity 
by reason of any medically determinable physical 
or mental impairment .... " 
The central distinction between this case and Goldberg 
could well turn on the fundamental difference in the natury~ 
aA.. ole ..,.~.-.t..IH..~ ~ 
of the relevant inquiry. As Greg's memo notes, the decision ~ ~ 
often will turn upon "questionable credibility and veracity" 
of witnesses with respect to facts comprehensible to laymen. 
-k,~~ 
In this case, the issue will usually ~tt!!'Jil ttl'en the unbiased 




Other differences that, in light of the difference in 
the nature of the inquiry, include: 
(1) The relevant information is elicited by a written 
questionnaire • wh+eh ~ claimant may seek assistance in filling~ 
~ 
out. He may obtain this from the welfare authorities with or 
without counsel, as he pleases. 
(2) Much of the information called for by the questionnaire 
will come from medical sources rather than the recipient or 
lay persons. Such sources (doctors) can communicate more 
effectively through written documents than welfare recipients 
who were before the Court in Goldberg. 
(3) The claimant of continued disability benefits has 
full access to his files. Either he or his representative 
can prepare his claim and questionnaire after having reviewed 
the agency file. He will thus have an opportunity to "confront"-
at least to challenge - adverse information in the file. 
(4) The initial "decision-maker" is relatively independent. 
The first step is taken by a team composed of a physician and 
an employee of the state agency. But their tentative con-
elusion is reviewed by a third party in the state agency• 
~J'Uk'~ 
(Presumab1y a sort of review officer), ~ has the questionnaire 
1\. 
and such addi tional information as the claimant may wish to 
71.c... c..,., • ... • •• 1--r tA• { • . 
present . ~~i,eh comes to the review officer directly from the 
" claimant, rather than through the initial investigating team. 
(5) The entire process, consisting of multiple opportunities 
f or the claimant to obtain administrative relief )is significantly 
.. 
3. 
more tailored to safeguard the rights of the claimant than the 
procedure in Goldberg. (See Greg's memo pp. 6-10). 
Perhaps the s t rongest argument made by respondent is that 
the post-termination de novo hearing before an administrative 
judge involves substantial delay - up to 12 to 15 months 
according to amicus curiae.* 
Respondent also emphasizes that of the cases ultimately 
heard by an administrative law judge, a reversal rate is high. 
But this figure must be considered in light of the total number 
of cases processed and disposed of by the administrative 
procedure without ever reaching the full adversary hearing 
stage. 
ss 
The following language in Goldberg is relevant: 
"Partticularly where credibility and veracity 
are at issue, as they must be in may termination 
proceedings, written submissions are a wholly 
unsatisfactory basis for decision. The secondhand 
presentation to the decisionmaker by the caseworker 
has its own deficiencies; since the caseworker 
usually gathers the facts upon which the charge of 
ineligibility rests, the presentation of the 
recipient's side of the controversy cannot safely 
be left to him. Therefore a recipient must be 
allowed to state his position orally. Informal 
procedures will suffice; in this context due 
process does not require a particular order of 
proof or mode of offering evidence." 
L.F.P., Jr. 
*In Fusar~ we commented on a delay of 126 days as being "torpid". 
But· ~n Fusari, the administrative safeguards afforded the 
claimant were elementary and not comparable to those presently 
involved. 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 74-204 - Matthews v. Eldridge 
During the conference discussion of this case last 
Friday, I made the observation when it carne my turn that 
although on balance I disagreed with the views .that had 
b e en expressed by Potter and Byron as to the effect of 
Sa lfi on the jurisdiction here, I thought them quite 
r e asonable. At that time I was under the impression 
that there were two possible approaches to the case~ but 
upon reviewing what we have here of the record, I now 
think there are three possible approaches, and that while 
either of two ar~ consis~with Salfl, the third is not. 
These three positions may summarized as follows: 
(1) Because of the nature of the constitutional 
claim based on Goldberq v • . Kelley, that claim may be 
brought in the District Court · immediately upon the cutoff 
of benefits, without making any effort even to present 
that claim to the Secretary, despite§ 405(h)~ 
~{- (2) Because of the nature of the constitutional 
'A·~~~~~ claim based on Goldberg v. Kelly, it may be separated 
~~~;~;~ from the claim on the merits for restoration of disability 
~~~~~ j~ benefits, ~ once the procedural claim has been presented 
~~ to the Secretary and rejected, an act1on may be brought in 
~~~he District Court even though a final decision on benefits 
~ - ias not been rendered; 






(3) Because of the language of§ 40S(g) referring 
to final decisions of the Secretary, no action may be 
brought in the District Court under§ 405(g), even on the 
procedural constitutional claim, until the Secretary has 
finally resolved the claimant's continued entitlement to 
benefits. 
Although my misunderstanding may have arisen from 
lack of sufficient attentiveness to the Conference discussion, 
I 
I don't think those who were in favor of upholding 
jurisdiction here, particularly Potter and Byron, 
differentiated between (1) and (2). In my opinion (2) 
would be uite a reasonable accommodation between our-
construction of the applicable jurisdictional statutes in 
Sa fi and the necess1ty that a constitutiOnal clain\ based 
on Goldberg v. Ke ly be presente o JU 1cia determination 
early in the dispute, bUt Tl} would be a complete repudiation 
not only of Salfi but of the language that Congress used in 
conferring jurisdiction on the district courts. 
Under Salfi, there cannot be any doubt, I think, 
that respondent's claim here was one 11 0n any claim arising 
under [Title II of the Social Security Act} 11 as that term 
is used in 42 u.s.c. § 40S(h) and was construed in Salfi 
at pages 4-5 and 8-9 of the slip opinion. At page 9, we 
said: 
11 It would of course be fruitless to contend 
that appellees• claim is one which does not 
arise under the Constitution, since their 
constitutional arguments are critical to their 
complaint. But it is just as fruitless to 
argue that this action does not also arise 
under the Social Security Act. For not only 
- 3 -
is it Social Security benefits which 
appellees seek to recover, but it is 
the Social Security Act which provides 
both the standing and the substantive 
basis for the presentation of their 
constitutional contentions." 
In his pleadings, Eldridge alleged that he had been 
receiving disability benefits pursuant to the Act, but 
that they had been stopped (appendix, pp. 1-2). He then 
prayed that the Secretary be commanded "to immediately 
transmit unto your undersigned plaintiff, his wife and 
infant children the disability benefits checks for the 
month of August, 1972 and all subsequent months thereafter 
until such time as your undersigned plaintiff is afforded 
a hearing under the alleged change of condition claim by the 
Department • • • • " (appendix, page 3). 
Surely if Salfi's claim was one arising under the 
Act, so also is Eldri~e's. 1s means a e only 
basis for jurisdiction in federal court is section 405(g) 
of Title 42, and that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is unavailable. 
The former section, of course, permits judicial review 
"after any final decisionbf the Secretary", and Salfi was 
I 
at pains to point out that constitutional claims could be 
considered on such review. 
It could be argued that because of some of the language 
in section 405(g) judicial review of any sort is available 
only after a final determination by the Secretary on 
termination of disability payments. This would, of course, 
wholly frustrate maintenance of respondent's Goldberg v. 
Kelly claim, since that claim is one seeking restoration of 
benefits before any such determination. We read§ 405(g) 
in a commonsense manner in Salfi, in order to avoid 
- 4 -
requiring someone to go all the way up the administrative 
ladder to the Secretary when the government had not 
indicated such review was required by departmental 
regulations. Here I think we could equally well construe 
the lan uage of§ 405(g), part~cular y ~n l~ght of its 
distinction between f~ndings" and "decisions" in its 
text, to mean that a constitutional claim such as 
respondent asserts here mus e presente to the Secretary 
or his delegate, but that ~t may be separated from t e 
claim on the merits in order to enable respondent to 
obtain judicial review of that aspect of the claim without 
waiting for a final determination of the entire proceeding. 
This would avoid any implication that Congress intended to 
preclude any practical opportunity of asserting a Goldberg 
v. Kelly type claim, and would still be faithful to the 
explicit language of 405(h). 
If (2) above is adopted as the proper meaning of 
the statute, Eldridge is still allowed to make his 
procedural claim at a time when he may still benefit from 
it but must have alerted the Secretary or his delegate 
of the claim and given them some opportunity to respond 
to it. In addition, under§ 405(g) he must bring his 
action in the District Cour~ithin sixty days after the 
Secretary has turned down his claim for a pre-termination 
heari~~· It seems to me that this reading would serve to 
effec~hat I take to be one of the principal values of 
the third sentence of§ 405(h), safeguarding the Social 
Security Trust Fund against unanticipated liabilities which 
the Secretary has had no chance to deal with administratively. 
If interpretation (1) is accepted by the Conference, it 
will open the door to potential massive claims against the 
fund. Eldridge can simply go into the District Court, 
l allege that his payments have been cut off, and assert that he represents a class consisting of all others similarly situated. Under (1) this class is potentially almost limit-
less, and while a judgment in their favor might not produce 
a bonanza for the individual claimants, it surely would be 
one for their lawyers. Under (2), however, the limitations 
on actions found in§ 405(g) would significantly circumscribe 
any potential class of beneficiaries. Eldridge could only 
bring his action on behalf of those persons who had not 
only asserted the Goldberg claim to the Secretary, but had 
- 5 -
asserted it within sixty days of the filing of Eldridge's 
complaint in the District Court. 
The third position, which would perhaps be slightly 
/ 
more faithful to the language of 405(g), would for practical 
purposes prevent the assertion of a Goldberg v. Kelly type 
of claim in Social Security litigation. I do not think the 
language should be read this way if such a reading can be 
avoided. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 u.s. 361 (1974)~ 
Thus my tentative conclusion is that if Potter and Byron 
were opting for a position along the lines of (2) above, 
I could certainly agree because of the constitutional 
implications, although I think it might entail some bending 
of the statutory language. If they were opting for position 
(1) above, I would regard it as a total repudiation of 
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Powell,J. ~ Rehnquist , J. 
MEMORANDUM 
' TO: Mr. Gre3 Palm DATE: December 11, 1975 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 74-204 Eldridge v. Mathews 
I hsve spent most of the afternoon reviewing, hurriedly, 
your first draft of 12/8/75. I rush to dictate this memorandum 
this afternoon so that you will have some guidance - even though 
far less than I would normally give you - as to what I think 
needs to be done as promptly as you can get at it. 
First, my general reactions: I am quite favorably 
impressed by the draft. It reflects the essential ingredients 
of a good opinion: a thorough grasp of the facts and the 
relevant authorities, sound analysis (subject to a reservation 
mentioned below as to the jurisdictional issue), and a well-
written and documented draft. 
There is, however, a major reservation. As you would 
be the first to acknowledge, the opinion in its present 
form is unacceptably long. I estimate that as now drafted, 
• including the notes, the printed opinion would be about t~ 
pages. Apart from the Rail Act case (written last term by 
Justice Brennan), I can recall no opinion for the Court in 
recent years that attains such vast proportions. MY Rodriguez 
opinion, as I recall, 40-odd pages, and this produced a 
certain amount of criticism. 
2. 
I must, therefore, reQuest,you to unde~take major revisions 
with the view to reducing the text by at least as much as one 
third. I know from personal experience that this is an 
unwelcome task, but it is one that judges and lawyers frequently 
confront. 
Now for a few generalizations that may possibly be helpful 
to you in this process. 
1. Part I (statement of the case and facts) 
This may be condensed somewhat, although basically I see 
little "fat" here. 
2. Part II (jurisdiction) 
I have sent a copy of this part to Justice Rehnquist 
for his comments. We can await word from him before attempting 
any revisions. 
3. Part III (the merits) 
This is the heart of the opinion, and must be divided -
as you have indicated - into several subparts. I will identify 
these, with the pages indicated (perhaps roughly). 
III-A. (pp. 22-28). This summarizes the governing 
principles and is excellent. Perhaps you can achieve 
some condensation, although the real opportunity is not 
here. 
III-B. (pp. 28-36). This describes the administrative 
procedure. It is far more detailed than necessary. I 
think you can cut it in half. 
3. 
III-C. (pp. 36-54) A great deal of condensation 
is required here. You really address two principal 
topics, as follows: 
pp. 39-43: The discussion of the "level of 
deprivation" can be summarized. 
pp. 43-54: The reliability of the pre-termination 
administrative procedures, while important, also can 
be substantially condensed. 
III-D. (pp. 54-60) The discussion of the interest 
of government and the public, primarily in terms of the 
administrative burden, can perhaps be reduced by as mucp 
as two thirds. We certainly don't want to "labor" this 
governmental interest. 
4. Part IV (Conclusion) (pp. 60-62) 
Excellent. 
* * * * 
I have not had an opportunity this afternoon to read the 
footnotes. It is evident, however, that these also much be 
reduced if we are to come up with an opinion of reasonable 
length. Please use your best judgment as to where the "cutting" 
should take place. I do observe very lengthy excerpts from 
Title 42 U.S.C. We simply have to omit or substantially reduce 
things like this. 
* * * * 
4. 
It is well to remember that a Court opinion, as distinguishec 
from a lawyer's brief, need not make every point, meet every 
argument in detail, or advance in detail every reason that 
supports the Court's decision. One advantage we enjoy is that 
we can be far more "conclusory" than a lawyer's brief. I know 
it will be painful to eliminate some of your excellent discussion: 
but this must be done. 
I feel satisfied, despite all that I've said above, that 
you have the basis of a very fine opinion. 






December 11, 1975 
'~' .r, to:,;\': 
,, '1~ !{'i ·~ '\"'"' ;T<i 
74-204 
·J~ 
" I deliver to you herewith a first draft, by my clerk, 
Greg Palm, of Part II of an opinion in the above case. . " 
Part II deals, as you will see, with the . jurisdictional 
issue that so troubled us and our brethren. , 
. As you are my guiding mentor on this subject, and 
particularly as to how this opinion should be written with-
out diluting the precedential effect of Salfi, I wonder if 
you would mind reviewing the draft and givliii me your. ~: , 
comments. '· 
i "" 
.~ ,i< ~· 
~J ~~. .t; ' f'•.: i, i i " il'f.: ~~ 
·· · Obviously, .the draft is too long. I have made no · 
attempt yet to edit or revise it, or to have Greg condense 
it. Before undertaking these ta'ftks, it would be most help-
ful particularly to know whether you agree that the analysis 
iS d ···, ' ' ···i..:t." s 0\JD. ' ''~';" .~ ' ' 
~>l.r I 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
,jnprttttt <lfonriltf tlft ~tb ,jtaU.s 
jfht.s!finghm. ~. <!f. 2llp'!~ 
December 16, 1975 
Re: No. 74-204 Eldridge v. Mathews 
Dear Lewis: 
I have now had an opportunity to review Greg Palm's 
draft of Part II of your proposed opinion in this case, 
the part which deals with the jurisdictional issue. I think 
the draft generally is a sound and certainly comprehensive 
treatment of the problem, and subject only to the minor 
suggestion contained in the following paragraph it fully 
comports with my understanding of the statute and of Salfi. 
On page 10, when describing Eldridge's fulfillment of 
the "crucial prerequisite to jurisdiction," I would feel 
happier if it were spelled out a little more precisely that 
the "claim for benefits" presented to, and denied by, the 
state agency was Eldridge's claim that he was still disabled 
and that his benefits should not be terminated. This claim, 
it seems to me, was presented by Eldridge's March 29, 1972, 
~turn of the questionnaire form sent him by the state agency; 
his May 25, 1972, letter objecting to the request for further 
evidence and continuing to assert his disability, or by both. 
These are contained in pages 12 and 13 of the Appendix. I 
would not want to go so far as to say that a recipient whose 
benefits were terminated without any protest on his part is 
entitled to bring a Goldberg type challenge to such a 
decision, arguing that he had presented a "claim for benefits" 
- 2 -
' 
in the form of his original, application, which although 
originally granted was n~ · in fact denied. If that were 
permitted, the sort of large and indefinite class action 
which I refer to in my earlier memorandum might be permitted. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Greg Palm 
Re: Matthews v. Eldridge [No. 74-204] 
Salfi construed 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) as precluding federal 
question jurisdiction over a suit challenging the duration-of-relationship 
requirements of 42 U.S.C, §§ 416(c)(5) & (e)(2). It was there held that 
the only avenue of revue was through 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which requires 
as a jurisdictional prerequisite a final decision by the Secretary. But 
although Salfi rejected the argument that simply because the claimant 
challenged the constitutionality of a provision of the SSA rather than an 
interpretation of the Act, exhaustion is not required, I think that the 
nature of the constitutional claim here makes Salfi distinguishable and 
that any further use of the adminisrative process by Eldridge was unecessary. 
Salfi indicated that the power to determine when finality has occurred 
under § 405(g) ordinarily rests with the Secretary. This is because he has 
ultimate resonsibility for the integrity of the administrative process. Thus 
even when the Secretary is without power to alter an offending provision 
exhaustion "assures [him] the opportunity prior to constitutional litigation 
to ascertain ... that the particular claims involved are neither invalid 
for other reasons nor allowable under the provisions of the Social Security 
Act." Here, Eldridge's challenge to the procedures by which his benefmts 
were terminated is an issue wholly collaateral to his substantive claim 
for benefits under the SSA. Unlike in Salfi denying his substantive claim 
"for other reasons" or upholding it "under other provisions" is not relevant 
to his claim of a denial of procedural due process. ~ Whether or not the 
Secretary ultimately determines that his benefits were wrongly terminated 
in no way affects his claim to a pre-termination hearing. [Indeed, the 
Secretary's contention that complete reinstatement of benefits(including 
retr<hactive payments) would "eliminate the necessity of judicial 
..._consideration" of Eldrige's claim that "termination was wrongful" 
oegs cne quesc~on present:ed: whether an oral evidentiary hearing is 
constitutional! required prior to termination of benefitsJ 
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I admit that my willingmess to distinguish Salfi is no doubt 
colored by my desire to reach the substantive issues here. As I indicated 
yesterday, I, TID Dis it may be hard to find a "waiver" here by the Secretary 
given its response to Eldridge's complaHint to the effect that: (1) he 
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and (2) the administrative 
process was adequate in any event. Of course,his response(part (2)) does 
emphasize again the futility of requiring Eldridge to present his procedural 
claim in the first instance to the Secretary. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.inprtmt <!Jltttrlcf t!rt ~b ,jtattg 
Jfz,wJri:ttgtcn. ~. <!J. 2llbTJ!~ 
January 9, 1976 
Re: No. 74-204, Mathews v. Eldridge 
Dear Lewis, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court in 
this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
,juprtutt Clfomi ~f tlrt ,-mttb ~t:dtg 
' .. N$ltittghn4 ~. elf. 2llgt'!~ I 
January 12, 1976 
Re: No. 74-204 -- Mathews v. Eldridge 
Dear Lewis: 




Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
.iu:pTmtt <!Jottd of t1ft ~t~ ,itattg 
Jfa:gfri:nghttt. ~. <!J. 2ll~Jl.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
January 13, 1976 
Re: No. 74-204 - Mathews v. Eldridge 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Conference 
~tm.t aromt ~ tift ~ttittb ~tatt. 
, JruJringt.ott. ~. ar. 2llc?~&t ' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
January 14, 1976 
Re: No. 74-204 - Mathews v. Eldridge 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
J~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
,§upumt <!Jourt of tqt 1l!nitrh ,§ta.tta 
'J.Illaafrington, p. <q. 20~>!-~ 
CHAMBE RS Of" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL January 26, 1976 
Re: No. 74-204 ;- -F. David Mathews v. George H. Eldridge 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 







February 19, 1976 
No. 74-204 Mathews v. Eldridge 
Dear Mr. Putzel: 
The line-up in the above case is as follows: 
Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Cour~ in 
which Burger, C.J., Stewart, White, Blackman, and Rehnquiat, 
JJ., joined. Brennan, J:
1
J filed~ dissenting opinion, in 
which Marshall, J., joiaea, post, p. • Stevens, J., 
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
, cc: The Print Shop 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
,jnprtutt <!fouri cf t4t ~b ,jtattg 
~asfri:nghrn .. ~. <!f. 2"ll~~.;l 
February 19, 1976 
Re: 74-204 - Mathews v. Eldridge 
Dear Lewis: 
I join your proposed opinion in the above. 
Mr. Justice Powell 





This case eema& co ~s on certiorari from the Court 
of Appeals fqr the Fourth Circuit. 
It presents a question of what process is ~e~hen 
disability benefits are terminated. Under the Social 
Security Act, a worker receiving such benefits~has the 
burden of showing continuous~disability. When disability 
is put in issue, las it was with respect to respondent,;' 
regulations of the Secretary of HEW/ prescribe an elaborate 
administrative review procedure. 
But this procedure does not include ~n oral evidentiary 
hearing prior to termination of benefits . ~;q~spondent 
I 
challenged the validity of the procedure by a suit in 
~ 
the federal district court. That court, relying on th~ 
Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, held that such a 
hearing was constitutionally required. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed. 
The decision whether to discontinue disability 
benefit,lnormally turns upon documented medical evidence. 
The issue of disability tRerei9~ is a focused~and limited 
one. Prior to termination of benefits, the claimant 
2. 
is given access to the governme~t file/ and t .o the reasons 
for the tentative decision to discontinue. The claimant 
also / is afforded an opportunity/=~bmit ~dditional evidence I . u-~  c. .#, 
and arguments. Following discontinuance there is a right 
to an oral evidentiary hearing ~nd ultimately to judicial 
review before the denial beco~s final. 
In view of the nature of the inquiry~and the care-
fully strus tured system for administrative review;lwe find 
no deprivation of procedural due process. Accordingly, we 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
The Chief Justice, and Justices Stewart, White, 
Blackmun and Rehnquist have joined the opinion of the 
Court. Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion, --
in which Mr. Justice Marshall has joined. Mr. Justice 
Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of 
the case. 
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Powell, Jr. / 
March 2, 1976 
Holds for No. 74-204 Mathews v. Eldridge 
I agree with your recommendations in the draft of a 
memorandum to the Conference, but - as you anticipated 
the memorandum is much too long. 
See what you can do to summarize the presentations on 
on Mattern and Frost. These should be reduced at least .,;: 
some 50% to conform to what is customarily presented. 
r We may assume that most of the Justices have cert memos 
in their offices on these cases. Thus, our presentation can 
be summary and conciusory. Our recommendation is what counts 
most. 
ss 
CHAMBE R S OF 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR . 
;§ttJ.!rtmt QJottrt c-f tlrt 'Jlbti:tth ~tetf.tg 
~a:$frittgtMt. Ifl. Qf. Zllp>-1~ 
March 3, 1976 
Cases held for No. 74-204, Mathews v. Eldridge 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Two cases currently are being held for Eldrid~e and 
one for Eldridge and Norton v. Mathews, No. 74-621 . 
1. No. 74-205, Mathews v. Williams 
This case presents the same issue as Eldridge. The 
state agency notified respondent that since her disability 
had ceased her social security benefits would be terminated. 
Respondent demanded a pre-termination evidentiary hearing, 
and she brought this action when none was granted. DC and 
CAS held, relying on the DC decision in Eldridge, that an 
evidentiary hearing is required prior to termination of 
benefits. I will vote to grant, vacate and remand in light 
of Eldridge. 
2. No. 75-649 Mathews v. Mattern [held for Eldridge 
and Norton] 
Respondent, a recipient of disabled widows' benefits under 
§ 402(e)(l)(B)(ii) of the Social Security Act, was erroneously 
paid $1,063.80 by the Social Security Administration (SSA). There 
is a dispute whether the SSA notified her by telephone, prior to 
receipt of the payment, that she should return it. Several months 
later the SSA notified her by letter that future benefits would 
be reduced until the overpayment had been recouped. Respondent 
was further informed that she was entitled to contest the 
finding of overpayment or to request the Secretary to "waive" 
the overpayment if she was not at fault in receiving it and 
recoupment would cause her severe financial hardship or be 
unfair for some other reason. Petitioner requested reconsidera-
tion of the recoupment decision, and the SSA affirmed its 
- 2 -
initial determination. Although her monthly benefits were then 
reduced, respondeqt was thereafter entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing, as well as administrative and judicial review. 
Meanwhile (after the reconsideration request, but prior 
to decision), respondent filed this class action, contending 
that the procedures for recovering overpayments violated due 
process since they do not afford claimants a prerecoupment 
oral hearing. The DC concluded that it has jurisdiction under 
the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, declared the recoupment 
procedures unconstitutional and enjoined the Secretary from 
recovering overpayments until after a hearing. CA3 affirmed, 
but remanded for a more limited order that would require a 
prior oral hearing only where the Secretary's decision might 
turn on the credibility of witnesses. 
Under Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) and 
Eldridge there is jurisdiction over respondent's constitutional 
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) only with respect to those 
members of the class who disputed a recoupment decision that 
occurred within 60 days of the filing of this action. Since 
Norton will make clear that there is no basis for jurisdiction 
here other than§ 405(g), the case probably should continue 
to be held for that decision. 
On the merits the case is not necessarily controlled by 
Eldridge. CA3 has limited the orerecoupment hearing right 
to cases in which issues of credibility may be important in 
the decision, but this requirement will be triggered in a 
substantial number of cases. Moreover, under the current 
procedures the recipient may personally discuss his case with 
officials at the SSA office. Finally, the extent of the 
potential deprivation implicated by a reduction in benefits 
is less than the total cutoff at issue in Eldrid.~. On the 
other hand, this case differs from Eldridge in that issues 
of credibility will play a significant role in the agency 
decision. Accordingly, I will vote to hold for Norton and 
then to grant, vacate, and remand in light of Salfi, 
Eldridge and Norton. 
3. No. 75-5220 Frost v. Mathews 
Petitioners are the mother and legitimate children of a 
deceased wage earner receiving mother's and surviving children's 
benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 202. Two other children claim to 
be illegitimate offspring. The Secretary determined that 
they are illegitimate children of the wage earner and notified 
- 3 -
the petitioners that their future payments would be reduced 
by the amounts to be paid to the illegitimate children. 
Under the Secretary's procedures, after the current 
beneficiaries are notified they may submit additional evidence 
challenging the determination. If the current beneficiary's 
protest is rejected he is so notified, and the benefit pay-
ments are adjusted as of the first month after the decision. 
He has a right to petition for reconsideration, to an 
evidentiary hearing, to administrative appeal, and to judicial 
review. 
Petitioners apparently did not protest but instead 
sought reconsideration and a hearing. Meanwhile the SSA 
reduced their benefits. They then filed this class action 
seeking an injunction against such reductions until after an 
evidentiary hearing and requiring that past reductions be 
restored. Petitioners lost their administrative hearing and 
the government moved for dismissal on several grounds, including 
mootness. The DC certified the class and granted declaratory 
relief requiring pre-reduction hearings. 
CA2 held that there was mandamus jurisdiction over the 
suit (the decision pre-dated Salfi). It also held that the 
case was not moot due to the presence of the members of the 
class other than the named plaintiffs. Although the class 
action was not declared until after the case had arguably 
become moot as to petitioners, CA2 pointed to n. 11 in Sosna 
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) and permitted certification to 
relate back to the time when the DC deferred its ruling on the 
question. On the merits CA2 reversed distinguishing Goldberg 
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) on three grounds: (1) This 
case involved a reduction, not a termination of benefits. 
(2) Survivor benefits are not necessarily the recipient's 
only resource - if income falls below subsistence, welfare 
may be available. (3) Although the government makes payments 
in excess of the family maximum during the short period 
allowed for protest, it indicates that such payments might 
not be made during the longer period until decision after 
an evidentiary hearing. Thus, in striking the appropriate 
due process balance, the weights against requiring a pre-
reduction hearing include the interest of the illegitimate 
children in immediate payments. 
Under Salfi, Eldridge and Norton the class is limited 
to those persons who contested a decision to reduce their 
benefits that occurred within 60 days of the filing of this 
action. Assuming that there exist such persons, it is my 
- 4 -
view that Sosna supports § 405(g) jurisdiction here. 
Although the Conference may want to remand to ascertain 
whether any such persons exist, I think it quite likely 
that they do. On the merits CA2's holding is consistent 
with Eldridge. Accordingly, I will vote to deny. 
~~  .... , .f) 
I -,~ ·?-'' 
.!r- I · / · 
L.F o Po, Jr o 
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UNITED ST~TES COURT OF APPE1.tLS~ ~ 
FoR THE SEco~o CrncurT 
K o. 5±7 -September Term, 197 4. 
(Argued January.l/, 1975 Decided April17, 1975.) 
Docket Ko. 74-2020 
Cuu-nu FRosT, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v. 
CASPAR WED.""BEP.GER, as Secretary of the United States 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Before: 
WATER:ll.,~..~, FRIE~DLY and GuRFEIN, 
Circuit ·Judges. 
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court fot t.he 
Eastern District of Xew York, Anthony J. Travia, Judge, 
375 F. Supp. 1312 (1974), declaring unconstitutional the 
procedures of the Social Security Administration whereby 
i;c::::.:~::.: L:.::..; ~:·" ;ri to SllrYi\-ors· c1lildr t:ii. iliigV hP. rP.dnced 
because of claims of illegitimate children which would cause 
the total benefits to exceed the statutory maxima without 
a pre-reduction oral evidentiary hearing. 







D.\Y1D )L GoHEx, Esq., Department of Justice, 
\\ asbi21gton, D. C. (Carla A. Hills, Assis-
tant ..:\..ttorHey General, David G. Trager, 
"Cnited States Attorney, \Yilliam Kanter, 
E:;q., of Co~msel), for .Appellant. 
llExE H. Rnx...\.CH, Esq., Rochester, Ne'v York 
O,Ionroe County Legal Assistance Corpo-
ration, Kenneth Cohn, Esq., and Nassau 
County Law Services Committee, Inc., of 
Counsel), for Appellees. 
FRIENDLY, Circuit Judge: 
This appeal displays a new facet in the developing law 
of due process with respect to administrative action by 
the welfare state. \\J.Jereas such controversies bave typi-
cally involved disputes between the Government on the 
one hand and a citizen or class of citizens on the other, 
here the ultin:w.te conflict is between two categories of ci_ii-
zens and the Go\ernment's interest is to pay tbe tight - ....._ 
<E!_e. Before reaclnng the problem of what due process 
requires in this context, we must traverse a procedural 
thicket. 
I. The Statutory Bacl;.gr~und and 
the R_egulations in Contr·ove·rsy. 
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(c1)(1), (d)(2), and (g) (1), 
the dependent children and the spouse, see Weinberger· v. 
lVeisenfe!d. 43 li.S.L.W. 1!393 (1975) of an individ.ua1 \\·ho 
died as fully insured under the ·Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 41-±(a), are eacb entitled to a monthly payment 
for a specified period equi>Rlent generally to tbree-quartcrs · 
of the primary insurance amount of the decedent. In no 






a specified maximtm1, 42 U.S.C. § 403(a), set out in the 
table accompanying 42 U.S.C. § 415(a). 
Prior to 1 :J6.5 the only children eligible for benefits pur-
swmt to ±2 L..S.C. H 402(d) (1) and (d) (2) ·were children 
who could inherit from the decedent pursuant to appli- . 
cable state la'\\ or whose parents had participated in a 
ceremony l':hich \'.-odd have resulted in a valid marriage 
except for one of two specified legal impediments. 42 
U.S.C. ~§ 416(h)(2) (...--\.) & (B), 402(d) (3). In 1965 Con-
gress amended tbe Act to include other illegitimate chil-
c1ren, Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L; No. 
89-97, § 339(a): 19 Stat. t109, where, inter alia, the decedent 
wage earner, before his death, acknowledged paternity in 
writing_. was decreed by a court to have been the father, 
or ''as ordered by a court to contribute support to the 
child because o~ paternity. This was codified as 42 U.S.C. 
§ 416(h) (3) (0) (i).1 
·Congress again amended the Act in 1968, Social Security 
Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 163(a) (1), 81 
Stat. 872,2 to deal with the situation, apparently not con-
1 A companion pronsion, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (3) (C) (ii), permitted ille· 
gitimate childre!l to recei>e benefits attributable to a deceased wage 
earner e;en "here the requirements of § 416 (h) (3) (C) (i) l1avc r..ot been 
met if "such :insured :i.ndi>idual is shown by evidence · satisfactory to the 
Secretary ,to han~ bee!l the father of tlte applicant, and such insured 
indintlual ;,a3 li\·:i.ng with or contributing to the support of the ·appli-
cant at the time such insured indi>idual died." This provision was re-
cently strnck down by _ a "district court on the ground that it violated 
the rights of affected illegitimate chilurt::n ulltler ~he eCJ_ual protection 
clause in that it impo;;ed an additional requirement to establish eligi-
bility-making a showing of sPpport if the i!l~ured v.:;.;,r. earuer wa~ 
not living with t!:Je illegitimate children-not faced by legitimate chil-
dren. This was fo·.!nd not to satisfy even a rational basis test :in that 
disfa>o.rbg "the offspring of a c"asual liaison" coulcl not sen·e any legit-
imate go\·e=eat..'ll interest. Lucas v. HEW, 43 U.S.L.W. 2382 (D .. R.I. 
Feb. 25, 1975). 
2 This amend!::Jent "as codified as 42 U.S.C .. § 403(a) (last sentence): 
Whene;er a reduction is made under this subsection in the total of 




templatcd by the 1965 legislation, 'vhere t1w inclusion of 
illcg·itima tc children would raise tho total above tho statu-
tory m::n:imum.3 Tb.c 19GS amendment provided that when 
the total be11efits \\ould exceed the maximum, any reduc-
tion should first occur ·in the benefits payable to children 
made eligible by the 19G5 amendments; the effec~1is 
was to exclude these illegitimate chilrli·en altogether when 
th;bene.fits p~e to the widow and other children reached 
the mnximum.4 This provision was held unconstitutional 
in Griffin'· Richardson, 34:6 F. Snpp. 1226 (D. 1Id~) (three-
on the basi.s of the wages and self-employment income of an insured 
individual, eaeh s:1ch benefit other than the old-age or disability 
insurance l;enefit shall be proportionately decreased; except that if 
such total of benefits for such month includes any benefit or bene-
fits under section 402(d) of this title which are payable solely by 
reason of sec tion 416(h) (3) of this title, the reduction shall be 
first applied to reduce (proportionately where there is more than 
one benefit so payable) . the beuefits so payable (but not below 
:zero). 
3 The ameutll;Ilent to · 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) was added by the Senate 
Finance Committee to H.R. 6575, 89th Cong., J st Sess. (1965) , as new 
§ 340. Neither the report of that committee, S.Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1965), nor the Conference Report, H.R. Rep. No. 682, 89th 
Cong., Jst Sess. (1955), in which the House acceded to the Senate 
amendment, contains any language which su:;gests that the legislators 
were cognizant of this possibility. See S.Rep. No. 404, s11pra, inl u:.s. 
Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943, 204.9-50, 2206 (1965); H.R. Rep. ·No . 
682, s1cpra, in 1 "C.S. Code _Con g. & Admin. News 2228, 2260 (1965). 
4 The Senate >ersion would hr:ve lil.ll.ited th, ei(.:lct of th" umendmcnt 
to children who were eligible in August, 1965, and whose benefits were 
reduced because of the 1965 amendment; children who became eligible 
afte,. the 1965 al;Ilendment would be subject to the pluvi•in'1s of that 
amendment, i.e., the shares of all children, legitimate and il1egitimate, 
would be recluced proportionately to the same amount. See S.Rcp. No. 
744, 90th Con g., 1st Se;s. (1967), in 2 U.S. Code Con g. & Admin. News 
2834, 2345, 3108 (1967). Tbe Senate version was thus only a "savings 
clause." This >ersion was rejected in important part in conference and 
the amendment was made applicable for any cl1ildren whose current or 
future entitlements were reduced as a result of the 1965 amendment. 
See H.R. Rep. :Xo. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Scss. (1967), in 2 U.S. Code 



















judge court), S!lii!iiWrily affinl.!;_cd per c7.wiam, 409 U.S. 1069 
(1972)," on the g-::ound that the discriminatory classifica-
tion in it ;er...-cc no legitimate state int .rest and was thus 
violatrve of the due process rif•·hts of the class of illegit-
imate childrer'l. who \\ere plaintiffs in that suit. 
-------------'This decision made it necessary for the Social Security 
Ac1minisb:ation (SS2 •. ) to revise its procedures, uuder au-
thority of 42 "C'.S.C. ~ 205(a), for handling cases where the 
addition of cbilclren claiming to be ~ntitled to benefits 
under the 1965 amendments would result in exceeding the 
statutory ma:s:im::u:n, the validity of which has not been 
questioned. Of. Dandridge v. Tflilliams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-87 
(1970). The ren3ec1 procedures, incorporated into the SSA 
Claims l.Ianual, \\ere designed to permit the re,vorking of 
all claims "as though the [1968] provision had never been 
enacted," Claims )1anual T305, and to provide all bene- )· 
ficiaries whose benefits were going to be reduced with "a · 
detailed explanation of the reason for the reduction.n Id. 
T30S(b). Beneficiaries \\hose benefits were to be reclnced . 
must be notified prior to the recluction, id. T315, by an SSA 
Reviewing Office, ',\hid.l \\Onlc1 process the award for the 
newly entitled illegitimate child but would "diary" th.e case 
for 45 days and not effectuate a benefit check reduction 
until the opetating month after the processing of any pro-
test filed within that period. Icl. T310(c). The notice ex-
pJ.ained tnat a "recent court decision" required equality of 
treatment for all chllclren of a ·wage earner who died fully 
immred and that, as a resuE> ttc r.JOnthly benefits of the-
beneficiaries named in the notice had to be reduced to an 
amount specified in order to pay benefits to other named 
children who qual:..+lecl uncler 42 . U.S.C. § 416(h) (3). The 
notice was to specify under w'C.ich subsection of 42 U.S.C. 
5 Three Justices would ha>e set the Secretary's appeal for oral argu· 
ment. 
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~ 416(h) (3) the::~ ch:ldrc·n qualified and show the "exad 
basi~'' for that d~;termina tion. The notice further invited 
the bcne:5.c:iar; or his r2yre.:;cntative to submit ~ray evidence 
within 30 days to p :·oH· that the illegitimate children do 
not q uaEfy- o::- tk: ~ , for some other reason, the benefits of 
the beuE:2 ·:::~ary SDOt<:d not b~ reduced. Claims Manual T315. 
If, bas~J upon this no~ice, the beneficiary visited an SSA 
District Of'.6c:2, he ';\a:; gi\-en a complete explanation for 
the action and had tb.<: right to inspect the original evi-
dence upon v.-hich the SS.A. determined that a child was 
entitled to participate in the benefits under 42 u.s.a. 
§ 416(h)(3). If that endence -was not immediately avail-
able, the District Offi.::e "as to send for it. If the bene-
ficiary ne\ertlleles3 elE-cted to protest and to offer evi-
dence to dispute tbe vaEdity of the determination of new 
entitlement, the District Office was to prepare a report 
describing the corrtact betv;-een the beneficiary and District 
Office personnel and to forn·ard that along with the evi-
dence submitted to the Renewing Office, which would de-
tennille '~whether [the] e-.-idence casts doubt on the orig-
inal detcrm.ir!.ation." ld. T30S(b). 
If a protest was recei...-ec1 by the Reviewing Office prior 
~o actual do~mward adjustment in the benefit .checks of 
the current benefciaries, that is, within 45 days of notice 
and such .additional t ime as effectuating that adjristment 
within SS~ would b.ke, id. T310(c) (3) (A), a branch of 
the Renewing Office was required to review the file fc r 
-the case, requesting an;:- necessary additional information 
and clarific-ation. "If tb.e eviC!cnce or argt:GlP.Pt sH1m,itrc0 
does not cast doubt on the original detennin.ation that the 
child is entitled under[-!~ U.S-C. §416(h)(3)] (a protest 
without snbstanti\e proof does not cast doubt upon the 
original determination)," the benefits were a·djusted and 

























and its effecti'e date in a notice which advised him of his 
right to petition for reconsideration of tho adjustment. If 
a protest was recei\' ed after the adjustment was _made, it 
was treated as a request for reconsideration. Claims 
l.Ianual T310(c). 
If the beneficiary requested recons·ideration, a rcvlew-
ii~g officer in t~e inc1epe:1dcmt Reconsideration Branch re-
examined the claim and produced a written Reconsidera-
tion Determination, smnmarizing the evidence and law and 
delivering a reconsidered determinatl.on. If this was also 
aclverse to the beneficiary, he could request a full evjclcn-
tiary hearing before an Administrative L-aw ,Judge of the 
Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, with attendant rights 
of administrat"iw appeal to the Appeals Council and of 
judicial review, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
IT. The Facts and the Proceedings in the District Co~wt. 
Plaintiffs, the mdow and two legitimate children of a 
fully insured, deceased wage-earner, Charles Frost, Jr., 
had been recei,ing mother's and ,surviving children's in-
surance during 1973 of $159.30 for Mrs. Frost and a like 
amount for each child. The widow, Claudia Frost, had 
filed for these benefits on August 26, 1968, five days ~fter 
the death · of her husband, from whom she had bee:ri. sep-
arated for some time:· On February 15, 1973, the SSA 
notified· these beneficiaries that their benefits would .be 
reduced to $95.70 for each claimant as a. result of the 
SSA's c, -~i~::;.Jin~tion t:U.at Cnarles Frost, Jr., was the 
fat er of two illegitimate children, Charles E. III and 
Tina L. Frost, whose mother, Lola Coolidge, had applied 
for benefits on behalf of the former on August 26, 1968, 
the same day Clauclia Frost filed her application, and 
on behalf of both on .April 8, 1969, a short time after 






. --.... ·--·-- -~.. . - . .. 
I 
because of the operation of the 1968 amendment disfavor-
ing illegitimate children, but the application was granted 
effective ::\Ir.rc:h, 1973, thereby reducing; the mnounts avail-
able to Claudia Frost and her two children fnthered by 
Charles Fro~ t 1 Jr. Seemingly the protest step in the SSA 
procedure was omitted, see 375 F. Supp. at 1315 n.5, but 
l\Irs. Frost clid request teconsic1eration on February 22,C 
after \\·hich she receind written notification that the de-
cision to grant benefits to Charles E. and Tina Frost and 
to reduce the benefits payable to herself and her children 
was deemed correct in all respects by the Reconsidera- . 
tion Branch. She thereupon called for a full evidentiary 
!tearinJ. 
Before the hearing could be held, Mrs. Jhost filed this 
action in the District Court for the Eastern Districf of ...____.. . 
New York on behalf of herself, of her children fathered 
by Charles Frost, Jr., and "of all persons who now or 
may in the future be entitled to surviYors' benefits under 
the .A.ct -whose benefits have been or may be reduced with-
out a prior hearing." The complaint alleged that the ~ 
SSA procedures denied c~ne process ~eeause. they f~iled . 
to proTI e f oi" an ora ev1 en mry re-rec uc 1 1 heanng; 
it sought declaratory and temporary ~mel permmient in-
junctive relief as -well as restoration of benefit~ . . · The 
district ccn1rt denied a temporary restraining order and 
a preliminary injunctron on November 12, 1973~ without 
prejudice br,t o.~. c1ered the Secretary to conduct a full 
hearing \\ithin a month; The hearing was helcl N 6vem-
6 Charles Frost :1dmittei!ly had been living with the mother of the two 
illegitimate children and had been named as father on their birth cer-
tificates. The only important bases for Mrs. Frost's disagreement with 
the initial determination were her statement that Mr. Frost became 
impotent early Lrl 1966 and the absence of any written · consent on his 
part to being r.am,.d as father in the birth certificates, see New York 
Pub. Health L. § 4135(2), something that was manifestly impossible in 
the case of the po.:~thcmous child. 
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ber 27, 1913, and the administrative law judge, on March 
4, 1974, rendered <: decision that the de termination of 
Charles' and Tina's status under 42 U.S.C. ~ 416(h) (3) 
and the consequent necessity to reduce benefits to :Mrs. 
Frost and her two children i.l':-~e correct. \Y e were in-
formed at argument that the mdter was before the Ap-
peals Council. 
On X o\ember 16, 1973, plain tiffs moved for a declara-
tion that the action couH be maintained as a class ac-
tion, F.R.Ci>.P. 23(h) (2), and, at oral argllmen~ on the 
motion~ December 8, . 1973, for summary judg·ment. The 
Secretary contested class action des-ignation, claimed that 
the district cour~'s direction and the holding of a post-
reduction lH.'?.r!ng had made the action moot and that 
plaintiffs had failed to e~haust their administrative rem-
edies, and son;ht snm1nary judgment.both on these grounds 
and on the· merits. With the agreement of the parties, 
375 F. Supp. at 1316, a ruling on the class action request 
was postponed pending determin::ttion of the summary judg-
ment motions. On ~Iay 3. 107±~ the court ruled generally 
in p1Eintiff's fa,·or, 375 F. Snpp. 1312 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). 
It conclucled t'!J.a t phintiffs had sa tisfiecl the requirements 
of R~1le 23 JQr the maintenance of a class action;: .that 
: siEce p}a~ntiffs co:.1ld · prQperly haYe represented the class 
when the <>.ction ;•:as brought, the subsequent holc~ing · of 
a pos~-rcdu.ction hearing at the court's direction did not 
depri...-c them of f!Ja t sta hls; that the action w~s not moot: 
thn t t!.!e court :C.1cl jnrisc1icticn; that defendant's e:s:hans-
tion ar5.1ment lncS:ecl merit; ~mel that failure to accord 
a prt>-reclt.~ction or-d en::'!entiary- hearing was unconstitu-
tionil. 'While d .:.!l:ing an inj~mction, the court granted 
decbratc:ry relief. Its order i<;sncd Hay 28, 1974. 
Subsequent to the entry of judgment, the Secretary 
moved for an orde:::- to amend the judgment. He contended 
that the class action ruling was erroneous because notice 
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to members of the cla::::::, as allegedly required by Eisen v. 
Carlisl e cf J tJ.r:g_a:::li,!, -- U.S. --, 40 L. Ed. 2c1 782 
(197±), had not been g:,en and that, the class action having 
failed, the ca:::e ·was moot. The motion was denied on 
July 1, 197 4:. Tbi::: appeal followed. 
TIL Jurisdiction. 
Although the Se:?retary has not contended that the action 
was not within the stah1tory jurisdiction of the district 
court, we mu:;t consider the matter, as Judge Travia did, 
375 F. Snpp. at 1319-::0. The problem is the one encoun-
tered in most actions questioning the constitutionality or 
interpretation o: s~atu~e3 or r 'egulations governing federal 
welfare or othe-r entitlements, namely, the certainty that 
the claims of the na:ned plaintiffs do not satisfy the $10,000 
jurisdictional amo<mt requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 133P and 
the doubt whether aggregation of the claims of the class 
would be permissible under Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 33:2 
(1969). See Jlills >.Richardson, 464 F.2d 995, 1001 (2 Cir. 
1912). We find it unnecessary to determine \rhether these 
difficulties preclude jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 13318 
since we are w.Jling to redicate federal ·uriscliction on 
~61, as other courts did in Martinez v. !Jicharcl-
son, 472 F;·2d 1121, 112.5-26 & n.l2 (10 Cir. 1973) ;· Elliott 
7 The amPn.].,..;_ complaint did not allege that the cb.im9 of Claudia 
Frost, James Frost, or Kr'..sten Frost satisfied this requirement. 
8 But cf. ][oQT:l' ani: Yerr.tont Welfare Rights .Ass'n v. J:etit, No. 74-
1300 (2 Cir., Fe3. 10, 191."'), ~~:: "Jr. !773, v;h.:.rd &. pauel of t~:; court 
remanded an ac=:o!l brought by an ind.iridna1 wel.fare recipient and a 
welfare rights or;an.izatiro for a determination of the propriety of a • 
··trn:;t fund·· apr·roadl fo-: e=:tablishing the e::rist!lnce of the jurisdic· 
tional amo:.:nt =~er § B31. See Bass v. Rockefeller, 331 F. Supp. 945 
(S.D.KY.), re= with i::rt":-nctioll3 to ;a~ate and dismiss, 464 F.2d 1300 
(2 Cir. 1911) (fre panel ceclining to express any jU(1gment on the 
correctness of ilie d:stri~t court•s jur!sdictiona1 holding). This theory · 
l:as ·not been u:geC. be!o~e us and, since we find jurisdiction upon 




























v. TVeinberger, 371 F. Supp. 960, 967-GS (D. Hawaii 1974); 1. ·. 
and iliatter·n Y. Tr eiilb erger, 377 li'. Supp. 906, 914 (E.D. Pa. 
1974). Granted that it may be t~oubLful whether Congress 
intended § 1361 to co\er situations of tills sort, see, e.g., 
.1 amieson '· TY einberger, 379 Ji'. Supp. 28, 34 (E.D. Pa. 
1974), the language: is sufficiently broad to do so, see Note, 
The J urisdictiona1 Amount Requirement in Suits Challeng-
ing- the Validity of Federal Gon;rnmeut Action, in Hart & 
Wechsler, The Federal Courts and tbe. :F'ederal System 
1158, 1160-61 (2d ec1. 1973), at least in a case like this where 
the sole issue is the type of hearing required. Benign Cl..ti'v\Dv .,..-/-
neglect by the Supr en::.e Court of the jurisclictiona~ 
in such cases as Richardson v. TVright, 405 U.S. 208, 1·eh. 
denied, 405 U.S. 1033 (1972), and Richardson v. G1·ifjin, 
supra, 409 U.S. 1069, must signify at least some degree of 
acquiescence in a federal court's proceeding to judgment 
in a matter so peculiarly appropi:iate for its decision as 
whether the Federal Constitutio11 requires federal officials 
administering federalle.;ri::lation to grant a full evidentiary 
. hearing. 
IV. jJJ ootness and Class Action. 
Although the dispute over the reduction of plaintiffs' 
survivors' be~e:fits c.oncededly remains alive, since if is 
before the Appeals Comicil, the Government urges that 
the controversy on1· the right to a pre-reduction hearing is 
dead. Its argument runs as follows: The named plaintiffs 
!1.:-.•c ::lG\Y :Uacl Uu; tn)e of ltearing they so11ght and therefore 
nothing remains for the district court to adjudicate with 
respect to them. If the decision of t!w administrative law 
judge should remain undisturbe ':l, they ought not to receive 
pre-decision 'reductions to which they are not entitled; if 
his result should be overturned, they will receive the 
amounts improperly dedncted. \Vhat~ver injury may have 
2929 






been suffered by an improper intermediate dcpr vation, if 
such there were, is beyond the 1)ower of a court o remedy. 
A sl ort nn:m-er to the Government's position is that if 
plaintiffs' rocec1ural claim includes . 1c nght not onlv to 
a full hearing l)l~t to the administrative appeal and judicial 
r~i ,,- r~.-ided hy 42 . ' .. § 405(g), plaintiffs, iTCor~ 
rcct on the due process issue, wou d be entitled to a re-
fund of the amounts deducted right now, without awaiting 
a decision by the Appeals Council and a reviewing court. 
HoweYer, " -e thinl~ t11at the suggestion of mootncss should 
be rejected on broader grounds. 
In Goldberg '· Kelly, 307 U.S. 254, 256 n.2 (1970), 9 the 
Court noted that "[d]nring the course of this. litigation 
most, though not all, of the plaintiffs either receiYed a 
'fair b.eriring' ... or >rere restored to the rolls without 
a hearin3'." Yet the Court did not intimate that the cases 
of these plaintiffs 11ad become moot. The situation was evi- · 
dently thought to cor.1e within the principle which protects 
against a claim of mootness those issues "capable of repeti-
tion, ye.Lev-ading re\~E'w." Southern Pacific Terminal Co. 
v. ICC, 219 U.S. 49S, 515 (1911). See Carroll v. Commis-
sioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-79 (1968); 
llfoore v. Ogilvie, 39:1: U.S. 814, 816 (1969) . The Sol/thern 
Pacific principle has been expanded in such recent. cases 
as Roe Y. n rade, 410 u.s. 113, 125 (1973), and Doe v. Bol-
ton, 410 U.S. 119, 187 (1973), where the pregnancies of 
_ the pregnant plaintiffs must have ended long before the 
cases reached the S:1preme Court, and in S ·ztper Tire Eng'r 
Co. V, McCorl.-le, 416 u.S. 115, 122 (1974), especially as 
regards c1ec1ara tory (as opposed to injunctive) relief, id. 
at 121, wl1ich was all tbat the Supreme Court suggested 
was proper in Super Tire and all that was granted here. 
As against this, there is hardly the same liJ;:elihoocl of the 
9 Go!dberg was not a class action. 
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appearance on the scene of more illegitimate children of 
f.Ir. Frost as tlccre was of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission's directing- another short-term order against the 
Soathem Pacific Terminal Company, of New York's again 
seeking to r cmn,-e the Goldbe·rg plaintiffs from the wel-
fare rolls, or of the R oe and Doe female plaintiffs becom-
ing pregnant again. See Sosna v. Iowa, - - U.S. --, 
- - (1915), -±3 u.S.L.\Y. 4125, 4127-28 (U.S., Jan. 14, 
1975). 
Whether or not the case would be moot if Mrs. Frost \ 
had sued only on behalf of herself and her children, we do ) 
not think it has become so here.10 In Sosna v. Iowa, supra, 
. -the Court refused to dismiss as moot a class action chal-
lenging Iowa's one-year residence requirement for insti-
tuting a di~orce suit because the year had long since ex-
pired for the plaintiff and she had obtained a divorce 
elsewhere. Altho-:1gh considering that the case would have 
become moot if 1frs. Sosna had snecl solely on her own 
behalf, -- U.S. at --, 43 U.S.L.W. at 4127, the Court 
found that "the controversy ... remains very much alive 
for the class of persons she has been certified to r epresent," 
at the appellate stage ·when her own claim was no longer 
so. - - U.S. at--, 43 U.S.L.W. at 4128. The Go\Tern-
ment argues .that the instant case differs significantly. in 
that, although plaintiff pacl moved for designation of the 
suit as a class action before the hearing before the SSA 
administrati~e law judge was held, the district court, with 
the agreement of the parties, had deferred ruling on the 
motion until he rendered his opinion on the merits by 
10 The Secretary's reliance on DeF1mis v. Odeqaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), 
is thus misplaced, since thare plaintiff sought only injunctive relief for · 
himself and :·rud not cast his suit as a class action." Id. at 317. That 
being the case, since plaintiff would never again himself face the law 
school admh .. <:ion process, which he challenged, the question '~>as moot, 
because "the question is certainly not 'capable of repetition' so far as 











which time the henrin6 ltnd been held ancl t1w case decided. 
Our attcntioll is c:1Jleu to the statement in Sosna: 
There ::nust 110t onl? be a nmnccl plaintiff who l1as 
such a ease or controversy at the time tbe complaint 
is filed, ancl nt the time the class action is certi·fied 
by tb e District Court pursuant to Rule 23,11 bnt there 
must be a live controversy at the time this Court 
renews the caseY SEC v. lvi cdical Committee for 
Humo;~ Riolds, supm. The controversy may exist, 
ho11e;er, between a named defendant and a member 
of the class represented by the named plaintiff, even 
though the claim of the named plaintiff has become 
moot. 
11 Tbere oay be ca~es in which the controversy involving the named 
plaintiifs i.3 such that it becomea moot as to them before the District 
Court can r c::tsonably b!' expected to rule on a certification motion. In such 
. instances, -;-;nether the certification can be said to "relate back" to the 
filing of the complaint may depend upon the circumstances of the par-
ticular c:~se and especially the reality of the claim that otherwise the 
issue wo!lld e·.-ade review. 
12 Whe:1 this Court l1as entertained doubt about the continuing nature 
of a case or contro•·crs:;, it has remaudecl the case to the lower court for 
consicler:!ticc of .the possibility of mootness. In(1iana Employment Secu-
rity Dit:ia!o~ \. B~trney, 409 U.S. 540 (1973). 
~- U.S. at --, 4:3 U.S."L.\V. at 4128. But the apparent 
force of ~what was said there in text is largely _chained 
b_y footnote 11, wbiCil sePms to- re?..d directly on thi~ cmse . 
• ' -.l 
"While fooh~o te 11, which was given speedy effect in Ger-
stein v. Pug!! , -- U.S. --, -- n.11 "<1975): 4-~ TT.S. 
L '"(V ~o.-.~ .~ .... ~ 1 (.,..U. S .,.., ' 18 197-) lL k · • l • ·.£-vv, ±~0~ n. 1 . . .1:1 ·eo. , ::> , spea ·s 1n 
11 In Gentril! it was not clear from the record whether any of the named 
rcsponde!:!ts, ~•bo challengec1 Florida procedure which permitted the ex-
t ended p:e~:-i :- 1 detention of arrested persons, without a preliminary 
hearing, s.,1~1y on the basis of the prosecutor's decision to file· an infor-
mation, were st ill in custo(ly when the district conrt certified the class. 
See Cron· '1". California Dep't of Human Reso11rces, -- U.S. --, 43 
U.S.L.W. 3~51 (U.S. Feb. 14, 1975), yncating and remanding 490 F.2d 
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terms of "may'~, it i.s harcl ro think of a case more clearly 
qualifying fc:· i!lclu;,;ion tbm t lli.s one. Mrs. Frost hac1 
raised an issEe 1\l!ic:b wa::; lin to her and the class she 
claimed to represen:. It is readily apparent that the judge 
was prepared to grant ciass action status all along.. Since 
granting t1 t: cla~s actiol1 request ,,·oulc1 have done nothing 
to assist ~Irs. Frost in her immediate and serious :finan-
cial plight, the judge as the first order of business com-
passionately compelled the Secretary to grant within 30 
days the po~·t-reductiou hearing to which she was admit-
tedly entitled. To hold that the completion of that bear-
ing and the renr1ition of judgment by the administrat~ve 
law judge rendered the case moot for the class would 
mean that the important question here at issue could 
never be decided unless a plaintiff or the SSA engaged 
J 
in foot-dragging v;ith. respect to the post-reduction hear-
ing sufficiently- long to enable a district judge to make a 
class action determination . . Such a principle could have 
little to commend it sl?lf. The reason for generally requir-
ing that the conh·o;ersy be ''live" as to the named plain-
tiff at the time of c1ass acEon designation is. that other-
'\\ise the court '\\Oulcl have no assurance that the n~mecl 
plaintiff will 'igorously represent the class. This has 
little applicati.on when, as here, the court has deferred 
class action determinatio~, with the ag:-eement of all par-
ties, pending a n11ing on the merit;;;. The Go7crnm'3nt· has··~··· 
poi11tecl to no resiJect in which this case would have pro-
ceeded differently if the ro11rt horl ccrE.f.ecl this as a cl8s'3 
action on :!.\·o 1emoer 16, 1973, rather than in its decision 
of May 3, 1974. If as :Mr. Justice \Vbite said with some 
justification in bis dissent in Sosna, --U.S. at -. -, 43 
U.S.L.W. at 4131-32 (footnote omitted), "The only spe-
cific, identifiable individual with an evident continuing 
interest in presenting an attack upon the residency re-
quirement is appellant's counsel" and if the Court had 
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O\'crcome tl!i~ by a "legal fiction'' consisting of "the rein-
cation of an abstract entity, 'the class', constituted of face-
less, nm1::1:1 t: cl inc1i':icl.n:tls v.·ho arc deemed to lHtvo a live 
case or conh·o,-er::;y \\·ith ·lippellecs," it scarcely can be 
consequc·ntial iii. a ca::e like tllis whether the named plain-
tiJf ktcl obtained a Leariug in the period \Yhkb, with the 
agreement of the parties, tho court took to m.ako its class 
action determination. 
It was, of course, essential tbat tlte district court assure 
itself "that the named representative will adequately pro-
tect the interests of the class/' Sosna v. Iowa, S1tpra, 
--U.S. at--, 43 U.S.L.\V. at 4128-29. See I~'.R.Civ.P: 
23(a). But the judge had ample ground for deciding that 
plaintiffs or, more realistically, their counsel, would do this, 
indeed had clone this, for persons similarly situated even 
after Mrs. Frost hn.c1 re.ccivcd a hearing before an adrnin-
istrati'e law judge. To be surcJ the named plaintiffs could 
not represent. the class of illegitimate children whose claims 
· would ,,-ork a diminution of amounts previously allowed, 
a status they had not songht.12 But despite some argument 
that they could, 375 F. Snpp. at 1317, the district judge 
came to rest on the sound proposition that "[p]laintiffs 
only purport to represent those recipients of . s\uvivor's 
12 The COJnp1:J.int ''as framed on behalf of all persons entitled .uow or 
in the futu re to .rerei>e benefits under the Act "whose bCiicfits have 
been or m:>.y be rrdu~ea witltO(t t a prior hearing." Certainly such a class 
de~cri;>tion v;onlll not on its face include newly Pntitled illrgitimato chil-
dren or illegitimate cbilclren whuse entitlements have been increased. 
While some such chil<lr!'n might in the future be faced with the prospect 
of rerlnctin'l i'1 h<;>nefits, in Sl'Ch in~t~n~cs they r.onlrl he propP.r members 
of the cla~ s . .In any c>ent, a Reply Affidasit in Support of Class Action 
:Motion 2-nJ. Renewal of Request · for Temporary Relief filecl by co~msel 
for plaint!:?s would ap('Nlr to aclmo-wledge that, where the statutory 
ma..~im:tm ·was a1rcac1y being paic1 (and presumably wltere the statutory 
ma.."Uml;m '~a3 not being paid but where the ac1dition of the illegitimate 
chi!cl or chil.lren v;oulJ pmh the total claims o~·er the statutory m:-~x­
imum), the interest of new c1aim:mts ancl o1cl cbimants would be atl· 
ver~e; the _.\.ffi.clant takes hsue with the question of how mn.ny sur.h 













benefits who ba\e b.acl a do\1.-;,v:;:ncl adjustment in benefits 
without being affcrcled a pr·r·-r.:-c1t:ction oYiclcniiary hG.:ll'-
ing." Jd.13 And ,_,-e do not re,;<1n1 thE:- sta.ten.1cnt with respect 
to notice in Eise;! 1. C:ulisle, 391l.~d 5:JG, 56!h (2 Ci.r. 19GS ), 
as applyi.n6 to class actions EIJcle r F.R.Civ.P. 23(b) (2), see 
Soslla V. Iou·a, supra,-- r.s. at -- 11.4, 3B ]\[oore, li"ecl-
eral Practice Ti 23.55 (197±) . 
V. Th e Jlerits. 
In recent years the Supreme Court has had increasing 
occasion to con.sider to v:hat e::;:tent clue process requin~s 
a. fnll trial-type hearing before administrative action is 
taken when one is pronded p:om~tly thereafter. The lead-
ing case in faYor of such a. requirement in the welfare .ficlcl 
is, of course, Goldberg v. Kelfy, supra, 397 U.S. 254. Recog-
nizing "that some go,-ernm.:::ntal benefits may be admin-
istrati,ely terminated withoat affording the recipient a 
pre-termi:nation enclentiary bearing", 397' U.S. at 2G3 (foot-
note omit.tec1), the Court tho:r;ht n different rule was re-
quired for recipients of aid tUJ.der tl1e federally assisted. 
AFDC program, 42 U.S.C. ~~COl, et seq., and New York's 
Home Relief program, X.Y. Soc. Welf. L. §§ 343, et .seq. 
The crucial factor \\as tbat sucb aid was g-iven to persons 
1 
on the \ery ma-rgin Of subsistence ; in such instances "'tcn:-
minahon of aid pending resolution of a _controversy OYCL_ _ _ 
~!ie,ibility may deprh-e an e;igiuie-rccipient of the very-
means by which to li\e wb.i~e he \\aits", 397 U.S. at 264 
.(emphasis in ori0nn l). 14 'I he oilly opposing inl l're:::b:: wore 
13 Since the jur1ge granted class ~ction sbtus after proper procedures 
and with r.ecessary cefulit<>ne.s:, »e see no force in the Government's 
contention b:uerl on Bt;ard of Sch"Y.JI Commissioners v. Jacobs,-- U.S. 
--, -- (1975), 43 U.S.L_)';'_ 4.23:3 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975), decided 
after the argument 1-lefore us. 
14 :Mr. Justice B:e:1::2!1 con~'lued, id. (footnote omitted) : 
Since be hcks in.!ependent re:;;:nuce:!, hi.'! .situation becomes immt>di-
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those of the . Go,ernment in preserving fiscal ancl admini::;-
trnt ive r esources, and the majority thought that "important 
goyernm cutal interests are promoted by affording recipi-
ents a pre-termination e·videntiary hearing." Icl. In its final 
Vi'eighing of the balance, the Court said, 397 u.s. at 2G6: . 
Thus, the interest of .the eligible recipient in uninter -
rupted r eceipt of public assistance, conr>lecl with the 
State's interest that his payments not be erroneously 
terminated, clearly outweighs the State's competing 
concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and aclmin~ 
istrati.-e burdens. 
As the Chief Justice pointed out, dissenting in a com-
panion case, Trh eele-r v. JJJ ontgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 284-85 
(1970),_2.~ the Goldberg opinion left unanswered whether 
due process required a full-scale hearing in ad vanee of 
aclrninistrati\e action in such matters as ."welfare reduc-
tions or denial of increases as opposed to terminations, or 
decisions concerning initial applications or requests for 
special assistance." The Court has not yet answered these 
questions, except perhaps for a passing observation in 
Richardson v. TTTright, 405 U.S. 208, 209, 1·eh. denied, 405 
U.S. 1033 (1972)/6 primarily because the field has Jar.gcly 
been occupied by administrative regulation. 
The Court has, ho~\·ever, given extensive consic1cratiou I 
to the problem in other t?ontexts. The most rele\·ant is 
A1·nett v. K euner?y, 416- U.S.-134 (1974), sush~i:cillg -the 
ately des::erate. His l!C e"!. t~ .' on~cntra~e t.pvu fmU.ing tl c n•(!::.<:3 for 
daily s:.rbsis~eace, in turn, adYersely affects his ability to seek re -
dre~s from the welfare bmcaucracy. 
15 The disse ::~t applied also to Golc11Jerg, 397 U.S. at 282. 
16 Mr. Justi~ t:l \\hite·s opinion in Arne·tt v. Kennecl.1f, infra, 416 U.S. at 
202, treats t hese remarks as more authoritative than we should have 
suppo:<ed t2·?L!l· to be. IE that is correct, the Wright decision would 
constitute st rong support for tho Government here. 
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validity of procedur e-:: "·herein a federal employee could 
be dismi.s~ecl for c:au~ c . 5 ll.S.C. ~~ 7.JOl(a), on the b:<sis of 
of notice of the action soHg-ht anLl any clmrgc~ prefrnec1 
agains t him, a copy of the charge, a l'C<1S011ahlc time for 
:filing a wi·itten ::ms'.•:er with nffida,·its, and a written deci.-
sioll, 3 U.S.C. ~ 1501 (h)-a pToccclure closely resemblii1g· 
SSA's l)l'e-rcduction procedure here at issuc-·with a full 
evidentiary heariEg t!lereafterY The employee received no 
pay pending the l:.earing, and delays amounted to more 
than three months i.n O\er 50% of the cases ·where the dis-
missal >\·as appealed, ±16 u.S. at 157 (plurality opinion of 
Mr. Justice Relmquist). \Ye find parbicular relevance in 
Mr. Justice Powell~s obser\ation18 that the deprivation of 
income prior to :final resolution 1vas "considerably less 
severe than that in\oh·ed in Goldberg" since ''a public em-
ployee- may "i'ell ha\e independent resources to overcome 
any temporary harclship'' and, if unable to secure a job in 
pri,ate employment, "l':ill he eligible for welfare benefits", 
416 U.S. at 169, and in ~Ir. Justice ·white's discussion, 416 
U.S. at 186-96 and 200-03.19 The Court's decisions can be 
17 By regulation, the~e statutory protections wero enlarged. See 416 
U.S. at 142-46. 
18 :lrr. Justice Po,ell spoke also for :Mr. Justice Blackmun. 
19 Speaking of' Goldberg, ::llr. Justice White snid, 416 U.S. at 201-02: , 
The decision to cut off A.PDC welfa ro p;tyments leaves the recipient ) ~ 
literally mthout any means to surl"ive or support a family. While ~l 
this level of depri>ation ma)' no~ bQ)nsistt>u upPtt ns a l!c·ccssrrry- -~,; 
conJition ior req:.t~g so:ne kind of prcterminntion hearing, it may 
..,-.,JJ b.- de.:'i.•i>e in reqairing the Government to pro\·ide specific 
procedure3 at tJe p:·et;,r!illt.ation sbge. The gre:th;r th'J !~1·"1 of 
depri>ation which may flow from a decision, the less one may tol-
erate the risk of a mistaken decision, cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, supm, 
and thus the C.:mrt in Goldberg, wl1ile maintaining that the pre· 
termination l:earing was in the nature of a probable-cause dcter-
mil;.ation, was le: s willing to allow a margin of error as to probable 
co.~se. Rules of proce,lure are often s1mpeL1 by the risk of making 
an erroneous c1~termination. See In re Winship, 397 U.S 358, 368 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Indeed, all that was specilicnlly 
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fairly- smmnarizecl as holding that the required clt:~gree of 
proc:cdnral s~fegtw.rds varies directly with the importance 
of the private interest oJfcctcd and tlw need for and usc-
ful11ess of tb.~ fJart.icuL:tr safeg·llnrd i11 tl1c g·ivcrl circum-
stances anc1.im-er:::ely with the burden and nuy other ad-
Yerse conseqw~ nces of affordiug it. 
Enn apart from tb.e interests of: the new claimants 
there would be strong grounds for holding this case to be 
attracted by Arnett v. Kennedy rather than by Goldberg 
v. Kelly. 1-\..n element crucial to Goldberg was that the 
benefits at is~ue -were awar~CT on the basis of need and 
represented the last source of income available to the 
families. Tb.e benefits here at issue are not based upon 
need; a mother recen-ing benefits on behalf of herself and 
he"..r..sl.lik~ earn__:!.1P to a statutory maximnm w:lth~ 
~~~~~--~~~~~----~--------out a reduction of her benefits, 42 U.S.a. § 403 (f) ( 3), and 
----------~ -
in no event do her earnings affect the benefits to the chil-
dren. See 4:2 -u.s.a. § -±OS(d). Furthermore ,,-hat is here 
at stake is not a complete termination of benefits, as in 
Goldberg, but a reduction--in the case of Mrs. Frost and 
her children from $-.1:/7.90 to $287.10 per month. ·we do not 
mean to underestimate the gravity of such a re_duction; 
not req,: ired in Goldberg was a complete record and a· ~omprehen-
si>e opi::Uon. 397 U.S. at 267. · 
In thh case, the employee is not_ totally without prospect for 
some form of support. during.J.he parlod becw~;eu. the prete1·minaticn 
· and :fi.::lal hearing on appeal, though it may not be equivalent earn-
ings or tenure to his prior competitive sernce position. Although 
the ernpl<1yee3 mi!y :not La cut!tlcc.l to unemployment compensation, 
- see Christian Y. Xew York:, 414 U.S. 614 (197-1), since he l1as been 
terminated for cause[,] he may get some form of employment in 
the prh·ate sector, ancl, if necessary, may' draw on the welfare sys-
tem in tile interim. Gi>cn the hasic floor of need, which the system 
pro\i<le~, we shoulcl not ho!<l that procedural due process is so iu-
fle:Uble a3 to requ.ire the Court to hold that the procedural pro-
tections, of :t \uitten statement and oral presentation to au impartial 




very likely, as the district court stated, 375 F. Snpp. at 
1322, many famtiics do depend solely or primarily on SSA 
survivors' benefits . But, ns indicated in Anwtt, su~Jm, 416 
U.S. at 169 (}lr . Justice Po·w·ell), 201-02 (}Yir. Justice 
\Vhite), in ca.ses where a reduction in such benefits would 
place a family below the subsistence level, other forms of 
government assistance would become available, ho·wever 
unattracti,-e resort to them may be. The "\Yeights in favor 
of departing from the ordinary principle t11at something 
less than a full-scale evidentiary hearing suffices befor-e 
administrative action, when a full hearing is provided 
pro~ptly thereafter, are thus substantially less t1wn in 
Goldberg. 
Even more important, the weights on the opposite side 
of the scale are significantly greater thnn in_ Goldbe.r.g 
and, for that matter, jn otller types of cases involving 
the i:0tal or partial loss of social benefits "\vhich have come 
before the courts. In all such cases the opposing weights 
have been solely the Govermnent's interests in protecting 
its fiscal and administrati,-e resources- the costs of con-
tinued payment of invalid claims with no likelihood of 
recovery, . and tlle e::s:pense of conducting full evidentiary 
hearings prior to action (more accurately, the incremental 
costs of snell henrings over what "\\rould be incurred in .. . .._ . . 
any post-termination bearings). \Vhile those interests are 
present llere, there are imrort(lnt privat~ interests _as 
well. 'J.1he ur..c1er5tanclP.ble clesi1~ of the legitimate -c111l:-
dten of Mr~ -Frost to avoid a reduction of benefits until 
there has been a determinati-:>n of the genuiueues::; of tlw 
illegitimate claimants after a fuU evidentiary hearing 
(and, for that matter, administrative appeal and judicial 
review) is counterbalancec.l by the equally understand-
able desires of the illegitimate children to begin receiv-
ing payments to which they claim to be entitled without 




ernment counsel has advised tLat SSA now makes pay-
ments ·in excess of the family maximum during the 
relatively sltOrt period allowed for a protest and its reso-
lution, they also state that the course might -..vell be dif-
ferent if the o-..·erpaymcnts had to continue for a longer 
period/0 which can lwrclly be said to be constitutionally 
required, since, in contrast to Goldberg, there would be 
·not merely a possibility but a certainty that it would be 
paying to someone monies that were not legally due. A 
full-scale e\·idcntiary bearing with respect to paternity 
is not likely to he of the simple sort characteristic of 
Goldbe-rg and most of the cases that have followed it, 
where the evidence is readily accessible to the claimant 
and the welfare administr~tor and a pre-termination hear-
- __ -----~---_.i...,.n6g .can ~ be promptly l1eld and- cmt be concluded usually 
within a matter of hours. The legitimate and illegitimate 
=----=- children may not enn be living in the same vicinity, as 
js the case here ·with the four children of Charles Frost, 
____ Jr.; yet a full evidentiary· hearing would require that 
---------- representatins of both sets of cJJildren be afforded an 
opporttlnity to he pre<::cnt, as likewi.se occurred here. 
1\Ioreover, a- paternity hc2.ring may demand an inquiry 
into the habits of a father long before marriage o~· l~mg 
after his ·departure from the matrimonial household. 
_·while this comiderr..tion cuts both ways, the deeper .c.u_t 
i::; in favor of allo-..nng the- SSA-to· act preliminarily-on 
tha..has:is . of-somst-l:li-ng-Jess than a full-scale hearing, par- . 
ticularly ;:;i-. .:~.:e the fact t11at the SSA has no financial 
20 It is tr'le that unc~er its present proceclures the SSA may still be 
involved in exceeding the ru::u.:imnm i.n a case where a post-rei!ucti.on 
full l1e11ring shorrs that the illegitimate children claiming entitl~ment 
were not in fact snch and the reductions are required to be restored. 
But at ·l::ast the SS_\ ·m.n ha>e clone all it can to a>oid t1tis, and the 
amount is nece~sarily less than rrlwt wol11d result from paying both 
sets of children tbrou~hout the period without regard to the ma:"timum. 
See also Claims :Manual T310(c), T316. 
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~take and is toLE:.- c1isiute:!. -tC>t1 rs bet-ween the h :o sets 
of cbirnants shol< U be1p to iu:-:11 r., a correct pre-reduction 
dc·ci:=:ion. Cf. C'r tJ'C -;·. Ca!ifuri!l(' Dcj/t of Huma-n Resources 
Der., -±90 F.2c15SJ, .S S-4: (9 Cr. 1973), ?-·acatcd and 1"C11WIIded 
for tOliSidcratioii-Oj ;noofizess, --U.S.-- , 43 U.S.L.\V. 
3451 (U.S. Feb. 1±, 1975). 
\\'" c thus hold th:t t the SS.:l.'s procedures for a prelimi-
nary pre-reclnctioll c:e-tcrr.1iuation m1 papers, to be follo·wed 
by a full post-reclnction J1earing if 1·equested, conform to 
the requirements of due process. In so ruling we make 
two as5umpi1cns: One is that persons whose benefits are 
--to be reauced sbodd ha\e full access to any SSA :files 
relevant to its re-reduction preliminary consideration if 
they so request. 'Il:!e o.ner 1s n e u hearing should 
-------.__; 
be scheL1ulecl promp""ly and decided \\·itb. all feasible speed. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 74-204 
F. David Mathews, Secretary 
of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, Petitioner, 
v. 
George H. Eldridge. 
On Writ of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit. 
[January -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The issue in this case is whether the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to 
the termination of Social Security disability benefit pay-
ments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for a 
full evidentiary hearing. 
I 
Cash benefits are provided to workers, during periods 
in which they are completely disabled, under the dis-
ability insurance benefits program created by the 1956 
amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act. 70 
Stat. 815, 42 U. S. C. § 423.1 Respondent Eldridge was 
1 The program is financed by revenues derived from employee 
and employer payroll taxes, 26 U. S. C. §§ 3101 (a), 3111 (a); 42 
U. S. C. § 401 (b). It provides monthly benefits to disabled per-
sons who have worked sufficiently to have an insured status, id., 
§ 423 (c) (1) (A), and who have had substantial work experience in 
a specified interval directly preceding the onset of disability. !d. , 
§ 423 (c) (1) (B). Benefits also are provided to the worker's depend-
ents under specified circmnstances. ld., §402 (b), (c)(d). At 
age 65 ·the recipient's disability benefits are automatically converted 
to retirement benefits, id., §§ 416 (1)(2) (D), 423 (a) (1). In fiscal 
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first awarded benefits in June 1968. In March 1972, he 
received a questionnaire from the state agency charged 
with monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge com-
pleted the questionnaire, indicating that his condition 
had not improved and identifying the physicians who had 
treated him recently. The state agency then obtained 
reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant. 
After considering these reports and other information 
in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter that it 
had made tentative determination that his disability 
had ceased in May 1972, The letter included a state-
ment of reasons for the proposed action, and advised 
Eldridge that he might have reasonable time in which 
to obtain and submit additional information pertaining 
to his condition. 
In his written response, Eldridge disputed one char-
acterization of his medical condition.2 The state agency 
then made its final determination that he had ceased to 
be disabled in May 1972. This determination was ac-
cepted by the Social Security Administration, which noti-
fied Eldridge in July that his benefits would terminate 
after that month. The notification also advised him of 
his right to seek reconsideration of this initial deter-
mination within six months. 
1974 over 3,760,000 persons received assistance under the program. 
Social Security Administration, The Year in Review 13 (1975) . 
2 Eldridge originally was disabled due to chronic anxiety and 
back strain. He subsequently was found to have diabetes. The 
tentative determination letter indicated that aid would be termi-
nated because available meclical evidence indicated that his diabetes 
was under control, there existed no significa.nt limitations on his 
back movements which would impose severe functional restrictions, 
and he no longer suffered severe emotional problems that would 
preclude him from all work for which he was qualified. App. 12-13. 
In his reply let ter he claimed to have arthritis of the spine rather 
than a strained back, 
,.. 
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Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge com-
menced this action challenging the constitutional valid-
ity of the administrative procedures established by the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for assessing 
whether there exists a continuing disability, and seeking 
an immediate reinstatement of benefits pending an oral 
hearing on the issue of his disability.3 361 F. Supp. 
520 (WD Va. 1973). The Secretary moved to dismiss on 
the grounds that Eldridge's benefits had been terminated 
in accordance with valid administrative regulations and 
procedures that he had failed to exhaust. Eldridge relied 
exclusively upon this Court's decision in Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), as establishing a right to a 
pretermination oral evidentiary hearing. The Secretary 
contended that Goldberg was not controlling since eli-
gibility for disability benefits is not based on financial 
need and since issues of credibility and veracity do not 
play a significant role in the disability entitlement de-
cision, which turns primarily on medical evidence. 
The District Court concluded that the administrative 
procedures pursuant to which the Secretary had termi-
nated Eldridge's benefits abridged his right to procedural 
due process. The court viewed the interest of the dis-
ability recipient in uninterrupted benefits as indistin-
guishable from that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg. 
It further noted that decisions subsequent to Goldberg had 
demonstrated that the due process requirement of prior 
hearings is not limited to situations involving the dep-
rivation of a vital necessity. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 
407 U. S. 67, 88-89; Bell v. Burson, 403 U.S. 535 (1971). 
Reasoning that disability determinations may involve 
subjective judgments based on conflicting medical and 
nonmedical evidence, the District Court held that prior 
8 The District Court ordered reinstatement of Eldridge's benefits 
pending its final disposition on the merits. 
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to termination of benefits Eldridge must be afforded an 
evidentiary hearing of the type required for welfare 
beneficiaries under Title IV of the Social Security Act. 
!d., at 528.4 Relying entirely upon the District Court's 
opinion, the Court of Appeals for the .Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the injunction barring termination of Eldridge's 
benefits prior to a full evidentiary hearing. 493 .F. 2d 
1230 (1974).5 We reverse. 
II 
At the outset we are confronted by a serious question 
as to whether the District Court had jurisdiction over 
this suit. The Secretary contends that our decision last 
Term in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1974) , bars 
the District Court from considering Eldridge's action. 
Salfi construed 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h) 6 as precluding fed-
eral question jurisdiction in an action challenging the 
duration-of-relationship requirements for surviving wives 
4 The HEW regulations direct that each state plan under the 
federal categorical assist ance programs must provide for pre-tr rmi-
nation hearings containing specified procedural sa feguards, which 
include all of the Goldberg requirements. See 20 CFR § 205.10 (a ) 
(1974). 
5 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, noting simply that 
the issue had been correctly decided by the District Court here, 
reached the same conclusion in Williams v. Weinberger, 494 F . 2d 
1191 (CAS) (per curiam) petition for cert. filed, 43 U. S. L. W. 
3175 (U. S., Sept. 8, 1974) (No. 74-205). 
6 Title 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h) provides in full : 
"Finality of Secretary's decision 
"(h) The findings and decisions of the Secreta.ry after a hearing 
shall be binding upon all individuals who were pa.rties to such hear-
ing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shaJl be re-
viewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as 
herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secre-
t.o'try, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under 
section 41 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this 
subcha.pter." 
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and stepchildren of deceased wage earners contained in 
the Social Security Act. We there held that the only 
avenue of judicial review of denials of claimed benefits 
was through 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g)/ which requires as a 
jurisdictional prerequisite exhaustion of the administra-
tive remedies provided under the Act. 
Section 405 (g) in part provides that 
"[a]ny individual, after any final decision of the 
Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a 
party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, 
may obtain a review of such decision by a civil 
action commenced within sixty days after the mail-
ing to him of notice of such decision or within such 
further time as the Secretary may allow." 
On its face § 405 (g) thus bars review in the district 
courts of any denial of a claim of disability benefits 
until after a "final decision" by the Secretary after a 
"hearing." It is uncontested that Eldridge could haYe 
obtained full administrative review of the termination 
7 Title 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g) in part provides: 
"Judicial review 
"(g) Any individual, after any final derision of the Secretary 
made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the 
amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a 
civil action commenced within sixty days afler the mailing to him 
of notice of such decision or within such further time a the 
SPcretary may allow. Such action shall be brought in the district 
court of the United States for the judicial district in which the 
plaintilT resides or has his principal place of business, or, if he does 
not reside or have his principal place of business within any such 
judicial district, in the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia. . . . Tho court shall have power to enter, upon the 
pleadings and transcript of the record, a juclgmenL affirming, modi-
fying , or reversing the decision of the· Secretary, with or without 
remanding the cau ·e for a rehearing. The findings of the Secretary 
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be 
conclusive .. . . " 
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of his benefits, yet failed even to seek reconsideration of 
the initial determination. Since the Secretary has not 
"waived" the finality requirement as he had in Salfi, 
supra, at 767, he concludes that Eldridge cannot prop-
erly invoke § 405 (g) as a basis for jurisdiction. We 
disagree. 
Salfi identified several conditions which must be satis-
fied in order to obtain judicial review under § 405 (g). 
Of these, the requirement that there be a final decision 
by the Secretary after a hearing was regarded as "central 
to the requisite grant of subject matter jurisdiction." 
!d., at 764.8 Impl"cit in Salfi, however, is the principle 
that this condition consists of two elements, only one of 
which is purely "jurisdictional" in the sense that it can-
not be "waived" by the Secretary in a particular case. 
The nonwaivable element is the requirement that a claim 
for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary. 
Absent such a claim there can be no "decision" of any 
typo. And some decision by the Secretary is clearly 
required by the statute. 
That this requirement is an essential and distinct 
pr.econdition for § 405 (g) jurisdiction is evident from 
the different conclusions that we reached in Salfi with 
respect to the named appellees and the members of the 
class. As to the class members the complaint was found 
to be jurisdictionally deficient since it "contain [ ed] no 
allegations that they have even filed an application with 
8 The other two conditions arc (1) that the civil action be com-
menced within 60 days after the mailing of notice of such decision, 
or within such additional time as the Secretary may permit and 
(2) that the action be filed in an appropriate district court. Salfi, 
sup.ra, at 763-764. These two requirements specify a statute of 
limitations and appropriate venue, and are waivable by the parties. 
As in Salfi no question as to whether Eldridge satisfied these re-
quirements was timely raised below, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proo. 8 (c), 
12 (h)( 1), and they need not be considered here. 
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the Secretary." Ibid. With respect to the named ap-
pellees, however, we concluded that the complaint was 
sufficient since it alleged that they had "fully presented 
their claims for benefits to their district Social Security 
Office, and upon denial, to the Regional Office for recon-
sideration." I d., at 764-765. Eldridge has fulfilled this 
crucial pre~equisite. Through his answers to the state 
agency questionnaire, and his letter in response to the 
tentative determination that his disability had ceased, 
he presented quite specifically the claim that he was still 
disabled and that his benefits should not be terminated. 
This claim was denied by the state agency the SSA. 
The fact that E ldridge failed to raise with the Secre-
tary his constitutional claim of entitlement to a pre-
termination oral hearing is not controlling. 9 As con-
strued in Salfi, § 405 (g) requires only that there be a 
''final decision" by the Secretary with respect to a claim 
of entitlement to benefits. Indeed, the named appellees 
in Salfi did not present their constitutional claim to the 
Secretary. To be sure, the situation here is not iden-
tical to Salfi. The Secretary had no power to amend the 
statute alleged to be unconstitutional in that case, and 
he does have authority to determine the timing and 
content of the procedures challenged here. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 405 (a). We do not, however, regard this difference 
as significant. It is unrealistic to expect that the Secre-
tary would consider substantial changes in the current 
administrative review system at the behest of a single 
aid recipient raising a constitutional challenge in an 
adjudicatory context. The Secretary would not be re-
quired even to consider such a challenge prior to termi-
nating a recipient's benefits. 
9 Even if Eldridge had exhausted the full set of available admin-
istrative review procedures, failure to have raised his constitutional 
claim would not bar him from asserting it later in a district court 
See, e. g., Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 604, 607 (1960). 
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As the threshold jurisdictional element was satisfied, 
we now consider whether the denial of Eldridge's claim 
to continued benefits was a sufficiently "final decision" 
with respect to his constitutional claim to satisfy the 
statutory exhaustion requirement. Eldridge concedes 
that he did not exhaust the full set of internal review 
procedures provided by the Secretary. See 20 CFR 
§§ 404.910, 404.916, 404.940. As Salfi recognized, the 
Secretary may waive the exhaustion requirement if he 
satisfies himself, at any stage of the administrative 
process, that no further review is warranted either be-
cause the internal needs of the agency are fulfilled or 
because the relief that is sought is beyond his power to 
ocnfer. We also agree that under § 405 (g) the power 
to determine when finality has occurred ordinarily rests 
with the Secretary since ultimate responsibility for the 
integrity of the administrative program is his. But 
cases may arise where a claimant's interest in having a 
particular issue resolved promptly is so great that defer-
ence to the agency's judgment is inappropriate. We 
think this is such a case. 
Eldridge's constitutional challenge is entirely collateral 
to his substantive claim of entitlement. Moreover, there 
is a crucial distinction between the nature of the consti-
tutional claim asserted here and that raised in Salfi. A 
claim to a predeprivation hearing as a matter of con-
stitutional right rests on the proposition that full relief 
cannot be obtained at a postdeprivation hearing. See 
Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 156 (1974). 
In light of prior decisions, see, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 
supra; Fuentes v. Shevin, Eldridge raised at least a 
colorable claim that because of his physical condition 
and dependency upon the disability benefits, an erro-
neous termination would damage him in a way not 
recompensable through retroactive payments. Thus, 
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unlike the situation in Salfi, denying Eldridge's substan-
tive claim "for other reasons" or upholding it "under 
other provisions," 422 U. S., at 762, would not answer 
his constitutional challenge. 
We conclude that the denial of Eldridge's request for 
benefits constitutes a final decision for purposes of § 405 
(g) jurisdiction over his constitutional claim.10 We now 
proceed to the merits of that claim.11 
10 Decisions not involving § 405 (g) have emphasized, in different 
contexts, that the nature of the claim being asserted and the con e-
quences of deferment of judicial rc1 iew are important factors in 
determining whether a statutory requirement of finality has been 
satisfied. The role these factors may play in particular cases is 
well illustrated by the intensely "practical" approach which we have 
adopted, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 
(1949), when applying the finality requirements of 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1291, which grants to courts of appeals review over all "final 
decisions" of the district courts, and 2 U. S. C. § 1257, which 
empowers this Court to review only "final judgments" of state 
courts. Sec, e. g., Local No. 438 Construction & General Laborers 
Union v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 550 (1963); Mercantile National 
Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 557-558 (1973); Cohen v. Bene-
ficial Indus. Loan Corp., supra, at 545-546. To be sure certain 
of the policy considerations implicated in § 1257 and § 1291 cases 
are different from those that are relevant here. Compare General 
Laborers Union, supra, at 550; Mercantile National Bank, supra, 
at 558, with McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-195 (1969); 
L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 424-425 (1965). 
But the core principle that even statutorily created finality require-
ments should, if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial 
collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to 
be suffered, remains applicable. 
Our conclusion finds strong support in Harris v. Washington, 
404 U. S. 55 ( 1971), which presented the issue whether a state 
court judgment was final for purpo es of § 1257 jurisdiction. In 
Harris the State attempted to try an individual previously acqtutted 
of a charge of murder stemming from a bombing death for the 
murder of a second person killed in the same explosion. The 
[Footnote 11 is on p. 10] 
10 
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III 
A 
Procedural due process imposes constraints on gov-
ernmental decisions which deprive individuals of "lib-
erty" or "property" interests within the meaning of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
Supreme Court of Washington rejected the defendant's pretrial 
motion that the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeop-
ardy prevented his being tried a second time. Despite the possi-
bility tha,t acquittal after trial might make review here unnecess'lry, 
or that if convicted the defendant might then challenge the validity 
of his conviction, we granted immediate review. Were the defend-
ant subsequently to have prevailed on the merits of his constitu-
tional claim, to have required him to go through the second trial 
prior to bringing his clajm to this Court would have forced him 
to suffer part of the harm which the Fifth Amendment's guarantee 
against double jeopardy is intended to prevent. Similarly, to re-
quire Eldridge to exhaust tho administmiive process as a pre-
requisite to obtaining judicial review would be to force him to 
suffer an injury that could not be rectified by posttermina.tion 
relief even if he were to prevn il on the merits. 
11 Given our conclusion that jurisdiction in the District Court 
wa.s propt>r under § 405 (g), we find it unnecessary to consider 
Eldridge's contention that notwithstanding § 405 (h) there was 
jurisdiction over his claim under the mandamus statute, 28 U.S. C. 
§ 1361, or tho Administmtive Procedure Act. 5 U. S. C. § 701 
et seq. In view of our dispisition of the constitutional issue in this 
case we also find it unnecessary to consider whether, even if juris-
diction by tho District Court was proper under § 405 (g), the scope 
of relief that the court ordered was not. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 
supra, at -, n, 8. Section 405 (g) empowers a district court to 
enter "a judgment affinning, modifying, or reversing the decision 
of the Secretary .. . . " The court below granted equitable relief, 
holding inter alia that Eldridge must be given an evidentiary hear-
ing prior to termination of his benefits. Although the parties do 
not directly address tllis issue, the Secretary apparently concedes 
that declaratory or injunctive remedies may in some circumstances 
be appropriate under § 405 (g). Supplemental and Reply Brief for 
the Petitioner 9. 
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ment. The Secretary does not contend that procedural 
due process is inalJ]Jlicable to terminations of social se-
curity disability benrfi.ts. He recognizes, as has been 
implicit in our prior deciRions, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher, 
404 U. S. 78, 80-81 (1971); Richardson v. Perales, 402 
n. S. 389, 401--402 (1971); Fleming V. Nestor, 363 U. s~ 
603, 611 (1960), that the interest of an individual in 
continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created 
"property" interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. 
Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 166 (PowELL, J., 
concurring); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 
576-578 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 539 
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 261-262. Ra_ther 
the Secretary contencis that the existing administrative 
procedures provide all the process that is constitutionally 
due before a recipient can be deprived of that interest. 
'This Court consistantly has held that some forn;t of 
hearing is required before an individual is finally de-
prived of a property interest. See, e. g., Dent v. West 
Tfirginia, 129 U. S. 114 (1889); North American Cold 
Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 ( 1908); Phillips ':· 
Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 (1931); Bell v. Burson, 
supra; North Georgia Finishing, In c. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 
422 U. S. (1975). The "right to be heard before being 
condemned to suffer a grievous loss of any kind, even 
though it may not involve the stigr1a and hardships of 
criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society." 
Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The fundamental 
requirement of due process is the c. portunity to be heard 
"at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). See 
Grannis v. Ordeau, 234 U. S. 385, 394 ( 1914). The re-
spondent agrees that if disability benefits were continued 
until after the evidentiary hearing stage of the admin-
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istrative process, the administrative and judicial pro-
cedures that may be invoked by a claimant before the 
initial determination of ineligibility becomes final would 
be adequate. The dispute centers upon what process is 
due prior to the initial termination of benefits, pending 
review. 
In recent years this Court increasingly has had oc-
casion to consider to what extent due process requires 
an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of some 
type of property interest even if a full hearing is provided 
thereafter. In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 
has the Court held that a hearing closely approximating 
a judicial trial is necessary. In other cases requiring 
some type of pretermination hearing the Court has 
spoken sparingly about the requisite procedures. Sni-
dach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 ( 1969), in-
volving garnishment of wages, was entirely silent on the 
matter. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 ( 1972), the 
Court said only that in a replevin suit between two 
private parties the initial determination required some-
thing more than an ex parte proceeding before a court 
clerk. Similarly, Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 540 
(1971), held that in the context of the revocation of a 
state-granted driver's license, due process required only 
that the initial hearing involve a probable-cause deter-
mination as to the fault of the licensee, and "need not 
take the form of a full adjudication of the question of 
liability." More recently, in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 
U.S. 134 (1974), we sustained the validity of procedures 
by which a federal employee could be dismissed for cause. 
They included notice of the action sought, a copy of the 
charge, reasonable time for filing a written response, and 
an opportunity for an oral appearance. Following dis-
missal, a full evidentiary hearing was provided. See id., 
at 142-146. 
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These decisions serve to underscore the truism that 
" 'due process,' unlike some legal rules is not a technical 
conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place 
and circumstances .... " Cafeteria & Restaurant Work-
ers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961). 
"[D] ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands." Jvi or-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). Accordingly, 
resolution of the issue whether the administrative pro-
cedures provided here constitutionally sufficient requires 
analysis of the governmental and private interests that 
are affected. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 167-168 
(PowELL, J., concurring); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 
263-266; Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. 
McElroy, supra, at 895. More precisely, our prior de-
cisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates 
of due process generally requires consideration of three 
distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the pro-
cedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's in-
terest, included the function involved and the admin-
istrative burden that the additional or substitute pro-
cedural requirement would entail. See, e. g., Goldberg v. 
Kelly, supra, at 263-271. 
We turn first to a description of the procedures for 
the termination of Social Security disability benefits, and 
thereafter consider the factors bearing upon the consti-
tutional adequacy of such procedures. 
B 
The disability insurance program is administered 
through a combination of state and federal agencies. 
State agencies make the initial determination whether 
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a disability exists, when it began, and when it ceased. 
42 U. S. C. § 421.12 The standards applied and the pro-
cedures followed are prescribed by the Secretary, see id., 
§ 421 (b), who has delegated his responsibilities and 
powers under the Act to the Social Security Administra-
tion (SSA), see 40 Fed. Reg. § 4473. 
In order to establish initial and continued entitle-
ment to disability benefits a worker must demonstrate 
that he is unable: 
"to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 
reason of any medically determinable physical or 
mental impairment which can be expected to result 
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to 
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 
months, ... " 42 U.S. C. § 423 (d)(1)(A). 
To satisfy this test the worker bears a continuing burden 
of showing, by means of "medically acceptable clinical 
and laboratory diagnostic techniques," id., § 423 (d)(3), 
a physical or mental impairment of such severity that: 
"he is not only unable to do his previous work but 
cannot, considering his age, education, and work ex-
perience, engage in any other kind of substantial 
gainful work which exists in the national economy, 
regardless of whether such work exists in the im-
12 In all but six States the state vocational rehabilitation agency 
charged with administering the state plan under the Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act, 41 Stat. 735, as amended, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 
III) § 701 et seq., acts as the "state agency" for purposes of the 
disability insurance program. Staff of the H. Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Report on the Disability Insurance 
Program 148 (1974) (hereinafter Staff Report). This use of state 
agencies was intended to encourage rehabilitation contacts by dis-
abled workers and to utilize the well-established relationships of 
these local agencies with the medical profession. H. Rep. No. 1698, 
83d Cong., 2d Sess., 23-24 (1954) . 
7 4--204--0PINION 
MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE 15 
mediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific 
job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be 
hired if he applied for work." I d., § 423 ( d)(2) (A) .~3 
The principal reasons for benefits terminations arc that 
the worker is no longer disabled or has returned to work. 
As Eldridge's benefits were terminated because he was 
determined to be no longer disabled, we consider only 
the sufficiency of the procedures involved in such cases.14 
Determinations that a worker's disability has ceased 
because of medical recovery typically occur, as in this 
case, as a result of a scheduled medical examination. 
The continuing eligibility investigation is made by a 
state agency acting through a "team" consisting of a 
physician and a nonmedical person trained in disability 
evaluation. The agency communicates with the dis-
abled worker, usually by mail- in which case he is sent 
a detailed questionnaire-or by telephone, and requests 
information conoerning his prercnt condition, including 
current medical restrictions and sources of treatment, and 
any additional information that he considers relevant to 
13 Work which exists in the national economy is in turn defined 
as "work which exists in significant numbers either in the region 
where such individual lives or in several regions of the country." 
42 U.S. C. §423 (d)(2)(A). 
14 Because the continuing disability investigation concerning 
whether a claimant has returned to work is usually done directly 
by the SSA Bureau of Disability Insurance, without any state agency 
involvement, the administrative procedures prior to the posttermina-
tion evidentiary hearing differ from those involved in cases of pos-
sible medical recovery. They are similar, however, in the important 
respect that the process relies principally on written communications 
and there is no provision for an oral hearing prior to the cut-off of 
benefits. Due to the nature of the relevant inquiry, in cases in-
volving self-employment, agricultural employment, or voluntary re-
port of work activity with a future medical re-examination date, 
the SSA office nearest the beneficiary interviews the beneficiary as 
part of the pretermination process. CM § 6705.2 (c). 
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his continued entitlement to benefits. SSA Claims 
Manual § 7605.1 (CM); Disability Insurance State 
Manual § 353.3 (DISM) .15 
Information regarding the recipient's current condition 
is also obtained from his sources of medical treatment. 
D ISM § 353.2 (B). If there is a conflict between the 
information provided by the beneficiary or his physician 
and that obtained from other medical sources, the agency 
may arrange for an examination by an independent con-
sulting physician.16 !d., §§ 353.2E, 353.5. Whenever 
the agency's tentative assessment of the beneficiary's 
condition differs from his own assessment, the beneficiary 
is informed of the proposed administrative action, pro-
vided a summary of the evidence upon which the deter-
mination is based, and afforded an opportunity to review 
the medical reports and other evidence in his case file.17 
He also may respond in writing and submit additional 
evidence. I d., § 353.6. 
The state agency then makes its final determination, 
which is reviewed by an examiner in the SSA Bureau 
of Disability Insurance. 42 U. S. C. § 421 (c); CM 
§ § 6701 (b), (b) .18 If as is usually the case, the SSA 
15 Information is also requested con coming his belief as to 
whether he can return to work, the nature and extent of his em-
ployment during the past year, and any vocational services he is 
receiving. 
16 All medical source evidence used to establish the absence of 
continuing disability must be in writing, with the source properly 
identified. DISM § 353.4C. 
17 The disability recipient is not permitted personally to examine 
the medical reports contained in his file. This restriction is not 
significant since he is entitled to have any representative of his 
choice, including lay friends or family members, examine all medical 
evidence. CM § 7314. Sec also 20 CFR § 401.3 (a) (2). The Sec-
retary informs us that this curious limitation is currently under 
review. . 
18 The SSA may not itself revise the state agency's determination 
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accepts the agency determination it notifies the recipient 
in writing, informing him of the reasons for the decision, 
and of his right to seek de novo reconsideration by the 
state agency. 20 CFR §§ 404.907, 404.909.19 Upon ac-
ceptance by the SSA benefits are terminated effective 
two months after the month in which medical recovery is 
found to have occurred. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) 
§ 423 (a). 
If the recipient seeks reconsideration from the state 
agency and the determination is adverse, he then has a 
right to an evidentiary hearing before an administrative 
law judge. I d., § 404.927. The hearing is nonadversary; 
the SSA is not represented by counsel or other staff. As 
at all prior and subsequent stages of the administrative 
process, however, the claimant may be represented by 
counsel or other spokesmen. I d., § 404.9,34. If this 
hearing results in an adverse decision, the claimant is en-
titled to request discretionary review by the SSA Appeals 
Council, id., § 404.9'45, and finally may obtain post-
termination judicial review. 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g); 20 
CFR § 404.951.20 
Should it be determined at any point after termination 
of benefits, that the claimant's disability extended be-
to be more favorable to the beneficiary. If, however, it believes 
that the worker is still disabled, or that the disability lasted longer 
than determined by the state agency, it may return the file to the 
agency for further consideration in light of SSA's views. The 
agency is free to reaffirm its original assessment. 
19 The reconsideration assessment is initially made by the state 
agency, but usually not by the same persons who considered the 
case originally. R. Dixon, Social Security Disability and Mass 
Justice 32 (1973). Both the recipient and the agency may adduce 
new evidence. The SSA reviews the reconsideration determina-
tion and notifies the recipient of the decision. 
20 Unlike all prior levels of review, which are de novo, the Dis-
trict Court is required to treat findings of fact as conclusive if sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S. C.§ 405 (g). 
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yond tho date of cessation initially established, the 
worker is entitled to retroactive payments. Cf. 42 
U.S. C. § 423 (b); 20 CFR §§ 404.501, 404.504.21 If, on 
the other hand, a beneficiary receives any payments to 
which he is later determined not to be entitled, the stat-
ute authorizes the Secretary to attempt to recoup these 
funds in specified circumstances. 42 U. S. C. § 404. 22 
c 
As in Goldberg, the only function of the pretermination 
administrative inquiry is "to produce an initial determi-
nation of the validity of the [state agency's] grounds for 
discontinuance of payments." 397 U. S., at 267. De-
spite the elaborate character of the administrative pro-
cedures provided by the Secretary, the courts below held 
them to be constitutionally inadequate, concluding that 
due process requires a full evidentiary hearing. Since 
a recipient whoso benefits are terminated is awarded full 
retroactive relief if he ultimately prevails, his actual in-
jury consists of the interruption of this source of income 
during the interim. His potential injury is thus similar 
in nature to that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg, see 
397 U. S., at 263-264, the nonprobationary federal em-
ployee in Arnett, see 416 U. S., at 146, and the garnished 
wage earner in Sniadach, see 395 U. S., at 341-342. 23 
21 Although the statutory basis for these payments is not unnm-
biguous, we assume, for purposes of this decision, thaL the Secre-
tary's unchallenged representation that such payments in fact are 
made is correct. 
22 The Secretary may reduce other payments to which the bene-
ficiary is entitled, or seek the payment of a refund, unless the 
beneficiary is "without fault" and such adjustment or recovery would 
defeat the purposes of the Act or be "against equity and good 
conscience." 42 U. S. C. § 4.04. (b). See generally 20 CFR 
§§ 404.501-404.515. 
2 ~ This, of conrse, assumes that an erronrously garnished em-
ployee is subsequently able to recover his back wages. 
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Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process re~ 
quires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary dep-
rivation. It was emphasized there that welfare assist~ 
ance was given to persons on the very margin of 
subsistence: 
"The crucial factor in this context-a factor not 
present in the case of ... virtually anyone else whose 
governmental entitlements are ended-is that ter~ 
minat.ion of aid pending resolution of a controversy 
over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of 
the very means by which to live while he waits." 
397 U.S., at 264 (emphasis in original). 
Eligibility for disability benefits is not based upon 
financial need. 24 Indeed, it is wholly unrelated to the 
worker's income or support from most other sources, 
such as employment of other family members, workmen's 
compensation awards,25 savings, tort claims awards, pri.: 
vate insurance, public or private pensions, veterans bene~ 
fits, food stamps, public assistance, or the "many other 
important programs both public and private, which con~ 
tain provisions for disability payments affecting a sub-
stantial portion of the work force . .. . " Richardson v. 
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 85-87 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). See Staff Report on the Disability Insurance Pro-
gram, House Comm. on Ways & Means, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess., 9-10, 419-429 (1974). 
24 The level of benefits is determined by the worker's average 
monthly earnings during the period prior to disability, his age, 
and other factors not directly related to financial need spccilicd in 
42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 415. See 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) 
§ 423 (a) (2). 
25 Workmen's compensation benefits, however, arc deducted in 
part in accordance with a statutory formula. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. 
III) § 424a; 20 CFR § 404.408; see Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 
78 (1971). 
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The level of deprivation that may be created by a 
particular decision is a factor to be considered in assess-
ing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking 
process. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
Although the Secretary is correct that the potential 
deprivation here is less than in Goldberg, we think he 
overstates the degree of difference. As the District Court 
emphasized, to remain eligible for benefits a recipient 
must be "unable to engage in substantial gainful ac-
tivity." 42 U. S. C. § 423; 361 F. Supp., at 523. Thus, 
in contrast to the discharged federal employee in Arnett, 
see 416 U. S., at 169 (PowELL, J., concurring); 416 U. S., 
at 202 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part), there may be little possibility that the terminated 
recipient will be able to find even temporary employ-
ment to ameliorate the loss prior to an evidentiary 
hearing. 
As we recognized lfl~t Term in Fusari v. Steinberg, 
422 U.S. 379, 389 (1975), "the possible length of wrong-
ful deprivation of . .. benefits [also] is an important factor 
in assessing the impact of official action on private in-
terests." The Secretary concedes that the delay between 
a request for an 2Jministrative hearing and a decision 
on the claim is currently between 10 and 11 months. 
Since a terminated recipient must first obtain a recon-
sideration decision as a prerequisite to invoking his right 
to a hearing, the actual delay between the cut-off of 
benefits and final decision after a hearing is over one 
year. In view of the torpidity of this administrative review 
process, cf. id., at 383-384, 386, and the relatively modest 
resources of the family unit of the physical disabled 
worker, 26 the hardship imposed upon the erroneously 
26 Amici cite statistics compiled by tho Secretary which indicate 
that in 1965 the mean income of the family unit of a disabled 
worker was $3,803, while the median income for a similar grouping 
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terminated disability recipient may in some cases be 
significant. 
We do not underestimate the potential seriousness of 
even a temporary interruption of disability benefits. 
Still, the disabled worker's need is likely to be less than 
that of a welfare recipient. In addition to the greater 
probability of access to private resources, other forms of 
government assistance will become available where the 
termination of disability benefits places a worker or his 
family below the subsistence leveP7 See Arnett, supra, 
at 169 (POWELL, J., concurring), id., at 201-202 (WHITE, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In view 
of these potential sources of temporary income, the 
weights in favor of departing from the ordinary prin-
ciple, established by our prior decisions, that something 
was $2,836. The mean liquid assets-i. e., cash, stocks, bonds-of 
the::>e family units was $4,862; the median was $940. These statistics 
do not take into account the family unit's nonliquid assets-i. e., 
automobile, real estate, or the like. 
27 Amici emphasize that because an identical definition of disabil-
ity is employed in both the Title II Social Security Program and in 
the companion welfare system for the disabled, Supplemental Se-
curity Income (SSI), compare 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (1) with id., 
§ 1382c (a)(::!), the terminated di8ability benefits recipient will be 
ineligible for the SSI Program. There exist, however, state and 
local welfare programs which may supplement the worker's income. 
In addition, the worker's household unit can qualify for food stamps 
if it meets the financial need requirements. See 7 U. S. C. §§ 2013 
(c), 2014 (b); 7 CFR § 271. Finally, in 1974 480,000 of the ap-
proximately 2,000,000 disabled workers receiving Social Security 
benefits also received SSI benefits. Since financial need is a criterion 
for eligibility under the SSI program, those disabled workers who 
are most in need will in the majority of cases be receiving SSI bene-
fits when disability insurance aid is terminated. And, under the 
SSI program, a pretermination evidrntiary hearing is provided, if 
requested. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 1383 (c); 20 CFR § 416.1336 
(c) ; 40 Fed. Reg. 1512; sec Staff Report 346. 
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less than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to 
administrative action are therefore less than in Goldberg. 
D 
An additional factor is the fairness and reliability of 
the current pretermination procedures, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards. Cen-
tral to the evaluation of any administrative process is 
the nature of the relevant inquiry. In order to remain 
eligible for benefits the disabled worker must demon-
strate by means of "medically acceptable clinical and 
diagnostic techniques," 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (3), that 
he is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful ac-
tivity by reason of any medically determinable physical 
or mental impairment .... " !d., § 423 (a) (1) (A) (em-
phasis supplied). In short, a medical judgment as to the 
worker's physical or mental condition is required. This 
is a more sharply focused and easily documented inquiry 
than the typical determination of welfare, entitlement. 
In the latter case, a wide variety of information may be 
deemed relevant, and issues of witness "credibility and 
voracity" often are critical to the decisionmaking process. 
Goldberg noted that in such circumstances "written sub-
missions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision." 
397 U. S., at 269. 
By contrast, the decision whether to discontinue dis-
ability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon "routine, 
standard and unbiased medical reports by physician 
specialists" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U, S. 389, 404 
( 1971), concerning a subject whom they have personally 
examined. 28 In Richardson the Court recognized the 
28 The decision is not purely a question of the accuracy of a medi-
cal diagnosis since the ulLimate issue which the state agency must 
resolve is whether in light of the particular worker's "age, education, 
and work experience" he cannot "engage in any . . . substantial 
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"reliability and probative worth of written medical re-
ports," emphasizing that while there may be "profes-
sional disagreement with medical conclusions" the spec-
ter of questionable credibility and veracity is not 
present." !d., at 405, 407. To be sure, credibility and 
veracity may be a factor in the ultimate disability assess-
ment in some cases. But procedural due process rules 
are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-
finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not 
the rare exceptions. The potential value of an eviden-
tiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the decision-
maker, is substantially less in this context than in 
Goldberg. 
The decision in GoldbPrg was also based on the Court's 
conclusion that written submissions were an inadequate 
substitute for oral presentation because they did not 
provide an effective means of communication. Written 
submissions were viewed as an unrealistic option, for 
most recipients lacked the "educational attainment nec-
essary to write effectively" and could not afford profes-
sional assistance. In addition, such submissions would 
not provide the "flexibility of oral presentations" or 
g:~i J tful work which exists in the national economy .... " 42 U.S. C. 
~ 123 (d)(~)(A). Yet information concerning each of these char-
.Ltleristics is amenable to effective written presentation. The value 
of a full evidentiary hearing, or even a limited oral presentation, to 
an accurate presentation of those factors to the decisionmaker does 
not appear substantial. Similarly, resolution of the inquiry as to 
the types of employment that potentially exist in the national 
economy for a physically impaired worker with a particular set of 
skills would not necessarily be advanced by an oral evidentiary 
hraring. Cf, Davis, Admini~:mtive Law Treatise § 7.06, at 429 
(1958) ("legislative facts"). Tho types of statistical i11formation rele-
vant to this judgment are more amenable to written than oral 
presentation. 
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"permit the recipient to mold his presentation to the 
issues the decision maker appears to regard as impor-
tant." 397 U. S., at 269. In the context of the dis-
ability benefits entitlement assessment the current ad-
ministrative procedures fully answer these objections. 
The detailed questionnaire which the state agency 
sends the recipient when a question arises as to his 
continued disability identifies with particularity the 
information relevant to the entitlement decision. More-
over, the recipient is invited to obtain assistance from 
the local SSA office in completing the questionnaire, 
and the supporting medical information usually is 
readily available in the form of the treating physician's 
written diagnosis. This information may be supported 
by X-rays and the results of clinical or laboratory tests. 
Thus, the type of information most relevant to a claim-
ant's physical or mental condition is typically more 
amenable to written than to oral presentation. Cf. 
W. Gellhorn & C. Byse, Admi 1istrative Law-Cases and 
Comments 860-863 (6th ed. 1974). 
A further safeguard against mistake is th~ policy of 
allowing the disability recipient or his representative full 
access to all information reli:ed upon by the state agency. 
In addition, prior to the c Jtoff of benefits the agency 
informs the recipient of its tentative assessment, the 
reasons therefor, and provides a summary of the evi-
dence that it considers most relevant. Opportunity is 
then afforded the recipient to submit additional evi-
dence or arguments, enabling him to challenge directly 
the accuracy of information in his file as well as the 
correctness of the agency's tentative conclusions. These 
procedures, again as contrasted with those before the 
Court in Goldberg, enable the recipient to "mold" his 
argument to respond to the precise issues which the 
decisionmaker regards as crucial. 
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Despite these carefully structured procedures, amtct 
point to the significant reversal rate for appealed cases 
as clear evidence that the current process is inadequate: 
Depending upon the base selected and the line of analy-
sis followed, the relevant reversal rates urged by the 
contending parties vary from a high of 58.6% for ap-
pealed reconsideration decisions to an overall reversal 
rate of only 3.3%. 29 Bare statistics rarely provide a 
satisfactory measure of the fairness of the current pre-
termination process. The administrative review system 
under attack here is operated on an open-file basis. A 
recipient may always submit new evidence, and such 
submissions may result in additional medical examina-
tions. Such fresh examinations are held in approxi-
mately 30% to 40% of the appealed cases, either at the 
reconsideration or hearing stage of the administrative 
process. Staff Report 238. In this context, the value 
of reversal rate statistics as one means of evaluating the 
adequacy of the pretermination process is diminished. 
Thus, although we view such information as relevant, it 
is certainly not controlling in this case. 
29 By focusing solely on the reversal rate for appealed recon-
sideration determinations amici overstate the relevant reversal rate. 
As we indicated last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg, 422 U. S., at 383 
n. 6, in order fully to assess the reliability and fairness of a system 
of procedure, one must also consider the overall rate of error for 
all denials of benefits. Here that overall rate is 12.2%. Moreover, 
about 75% of these reversals occur at the reconsideration stage of 
the administrative process. Since the median period between a 
request for reconsideration review and decision is only two months, 
Brief for Amici AFL--CIO/Greene, App. 4a, tho deprivation of the 
erroneously terminated recipient is significantly less than that con-
commitant in the more lengthy delay before an evidentiary hearing. 
Netting out these reconsideration reversals the overall reversal rate 
falls to 3.3%. 
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E 
In striking the appropriate due process balance the 
final factor to be assessed is the public interest. This 
includes the administrative burden and other societal 
costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter 
of constitutional right, an evidentiary hearing upon de-
mand in all cases prior to the termination of benefits. 
The more visible burden would be the incremental cost 
resulting from the increased number of hear.ings and the 
expense of providing benefits to ineligible recipients pend-
ing decision. No one can predict the extent of the in-
crease, but the fact that full benefits would continue until 
after such hearings would assure the exhaustion in most 
cases of this attractive option. Nor would the theoretical 
right of the Secretary to recover undeserved benefits 
result, as a practical matter, in any substantial offset to 
the added outlay of public funds. The parties submit 
widely varying estimates of the probable additional cost. 
We only need say that experience with the constitution-
alizing of government procedures suggests that the ulti-
mate additional cost would be substantial. 
In most circumstances, as here, financial cost is not a 
compelling weight in the assessment whether due process 
requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to some 
administrative action. But the Government's interest, 
and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal 
and administrative resources, is a factor that must be 
weighed. At some point the benefit of an additional 
safeguard to the individual affected by the administra-
tive action and to society in terms of increased assur-
ance that the action is just, will be outweighed by the 
cost. Significantly, the cost of protecting those who the 
preliminary administrative process has identified as likely 
to be found undeserving may in the end come out of the 
pockets of the deserving since resources available for any 
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particular program of social welfare cannot be unlimited. 
See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, J 23 Penn. L. Rev. 
1267, 1276 (1975). 
But more is implicated in cases of this type than ad hoc 
balancing of monetary costs against the interests of a 
particular class of claimants. The ultimate balance in-
volves a determination as to when, under our constitu-
tional system, judicial type procedures must be imposed 
upon administrative action to assure fairness. We re-
iterate the wise admonishment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
that differences in the origin and function of administra-
tive agencies "preclude wholesale transplantation of the 
rules of procedure, trial, and review which have evolved 
from the history and experience of the courts." FCC v. 
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 140 (1940). 
The judicial model is neither a required, nor even the 
most effective method of decisionmaking in all circum~ 
~tances. The essence of due process is the requirement 
that "a person in jeopardy of serious loss" be given 
notice of the case against . him and an opportunity to 
meet it." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. M c-
Grath, supra, at 171-172. (Franldurter, J., concurring). 
All that is necessary is that by "tailor[ing] the [pro-
cedures] to the capacities and circumstances of those who 
are to be heard," Goldberg, supra, at 268-269, they be 
given a mean'•1gful opportun~ty to present their case. 
In assessing w·. rt process is due, substantial weight must 
be given to the goocl-faith judgments of the individuals 
charged by Congress with the administration of the social 
welfare system that the procedures they have provided 
fairly deal with the entitlement claims of individuals. 
See Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 202 (WHITE, J., concur-
ring and dissenting in part). This is especially so where, 
as here, the prescribed procedures not only provide the 
claimant with an effective process for asserting his claim 
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prior to any administrative action, but also assure a 
right to an evidentiary hearing, as well as to subsequent 
judicial review, before the denial of his claim becomes 
final. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 402 U. S. 371, 378 
( 1971). 
We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not re-
quired prior to the termination of disability benefits and 
that the present administrative procedures fully comport 
with due process. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
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The Issue in this case IS whether the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to 
the termination of Social Security disability benefit pay-
ments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for a 
full evidentiary heanng·. 
I 
Cash benefits are provided to workers during periods 
in which they are completely disabled under the dis-
ability insurance benefits program created by the 1956 
amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act. 70 
Stat. 815, 42 U S C. § 423.1 Respondent Eldridge was 
1 The program is financed by revenues derived from employee 
and employer payroll taxes. 26 U S. C. §§ 3101 (a), 3111 (a) , 42 
U, S. C. § 401 (b) It prov1des monthly benefits to disabled per-
sons who have workerl a sufficient amount of time to have an insured 
status, td., § 423 (c) (l) (A), and who have had substantial work ex-
penenc<' m a :>JWclficd mtt'rval duectly preceding the onset of dis-
nlHhty I d., § 423 (c) (1) (B). Benefits also are prov1ded to the 
worker's depmdent'5 under ,;pec1fied circumstances. !d., §§ 402 (b)-
( d). Wht•n tho n·mp1ent reaches age 65 Ius d1sabuity benefits are 
~.~.~ttomat.icall ' ~"Onwrted to retir<'moot b<'nefits., ld 1 §§ 416 {Z) (D)» 
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first awarded benefits in June 1968. In March 1972, he 
received a questionnaire from the state agency charged 
with monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge com-
pleted the questionnaire, indicating that his condition 
had not improved and identifying the medical sources, 
including physicians from which he had received treat-
ment recently. The state agency then obtained re-
ports from his physiCian and a psychiatric consultant. 
After considering 'these reports and other information 
in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter that it 
had made a tentative determination that his disability 
had ceased in May 1972, The letter included a state-
ment of reasons for the proposed termination of benefits, 
and advised Eldridge that he might request reasonable 
time in which to obtain and submit additional informa-
tion pertaining to his condition. 
In his written response, Eldridge disputed one char-
acterization of his medical condition and indicated that 
the agency already had enough evidence to establish his 
disability.2 The state agency then made its final deter-
mination that he had ceased to be disabled in May 1972. 
This determination was accepted by the Social Security 
Administration ( SSA), which notified Eldridge in July 
that his benefits would terminate after that month. 
423 (a) (1) . In fiscal1974 approximately 3,700,000 persons received 
assistance under the program. Social Security Administration, The 
Year in Review 21 (1974) . 
2 Eldridge originally was disabled due to chronic anxiety and 
back strain. He subsequently was found to have diabetes. The 
tentative determination letter indicated that aid would be termi-
nated because available medical evidence indicated that his diabetes 
was under control, that there existed no limitations on his back 
movements which would Impose severe functional restrictions, 
and that he no longer suffered emotional problems that would 
preclude him from all work for which he was qualified. App. 12-13. 
In his reply letter he claimed to have arthritis of the spine rather 
:than a strained back, 
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The notification also advised him of his right to seek 
reconsideration by the state agency of this initial deter-
mination within six months, 
Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge com-
menced this action challenging the constitutional valid· 
ity of the administrative procedures established by the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for assessing 
whether there exists a continuing disability. He sought 
an immediate reinstatement of benefits pending an oral 
hearing on the issue of his disability.3 361 F. Supp. 
520 (WD Va. 1973) . The Secretary moved to dismiss on 
the grounds that Eldridge's benefits had been terminated 
in accordance with valid administrative regulations and 
procedures and that he had failed to exhaust these reme-
dies. In support of his contention that due process re· 
quires a pretermination hearing, Eldridge relied exclu-
sively upon this Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U. S, 254 (1970), which established a right to an 
oral evidentiary hearing prior to termination of welfare 
benefits. The Secretary contended that Goldberg was 
not controlling since eligibility for disability benefits, un-
like eligibility for welfare benefits, is not based on finan-
cial need and since issues of credibility and veracity do 
not play a significant role in the disability entitlement 
decision , which turns primarily on medical evidence. 
The District Court concluded that the administrative 
procedures pursuant to which the Secretary had termi-
nated Eldridge's benefits abridged his right to procedural 
due process. The court viewed the interest of the dis-
ability recipient in uninterrupted benefits as indistin-
guishable from that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg. 
It further noted that decisions subsequent to Goldberg 
demonstrated that the due process requirement of pre-
~ The District Court ordered reinstatement of Eldridge's ben~Jits 
pendl:n:g it,g final dispo.~tt,ion on the merits." 
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termination heanngs is not limited to situations involv-
mg the deprivation of vital necessities. See Fuentes v. 
Shemn, 407 U. S. 67, 88-89 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 
U. S. 535 (1971) Reasoning that disability determina-
tions may involve subjective judgments based on con-
flicting medical and nonmedical evidence, the District 
Court held that prior to termination of benefits Eldridge 
must be afforded an evidentiary hearing of the type re-
qmred for welfare beneficiaries under Title IV of the 
Social Security Act. I d., at 528.4 Relying entirely upon 
the District Court's opinion, the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the injunction barring termi-
nation of Eldridge's benefits prior to a full evidentiary 
hearing. 493 F . 2d 1230 (1974) . ~ We reverse. 
II 
At the outset we are confronted by a question as 
to whether the District Court had jurisdiction over 
this suit. The Secretary contends that our decision last 
Term in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), bars 
the District Court from considering Eldridge's action. 
Salfi was an action challenging the Social Security Act's 
duration-of-relationship eligibility requirements for sur-
viving wives and stepchildren of deceased wage earners. 
We there held that 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h) 6 precludes fed-
4 The HEW regulations duect that each state plan under the 
federal categorical assistance programs must provide for pretermi-
nation heanngs contaming specified procedural safeguards, which 
include all of the Goldberg reqUirements. See 20 CFR § 205.10 (a) . 
~The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, simply noting that 
the Issue had been correctly decided by the District Court in this 
C\ase, reached the same conclusion m Williams v. Weinberger, 494 F. 
2d 1191 (CA5) (per curiam, petition for cert . filed, 43 U. S. L W. 
3175 (U S., St.>pt. 8, 1974) (No. 74-205) 
• Title 42 U, S C. § 405 (h) provides m full · 
"Finality of Secretary's deCJsion 
" (h) The findings and deciswns of the Secretary after a hearing; 
74-204-0PIN'ION 
MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE 
eral question jurisdiction in an action challenging denial 
of claimed benefits. The only avenue for judicial review 
is 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g)/ which requires exhaustion of 
the administrative remedies provided under the Act as 
a jurisdictional prerequisite. 
Section 405 (g) in part provides : 
" [A] ny individual, after any final decision of the 
Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a 
party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, 
may obtain a review of such decision by a civil 
action commenced within sixty days after the mail-
ing to him of notice of such decision or within such 
further time as the Secretary may allow." 
shall be bindmg upon all individuals who were parties to such hear-
ing. No findmgs of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be re-
viewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as 
herein provided. No actwn against the United States, the Secre-
tary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under 
section 41 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this 
subchapter." 
1 Title 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g) in part provides : 
"Judicial review 
" (g) Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary 
made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the 
amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by ·a 
civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him 
of notice of such decision or within such further time as the 
Secretary may allow. Such action shall be brought in the district 
court of the United States for the judicial district in which the 
plaintiff resides or has his principal place of business, or, if he does 
not reside or have hlS principal place of business within any such 
judicial district, in the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia. . . . The court shall have power to enter, upon the 
pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modi. 
fying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without 
remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the Secretary 
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be 
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On its face § 405 (g) thus bars judicial review of any 
denial of a clarrn of disability benefits until after a 
"final decisiOn '' by the Secretary after a "hearing." 
It is uncontested that Eldridge could have obtained 
full administrative review of the termination of his 
benefits, yet failed eve11 to seek reconsideration of the 
initial determination. Smce the Secretary has not 
"waived" the finality requirement as he had in Salfi, 
supra, at 767, he concludes that Eldridge cannot prop-
erly invoke § 405 (g) as a basis for jurisdiction. We 
disagree. 
Salfi identified several conditions which must be satis-
fied in order to obtain judicial review under § 405 (g) . 
Of these, the requirement that there be a final decision 
by the Secretary after a hearing was regarded as "central 
to the requisite grant of subject matter jurisdiction .... " 
!d., at 764.8 Implicit in Salfi, however, is the principle 
that this condition consists of two elements, only one of 
which is purely "jurisdictional" in the sense that it can-
not be "waived" by the Secretary m a particular case. 
The waivable element 1s a statutory administrative ex-
haustion requirement. The nonwaivable element is the 
requirement that a claim for benefits shall have been 
presented to the Secretary. Absent such a claim there 
can be no "decision" of any type. And some decision by 
the Secretary is clearly reqmred by the statute. 
That this second requirement is an essential and dis-
tinct precondition for § 405 (g) jurisdiction is evident 
8 The other two conditions are (1) that the civil action be com-
menced withm 60 days after the mailing of notice of such decision, 
or withm such additional hme as the Secretary may permit, and 
(2) that the actiOn be filed m an appropriate district court. These 
two reqmremen.ts specify a statute of limitations and appropriate 
venue, and are w1avable by thf' partie;, Salfi, supra, at 763-764. 
As in Salfi no questiOn as to whether Eldridge satisfied these re-
quirements was timely raised below, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proo. 8 (c)~ 
12 (h) ( 1) , a.nd thPy nP.ed not be considered here. 
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from the different conclusions that we reached in Salfi 
with respect to the named appellees and the unnamed 
members of the class. As to the latter the complaint 
was found to be jurisdictionally deficient since it "con-
tain[ed] no allegations that they have even filed an 
application with the Secretary . , . Ibid. With respect 
to the named appellees, however, we concluded that the 
complaint was sufficient since it alleged that they had 
"fully presented their claims for benefits 'to their district 
Social Security Office, and upon denial, to the Regional 
Office for reconsideration.' " I d., at 764-765. Eldridge 
has fulfilled this crucial prerequisite. Through his an-
swers to the state agency questionnaire, and his letter in 
response to the tentative determination that his dis-
ability had ceased, he specifically presented the claim 
that his benefits should not be terminated because he 
was still disabled and that his benefits should not be ter-
minated. This claim was denied by the state agency and 
this decision was accepted by the SSA. 
The fact that Eldridge failed to raise with the Secre-
tary his constitutional claim to a pretermination oral 
hearing is not controlling,9 As construed in Salfi, § 405 
(g) requires only that there be a "final decision" by the 
Secretary with respect to a claim of entitlement to bene-
fits. Indeed, the named appellees in Salfi did not pre-
sent their constitutional claim to the Secretary. Salfi, 
App. 11, 17-21. The situation here is not identical to 
Salfi, for, while the Secretary had no power to amend 
the statute alleged to be unconstitutional in that case, 
he does have authority to determine the timing and 
content of the procedures challenged here. § 405 (g). 
We do not. however, regard this difference as signifi-
9 If Eldridge had exhausted the full set of available admin-
istrative review procedures, failure to have raised his constitutional 
claim would not bar him from asserting it later in a district court 
~P-e~ e. q .Flemmwg v. Ne.~ta, 363 TT. S .. 603, 604, 607 (1960), 
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cant. It is unrealistic to expect that the Secretary 
would consider substantial changes in the current ad-
ministrative review system at the behest of a single 
aid recipient raising a constitutional challenge in an 
adjudicatory context. The Secretary would not be re-
quired even to consider such a challenge. 
As the nonwaivable jurisdictional element was satisfied, 
we next consider the second elementr--whether the denial 
of Eldridge's claim to continued benefits was a sufficiently 
"final decision" with respect to his constitutional claim 
to satisfy the statutory exhaustion requirement. Eldridge 
concedes that he did not exhaust the full set of internal 
review procedures provided by the Secretary. See 20 CFR 
§§ 404.910, 404.916, 404.940. As Salfi recognized, the 
Secretary may waive the exhaustion requirement if he 
satisfies himself, at any stage of the administrative· 
process, that no further review is warranted either be-
cause the internal needs of the agency are fulfilled or 
because the relief that is sought is beyond his power to 
confer. Salfi suggested that under § 405 (g) the power 
to determine when finality has occurred ordinarily rests 
with the Secretary since ultimate responsibility for the 
integrity of the administrative program is his. But 
cases may arise where a claimant's interest in having a 
particular issue resolved promptly is so great that defer-
ence to the agency's judgment IS mappropriate. This 
is such a case. 
Eldndge's constitutional challenge is entirely collateral 
to his substantive claim of entitlement. Moreover, there· 
is a crucial distinction between the nature of the consti-
t utional claim asserted here and that raised in Salfi. A 
claim to a predeprivation hearing as a matter of con-
stitutional right rests on the proposition that full relief 
cannot be obtained at a post-deprivation hearing. See 
Regional Ra.il Reoraanization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 15fij 
,. 
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(1974). In light of the Court's prior decisions, see, e. g., 
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Fuentes v. Shevin, supra, 
Eldridge has raised at least a colorable claim that because 
of his physical condition and dependency upon the dis-
ability benefits, an erroneous termination would damage 
him in a way not recompensable through retroactive pay-
ments.:10 Thus, unlike the situation in Sal"fi, denying 
Eldridge's substantive claim "for other reasons" or up-
holding it "under other provisions" at the post-termina-
tion stage, 422 U. S., at 762, would not answer his con-
stitutional challenge. 
We conclude that the denial of Eldridge's request for 
benefits coru;titutes a final decision for purposes of § 405 
l() Decisions in different contexts have emphasized that the 
nature of the claim being asserted and the consequences of 
deferment of judteiai review are important factors in determin-
ing whether a statutory reqmrement of finality has been satisfied. 
The role these factors may play is illustrated by the intensely 
"practical" approach whJCh we have adopted, Cohen v. Beneficial 
Indus . Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 ( 1949), when applying 
the finality requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 1291, which grants 
junsdtet10n, to courts of appeals to review all "final decisions" 
of the district courts, and 28 U. S. C. § 1257, which empowers this 
Court to rev1ew only "final judgments" of state courts. See, e. g., 
Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55 (1971); Local No. 438 Corv-
struction & General Laborers Union v Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 549, 
550 (1963); Mercantile Natwnal Bank v Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 
557-558 (1963), Cohen v Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., supra, 
at 545-546. To be sure, certain of the policy considerations 
imphcated m § 1257 and § 1291 cases are different from those 
that are relevant here. Compare General Laborers Union, supra, 
at 550, Mercantile N atwnal Bank, supra, at 558, with M cKart 
v United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193-195 (1969); L. Jaffe, Judi-
cial Control of Adm1mstrat1ve ActiOn, 424-426 (1965). But the 
core prmciple that statutorily created finality requirements should, 
if poss1ble, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims 
t.o be lost and potRntJally meparable mjuries to be suffered reznains, 
applicable, 
74-204-0PINION 
10 MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE 
(g) jurisdwtion over his constitutiOnal claim. We now 
proceed to the merits of that claim.11 
III 
A 
Procedural due process Imposes constraints on gov-
ernmental decisions which deprive individuals of "lib-
erty" or "property" interests within the meaning of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ments. The Secretary does not contend that procedural 
due process is inapplicable to terminations of social se-
curity disability benefits. He recognizes, as has been 
tmplicit in our prior decisions, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher, 
404 U. S. 78, 80-81 (1971); Richardson v. Perales, 402 
U. S. 389, 401--402 (1971); Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 
603, 611 (1960), that the interest of an individual in 
continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created 
"property" interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. 
Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 164, 166 (PowELL, 
J., concurring); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 
576-578 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S., at 539 
( 1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 261-262. Rather, 
the Secretary contends that the existing administrative 
procedures provide all the process that is constitutionally 
due before a recipient can be deprived of that interest. 
This Court consistently has held that some form of 
hearing is required before an mdividual is finally de-
prived of a property mterest. Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 
U. S. 539, 557-558 (1974). See, e. g., Phillips v. 
Commisswner, 283 U S. 589, 596-597 (1931).. See 
n Grven our conclusion that Jum;drctron m the District Court 
was proper under § 405 (g), we find it unnecessary to consider 
Eldridge's contention that notwithstanding § 405 (h) there was 
JUrisdiction over hrs claim under the mandamus statute, 28 U. S. C 
~ 1361 , or the Admrmstrative Procedure Act. 5 U. S. G § 701 
"( sPq. 
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also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 124-125 
(1889). The "right to be heard before being condemned 
to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it 
may not involve the stigma and hardships of criminal 
conviction, is a principle basic to our society." Joint 
Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 
"at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'' 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). See 
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 (1914). Eldridge 
agrees that if disability benefits were continued until 
after the evidentiary hearing stage of the administra-
tive process, the administrative and judicial procedures 
that may be invoked by a claimant before the initial 
determination of ineligibility becomes final would be 
adequate. The dispute centers upon what process is 
due prior to the initial termination of benefits, pending 
review. 
In recent years this Court increasingly has had oc-
casion to consider the extent to which due process re-
quires an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of 
some type of property interest even if a full hearing is 
provided thereafter. In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U. S. 254, 266-271 (1970), has the Court held that 
a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial is neces-
sary. In other cases requiring some type of pretermi-
nation hearing as a matter of constitutional right the 
Court has spoken sparingly about the requisite proce-
dures. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 
(1969), involving garnishment of wages, was entirely 
silent on the matter. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 
96-97 (1972), the Court said only that in a replevin suit 
between two private parties the initial determination re-
quired something more than an ex parte proceeding 
before a court clerk. See also North Georgia Finishing, 
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Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601, 607 (1975). Simi~ 
larly, Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 540 (1971), held, 
in the context of the revocation of a state-granted 
driver's license, that due process required only that the 
initial hearing involve a probable-cause determination as 
to the fault of the licensee, and that the hearing "need 
not take the form of a full adjudication of the question 
of liability." More recently, in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 
U.S. 134 (1974), we sustained the validity of procedures, 
by which a federal employee could be dismissed for cause. 
They included notice of the action sought, a copy of the 
charge, reasonable time for filing a written response, and 
an opportunity for an oral appearance. Following dis-
missal, a full evidentiary hearing was provided. I d., at 
142-146. 
These decisions underscore the truism that " ' [ d] ue 
process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical con-
ception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place· 
and circumstances." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers-
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961). 
"[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands." M or-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (19-72). Accordingly,. 
resolution of the issue whether the administrative proce-
dures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires 
analysis of the governmental and private interests that 
are affected. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 167-168 
(PowELL, J ., concurring) ; Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at. 
263-266; Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. 
McElroy, supra, at 895. More precisely, our prior de-
cisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates 
of due process generally requires consideration of three 
distinct factors : first, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action ; second, the risk of an 
ecroneous deprivation of such interest through the pro-
.. 
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cedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional 
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the gov-
ernment's interest, including the function involved and 
the administrative burden that the additional or substi-
tute procedural requirement would entail. See, e. g., 
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 263-271. 
We turn first to a description of the procedures for 
the termination of Social Security disability benefits, and 
thereafter consider the factors bearing upon the consti-
tutiOnal adequacy of these procedures. 
B 
The disability insurance program is administered 
jointly by state and federal agencies. State agencies 
make the initial determination whether a disability 
exists, when it began, and when it ceased. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 421,12 The standards applied and the procedures fol-
lowed are prescribed by the Secretary, see § 421 (b), 
who has delegated his responsibilities and powers under 
the Act to the SSA. See 40 Fed. Reg. § 4473. 
In order to establish initial and continued entitle-
ment to disability benefits a worker must demonstrate 
that he is unable 
"to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 
reason of any medically determinable physical or 
12 In all but six States the state vocational rehabilitation agency 
charged with administering the state plan under the Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act, 41 Stat. 735, as amended, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 
III) § 701 et seq., acts as the "state agency" for purposes of the 
disability insurance program. Staff of the House Comm. on Ways 
and Means, Report on the DISability Insurance Program, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess., p. 148 (1974) . This assignment of responsibility was 
intended to encourage rehabil!tatwn contacts for disabled workers 
and t<> utilize the well-established relationships of the local re-
habihtatwn agencies with the medical profession, H. Rep. No.1698, 
83d Cong., 2d Se~s ., 23-24 (1954) . 
14 
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mental impairment which can be expected to result 
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to 
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 
months, ..• " 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d)(l)(A). 
To satisfy this test the worker bears a continuing burden 
of showing, by means of "medically acceptable clinical 
and laboratory diagnostic techniques," § 423 (d) ( 3), that 
he had a physical or mental impairment of such severity 
that 
"he is not only unable to do his previous work but 
cannot, considering his age, education, and work ex~ 
perience, engage in any other kind of substantial 
gainful work which exists in the national economy, 
regardless of whether such work exists in the im~ 
mediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific 
job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be 
hired if he applied for work." § 423 (d) (2) (A) .18 
The principal reasons for benefits terminations are that 
the worker is no longer disabled or has returned to work, 
As Eldridge's benefits were terminated because he was 
determined to be no longer disabled, we consider only 
the sufficiency of the procedures involved in such cases.14 
13 Work which "exists in the national economy" is in turn defined 
as "work which exists in significant numbers either in the region 
where such individual lives or in several regions of the country." 
§ 423 (d) (2) (A) . 
14 Because the continuing disability investigation concerning 
whether a claimant has returned to work is usually done directly 
by the SSA Bureau of Disability Insurance, without any state agency 
involvement, the admirustrative procedures prior to the post-termina-
tion evidentiary hearing differ from those involved in cases of pos-
sible medical recovery. They are similar, however, in the important 
respect that the process relies principally on written communications 
and there generally is no prov1sion for an oral hearing prior to the 
cut-off of benefits. Due to the nature of the relPvant inquiry in 
cert.ain tyP,os of cases, su~h f.\S those involving self-employment and: 
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The continuing eligibility investigation is made by a 
state agency acting through a "team" consisting of a 
physician and a nonmedical person trained in disability 
evaluation. The agency periodically communicates with 
the disabled workers, usually by mail-in which case he 
is sent a detailed questionnair~r by telephone, and 
requests information concerning his present condition, 
including current medical restrictions and sources of 
treatment, and any additional information that he con-
siders relevant to his continued entitlement to benefits. 
SSA Claims Manual (CM) § 6705.1; Disability Insurance 
State Manual (DISM) § 353.3.15 
Information regarding the recipient's current condition 
is also obtained from his sources of medical treatment. 
DISM § 353.4. If there is a conflict between the 
information provided by the beneficiary and that ob-
tained from medical sources, such as his physician, Ol" 
between two sources of treatment, the agency may 
arrange for an examination by an independent consulting 
physician.16 Ibid. Whenever the agency's tentative 
assessment of the beneficiary's condition differs from his 
own assessment, the beneficiary is informed that benefits 
may be terminated, provided a summary of the evidence 
upon which the proposed determination to terminate is 
based, and afforded an opportunity to review the medical 
agricultural employment, the SSA office nearest the beneficiary 
conducts an oral interview of the beneficiary as part of the pre-. 
termination process. SSA Claims Manual (CM) § 6705.2 (c) . 
u Information is also requested concerning the recipient belief as 
to whether he can return to work, the nature and extent of his em-
ployment during the past year; and any vocational services he is 
receiving. 
16 All medical source evidence used to establish the absence of 
continuing disability must be in writing, with the source properly 
j4entjfied. DISM § 353.4Q. 
,. 
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reports and other evidence in his case file.17 He also 
may respond in writing and submit additional evidence. 
I d., § 353.6. 
The state agency then makes its final determination, 
which is reviewed by an examiner in the SSA Bureau 
of Disability Insurance. 42 U. S. C. § 421 (c); CM 
§§6701 (b), (c).18 If, as is usually the case, the SSA 
accepts the agency determination it notifies the recipient 
in writing, informing him of the reasons for the decision, 
and of his right to seek de novo reconsideration by the 
state agency. 20 CFR §§ 404.907, 404.909.19 Upon ac-
ceptance by the SSA, benefits are terminated effective 
two months after the month in which medical recovery is 
found to have occurred. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) 
§ 423 (a), 
If the recipient seeks reconsideration by the state 
agency and the determination is adverse, the SSA reviews 
the reconsideration determination and notifies the recipi-
ent of the decision, He then has a right to an eviden-
17 The disab1hty recipient is not permitted personally to examine 
the medical reports contained in his file. This restriction is not 
significant smce he is entitled to have any representative of his 
choice, mcludmg a lay friend or family member, examine all medical 
twidence. CM ~7314 . See also 20 CFR § 401.3 (a) (2). The Sec-
retary informs us that this cunous limitation is currently under 
review. 
18 The SSA may not itself revise the state agency's determination 
in a manner more favorable to the beneficiary. If, however, it believes 
that the worker is still disabled, or that the disability lasted longer 
than determined by the state agency, it may return the file to the 
agency for further consideration m light of SSA's views. The 
agency is free to reaffirm its original assessment. 
19 The reconsideration assessment is initJally made by the state 
agency, but usually not by the same persons who considered the 
case originally. R. D1xon, Soc1al Security Disability and Mass 
Justice 32 (1973) . Both the recipient and the agency may adduce 
vew. Pv1denee •. 
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tiary hearing before an SSA administrative law judge. 
20 CFR §§ 404.917, 404.927. The hearing is nonadver-
sary; the SSA is not represented by counsel or other staff. 
As at all prior and subsequent stages of the administra-
tive process, however, the claimant may be represented 
by counsel or other spokesmen. § 404.934. If this 
hearing results in an adverse decision, the claimant is en-
titled to request discretionary review by the SSA Appeals 
Council, § 404.945, and finally may obtain judicial re-
view. 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g); 20 CFR § 404._9•51.20 
Should it be determined at any point after termination 
of benefits, that the claimant's disability extended be-
yond the date of cessation initially established, the 
worker is entitled to retroactive payments. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 404. Cf. 42 U. S. C. ~ 423 (b); 20 CFR §§ 404.501, 
404.503, 404.504. If, on the other hand, a beneficiary 
receives any payments to which he is later determined 
not to be entitled, the statute authorizes the Secretary 
to attempt to recoup these funds in specified circum-
stances. 42 U. S. C. § 404.21 
c 
As in Goldberg, the only function of the pretermination 
administrative inquiry in this case is "to produce an ini-
tial determination of the validity of the [state agency's] 
grounds for discontinuance of payments . . . . " 397 U. S., 
at 267. Despite the elaborate character of the adminis-
trative procedures provided by the Secretary, the courts 
20 Unhke all prior levels of review, which are de novo, the dis-
trict court is reqwred to t.reat findings of fact as conclusive if sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 42 U. S. C.§ 405 (g) . 
21 The Secreta.ry may reduce other payments to which the bene-
ficiary is entitled, or seek the payment of a refund, unless the 
beneficiary is "without fault" and such adjustment or recovery would 
defeat the purposes of the Act or be "against equity and good 
conscience." 42 U. S. C. § 404 (b). See generally 20 CFlt 
§§ 4.()4 501·-404,515. 
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below held them to be constitutionally inadequate, con~ 
eluding that due process requires a full evidentiary hear-
ing prior to termination. 
Since a recipient whose benefits are terminated is 
awarded full retroactive relief if he ultimately prevails, 
his potential inJury consists solely of the interruption of 
this source of income during the interim. His injury is 
thus similar in nature to that of the welfare recipient in 
Goldberg, see 397 U. S., at 263-264, the nonprobationary 
federal employee m Arnett, see 416 U. S., at 146, and the 
wage earner in Sniadach. See 395 U. S., at 341-342.2'2 
Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process 
requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary dep-
rivation. It was emphasized there that welfare assist-
ance was given to persons on the very margin of 
subsistence: 
"The crucial factor in this context-a factor not 
present in the case of . .. virtually anyone else whose 
governmental entitlements are ended-is that ter-
mination of aid pending resolution of a controversy 
over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of 
the very means by which to live while he waits." 
397 U.S., at 264 (emphasis in original) . 
Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based 
upon financial need.23 Indeed, it is wholly unrelated to 
the worker's income or support from most other sources, 
such as earmngs of other family members, workmen's 
22 This, of course, a.ssumes that an employee whose wages are 
erroneously garmsheed Js subsequently able to recover his back 
wages~ 
23 The level of benefits is determmed by the worker's average 
monthly earmngs durmg the penod prior to disability, h1s age,. 
and other factors not duectly related t<> financ1al need, specified in: 
42 U. S C (Supp III) ~ 415 See id, § 423 (a) (2) . 
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compensation awards,24 tort claims awards, savings, pri-
vate insurance, public or private pensions, veterans' bene-
fits, food stamps, public assistance, or the "many other 
important programs both public and private, which con-
tain provisions for disability payments affecting a sub-
stantial portion of the work force .. .. " Richardson v. 
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 85-87 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). See Staff of the House Comm. on Ways & Means,. 
Report on the Disability Insurance Program, 9~3d Cong., 
2d Sess., 9~10, 419-429 (1974) (hereinafter Staff Report). 
The level of deprivation that may be created by a 
particular decision is a factor to be considered in assess-
ing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking 
process. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
Although the potential deprivation here is less than in 
Goldberg, the degree of difference can be overstated. As 
the District Court emphasized, to remain eligible for 
benefits a recipient must be "unable to engage in sub-
stantial gainful activity." 42 U. S. C. § 423; 361 F. 
Supp., at 523. Thus, in contrast to the discharged fed-
eral employee in Arnett, there is little possibility that 
the terminated recipient will be able to find even tempo-
rary employment to ameliorate the interim loss. 
As we recognized last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg, 
419 U. S. 379, 389 (1975), "the possible length of wrong-
ful deprivation of ... benefits [also] is an important factor 
in assessing the impact of official action on private in-
terests." The Secretary concedes that the delay between 
a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law 
Judge and a decision on the claim is currently between 
10 and 11 months. Since a terminated recipient must· 
24 Workmen's compensation benefits are deducted in part in· 
accordance with a statutory formula. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) 
§ 424a ; 20 CFR § 404.408', see Richardson v. Belcher, 404 lL 8 .. 
1R (1911). 
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first obtain a reconsideration decision as a prerequisite 
to invoking his right to an evidentiary hearing, the 
actual delay between the cut-off of benefits and final 
decision after a hearing exceeds one year. In view of 
the torpidity of this administrative review process, cf. 
id., at 383-384, 386, and the typically modest resources 
of the family unit of the physical disabled worker,2 ~ the 
hardship imposed upon the erroneously terminated dis-
ability recipient may be significant. 
We do not underestunate the potential seriousness of 
·even a temporary interruption of disability benefits. 
Still, the disabled worker's need is likely to be less than 
that of a welfare recipient. In addition to the possi-
bility of access to private resources, other forms of 
government assistance will become available where the 
termination of disability benefits places a worker or his 
family below the subsistence level.26 See Arnett, supra, 
26 Amici cite statistics compiled by the Secretary which indi-
cate that in 1965 the mean income of the family unit of a 
-disabled worker was $3,803, while the median mcome for the unit 
was $2,836. The mean liquid assets-i. e., cash, stocks, bonds-of 
these family units was $4,862; the median was $940. These statistics 
do not take into account the family unit's nonliquid assets-i. e., 
automob1le, real estate, and the like. Bnef for Amici AFL-
CIOjGreen, at 25 n. 29, App. 4a. 
26 Amici emphas1ze that because an identical definition of disabil-
ity IS employed m both the Title II Social Security Program and in 
the companion welfare system for the disabled, Supplemental Se-
cunty Income (SRI), compare 42 U S. C. § 423 (d)(l) with id., 
(Supp. III) § 1382c (a) (3), the terminated d1sability benefits recipient 
will be ineligible for the SSI Program. There exist, however, state and 
local welfare programs which may supplement the worker's income. 
In addition, the worker's household umt can qualify for food stamps 
if it meets the financial need requirements. See 7 U. S. C. §§ 2013 
(c), 2014 (b), 7 CFR § 271. Finally, m 1974 480,000 of the ap-
proximately 2,000,000 disabled workers rece1vmg Social Security· 
benefits also received SSI benefits. Since financial need is a criterion 
(OJ:: eligibility under the SSI program., those disabled workers whOJ 
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at 169 (POWELL, J., concurring), id., at 201-202 (WHITE, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In view 
of these potential sources of temporary income, the 
weights in favor of departing from the ordinary prin-
ciple, established by our prior decisions, that something 
less than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to 
adverse administrative action are therefore less than in 
Goldberg. 
D 
An additional factor is the fairness and reliability of 
the available pretermination procedures, and the prob-
able value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards. 
Central to the evaluation of any administrative process 
is the nature of the relevant inquiry. See Mitchell v. 
W . T . Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 617 (1974). Friendly, 
"Some Kind of Hearing,'' 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1281 
( 1975). In order to remain eligible for benefits the dis-
abled worker must demonstrate by means of "medically 
acceptable clinical and diagnostic techniques," 42 U. S. C. 
§ 423 (d) ( 3), that he is unable "to engage in any sub-
stantial gainful activity by r.eason of any medically de-
terminable physical or mental impairment ..... " § 423 
(a) (1 )(A) (emphasis supplied) . In short, a medical 
assessment of the worker's physical or mental condition 
is required. This is a more sharply focused and easily 
documented decision than the typical determination of 
welfare entitlement. In the latter case, a wide variety 
of information may be deemed relevant, and issues of 
witness "credibility and veracity'' often are critical to the 
decisionmaking process. Goldberg noted that in such 
are most in need will in the majority of cases be receiving SSI bene-
fits when disability insurance aid IS terminated. And, under the 
SSI program, a pretermmanon evidentiary heanng IS provided, if 
requested. 42 U S. C. (Supp. III) § 1383 (c) , 20 CFR § 416.1336 
(c) : 40 Ft'd Reg Hi12 , Hee Staff Report 346. 
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circumstances "written submissions are a wholly unsatis .. 
factory basis for decision." 397 U. S., at 269:. 
By contrast, the decision whether to discontinue dis-
ability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon "routine, 
standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician 
specialists," Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 404 
(1971), concerning a subject whom they have personally 
examined.27 In Richardson the Court recognized the 
"reliability and probative worth of written medical re-
ports," emphasizing that while there may be "profes-
'sional disagreement with the medical conclusions" the 
"specter of questionable credibility and veracity is not 
present." I d., at 405, 407. To be sure, credibility and 
veracity may be a factor in the ultimate disability assess-
ment in some cases. But procedural due process rules 
are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-
finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not 
the rare exceptions. The potential value of an eviden-
tiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the decision-
maker, is substantially less in this context than irr 
Goldberg. 
27 The decision is not purely a question of the accuracy of a medi-
cal diagnosis since the ultimate issue which the state agency must 
resolve is whether in light of the particular worker's "age, education,. 
and work experience" he cannot "engage in any . . . substantial 
gainful work which exists in the national economy .... " 42 U. S. C. 
§ 423 (d)(2) (A). Yet information concerning each of these worker 
characteristics is amenable to effective written presentation. The 
-value of a full evidentiary hearing, or even a limited oral presentation, 
to an accurate presentation of those factors to the decisionmaker does 
not appear substantial. Similarly, resolution of the inquiry as to 
the types of employment opportunities that exist in the national 
economy for a physically impaired worker with a particular set of 
skills would not necessarily be advanced by an oral evidentiary 
hearmg. Cf, Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.06, at 429 
( 1958) . The statistical information relevant to this judgment is. 
more amenable to written than oral presentation. 
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The decision in Goldberg was also based on the Court's 
conclusion that written submissions were an inadequate 
substitute for oral presentation because they did not 
provide an effective means of communication with the 
decisionmaker. Written submissions were viewed as an 
unrealistic option, for most recipients lacked the "educa-
tional attainment necessary to write effectively" and 
could not afford professional assistance. In addition, 
such submissions would not provide the "flexibility of 
oral presentations" or "permit the recipient to mold his 
argument to the issues the decision maker appears to 
regard as important." 397 U. S., at 269. In the con-
text of the disability benefits entitlement assessment the 
administrative procedures under review here fully an-
swer these objections. 
The detailed questionnaire which the state agency 
periodically sends the recipient identifies with particu-
larity the information relevant to the entitlement deci-
sion, and the recipient is invited to obtain assistance 
from the local SSA office in completing the questionnaire. 
More important, the information critical to the entitle-
ment decision usually is derived from medical sources, 
such as the treating physician. Such sources are signifi-
cantly more able to communicate effectively through 
written documents than are welfare recipients or the lay 
witnesses supporting their cause. These sources' con-
clusions may be supported by X-rays and the results of 
chnical or laboratory tests, information typically more 
amenable to written than to oral presentation. Cf. 
W. Gellhorn & C. Byse, Administrative Law-Cases and 
Comments 860-863 (6th ed. 1974) . 
A further safeguard against mistake is the policy of 
allowing the disability recipient or his representative full 
access to all information relied upon by the state agency, 
In .addition, prior to the cut-off of benefits the agencr 
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informs the recipient of its tentative assessment, ihe 
reasons therefor, and provides· a summary of the evi-
dence that it considers most relevant. Opportunity is 
then afforded the recipient to submit additional evi-
. deuce or arguments, enabling him to challenge directly 
the accuracy of information in his file as well as the 
correctness of the agency's tentative conclusions. These 
procedures, again as contrasted with those before the 
1Court in Goldberg, enable the recipient · to "mold" his 
argument to respond to the precise issues which the 
decisionmaker regards as crucial. 
Despite these carefully structured procedures, amici 
point to the significant reversal rate for appealed cases 
as clear evidence that the current process is inadequate. 
Depending upon the base selected and the line of analy-
sis followed, the relevant reversal rates urged by the 
contending parties vary from a high of 58.6% for ap-
pealed reconsideration decisions to an overall reversal 
rate of only 3.3%.zs Bare statistics rarely provide a 
satisfactory measure of the fairness of a decisionmaking 
process. Their adequacy is especially suspect here since 
the administrative review system is operated on an open-
file basis. A recipient may always submit new evidence, 
~8 By focusing solely on the reversal rate for appea.Ied recon~ 
. sideration determinations amict overstate the relevant reversal rate. 
As we indicated last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S., at 383 
n. 6, in order fully to assess the reliability and fairness of a system 
of procedure, one must also consider the overall rate of error for 
all denials of benefits . Here that overall rate is 12.2%. Moreover, 
about 75% of these reversals occur at the reconsideration stage of 
the administrative process. Since the median period between a 
request for reconsideration rev1ew and decision is only two months, 
Brief for Am1ci AFL--CIO / Green, App. 4a, the deprivation is 
significantly less than that concommitant in the more lengthy delay 
before an ev1dentiary hearing. Netting out these reconsideration 
reversals, the overall reversal rate falls to 3.3%. 
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and such submissions may result in additional medical 
examinations, Such fresh examinations are held in ap-
proximately 307'o to 407'o of the appealed cases, either at 
the reconsideration or hearing stage of the administrative 
process. Staff Report 238. In this context, the value 
of reversal rate statistics as one means of evaluating the 
adequacy of the pretermination process is significantly 
diminished. Thus, although we view such information 
as relevant, it is certainly not controlling in this case. 
E 
In striking the appropriate due process balance the 
final factor to be assessed is the public interest. This 
includes the administrative burden and other societal 
costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter 
of constitutional right, an evidentiary hearing upon de-
mand in all cases prior to the termination of disability 
benefits. The more visible burden would be the incre-
mental cost resulting from the increased number of hear-
ings and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible 
recipients pending decision. No one can predict the 
extent of the increase, but the fact that full benefits 
would continue until after such hearings would assure 
the exhaustion in most cases of this attractive option. 
Nor would the theoretical right of the Secretary to re-
cover undeserved benefits result, as a practical matter,. 
in any substantial offset to the added outlay of public 
funds. The parties submit widely varying estimates of 
the probable additional cost. We only need say that 
experience with the constitutionalizing of government 
procedures suggests that the ultimate additional cost 
would be substantial. 
In most circumstances, as here, financial cost is not a 
compelling weight in the assessment whether due process 
requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to some 
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administrative action. But the Government's interest, 
and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal 
and administrative resources, is a factor that must be 
weighed. At some point the benefit of an additional 
safeguard to the individual affected by the administra~ 
tive action and to society in terms of increased assur~ 
ance that the action is just, will be outweighed by the 
cost. Significantly, the cost of protecting those whom the 
preliminary administrative prooess has identified as likely 
to be found undeserving may in the end come out of the 
pockets of the deserving since resources available for any 
particular program of social welfare are not unlimited. 
See Friendly, supra, at 1276, 1303. 
But more is implicated in cases of this type than ad hoc 
balancing of monetary costs against the interests of a 
particular class of claimants. The ultimate balance in-
volves a determination as to when, under our constitu~ 
tional system, judicial-type procedures must be imposed 
upon administrative action to assure fairness. We re-
iterate the wise admonishment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
that differences in the origin and function of administra-
tive agencies "preclude wholesale transplantation of the 
rules of procedure, trial, and review which have evolved 
from the history and experience of the courts." FCC v. 
Pottsville Broadcasting Co. , 309 U. S. 134, 143 (1940). 
The judicial model of a full evidentiary hea.ring is 
neither a required, nor even the most effective, method 
of decisionmaking in all circumstances. The essence of 
due process is the requirement that "a person in jeop~ 
ardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against 
him and opportunity to meet it." Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. , at 171-172. 
(Frankfurter, J. , concurring.) All that is necessary is· 
that that the procedures be "tailor [ ed] the capacities and 
circumstances of those who are to be heard," Goldber(J;· 
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v. Kelly, supra, at 268- 269, to insure that they are 
given a meaningful opportunity to present their case. 
In assessing what process is due, substantial weight must 
be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals 
charged by Congress with the administration of the social 
welfare system that the procedures they have provided 
deal fairly with the entitlement claims of individuals. 
See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S., at 202 (WHITE, J., 
concurring and dissenting in part). This is especially so 
where, as here, the prescribed procedures not only pro-
vide the claimant with an effective process for asserting 
his claim prior to any administrative action~ but also 
assure a right to an evidentiary hearing, as well as to 
subsequent judicial review, before the denial of his claim 
becomes final. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 
378 (1971). 
We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not re-
quired prior to the termination of disability benefits and 
that the present administrative procedures fully comport 
with due process. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
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The issue in this case is whether the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to 
the termination of Social Security disability benefit pay-
ments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
I 
Cash benefits are provided to workers during periods 
in which they are completely disabled under the dis-
ability insurance benefits program created by the 1956 
amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act. 70 
Stat. 815, 42 U. S, C. § 423.1 Respondent Eldridge was 
1 The program is financed by revenues derived from employee 
and employer payroll taxe:,. 26 U S. C. §§ 3101 (a), 3111 (a) ; 42 
U, S. G § 401 (h). It provides monthly benefits to disabled per-
sons who havr worked sufficiently long to have an insured 
Rtatus, id., §423 (c)(1)(A), and who have had substantial work ex-
penence m a t·rpecified interval directly prl'ceding the onset of dis-
ability Jd., § 423 (c) (1) (D) Benefits also are provided to the 
worker's dependents under specified Circumstances. ld., §§ 402 (b)-
(d). When the reCipient reaches age 65 his disability benefits are 
automatically converted to retlr~'rnent benefits, !d., §§ 416 (2) (D), 
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first awarded benefits in June 1968. In March 1972, he 
received a questionnaire from the state agency charged 
with monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge com-
pleted the questionnaire, indicating that his condition 
had not improved and identifying the medical sources, 
including physicians, from whom he had received treat-
ment recently. The state agency then obtained re-
ports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant. 
After considering these reports and other information 
in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter that it 
had made a tentative determination that his disability 
had ceased in May 1972. The letter included a state-
ment of reasons for the proposed termination of benefits, 
and advised Eldridge that he might request reasonable 
time in which to obtain and submit additional informa-
tion pertaining to his condition. 
In his written response, Eldridge disputed one char-
acterization of his medical condition and indicated that 
the agency already had enough evidence to establish his 
disability.2 The state agency then made its final deter-
mination that he had ceased to be disabled in May 1972. 
This determination was accepted by the Social Security 
Administration ( SSA), which notified Eldridge in July 
that his benefits would terminate after that month. 
423 (a) (1) . In fiscal 1974 approximately 3,700,000 persons received 
assistance under the program. Social Security Administration, The 
Year in Review 21 (1974) 
2 Eldridge originally was disabled due to chronic anxiety and 
back strain. He subsequently was found to have diabetes. The 
tentative determination letter indicated that aid would be termi-
nated because available medical evidence indicated that his diabetes 
was under control, that there existed no limitations on his back 
mo~ements which would impose severe functional restrictions, 
and that he no longer suffered emotional problems that would 
preclude him from all work for which he was qualified. App. 12-13. 
In his reply letter he claimed to have arthritis of the spine rather 
than a strained back. 
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The notification also advised him of his right to seek 
reconsideration by the state agency of this initial deter-
mination within six months. 
Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge com-
menced this action challenging the constitutional valid-
ity of the administrative procedures established by the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for assessing 
whether there exists a continuing disability. He sought 
an immediate reinstatement of benefits pending a 
hearing on the issue of his disability.8 361 F. Supp. 
520 (WD Va. 1973). The Secretary moved to dismiss on 
the grounds that Eldridge's benefits had been terminated 
in accordance with valid administrative regulations and 
procedures and that he had failed to exhaust available 
remedies. In support of his contention that due process 
requires a pretermination hearing, Eldridge relied exclu-
sively upon this Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U. S. 254 (1970), which established a right to an 
"evidentiary hearing" prior to termination of welfare 
benefits.4 The Secretary contended that Goldberg was 
not controlling since eligibility for disability benefits, un-
like eligibility for welfare benefits, is not based on finan-
cial need and since issues of credibility and veracity do 
8 The District Court ordered reinstatement of Eldridge's benefits 
pending its final disposition on the merits. 
4 In Goldberg the Court held that the pretermination hearing must 
include the followmg elements : ( 1) "timely lmd adequate notice de-
tailing the reasons for the proposed termination"; (2) "an effective 
opportunity [for the recipH'nt] to defend by confronting any ad-
verse witnesses and by presenting h1~ own arguments and evidence 
orally"; (3) retained counsel, if desired ; (4) an " impartial" 
decisionmaker ; (5) a deciswn resting "solely on the legal rules and 
evidence adduced at the hearing"; (6) a ~tatement of reasons for 
the decision and the evidence relied on . 397 U. S., at 266-271. In 
this opinion the term "evidentiary hearing" refer,; to a hearing 
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not play a significant role in the disability entitlement 
decision, which turns primarily on medical evidence. 
The District Court concluded that the administrative 
procedures pursuant to which the Secretary had termi-
nated Eldridge's benefits abridged his right to procedural 
due process. The court viewed the interest of the dis-
ability recipient in uninterrupted benefits as indistin-
guishable from that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg. 
It further noted that decisions subsequent to Goldberg 
demonstrated that the due process requirement of pre-
termination hearings is not limited to situations involv-
ing the deprivation of vital necessities. See Fuentes v. 
Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 88-89 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 
U. S. 535 (1971). Reasoning that disability determina-
tions may involve subjective judgments based on con-
flicting medical and nonmedical evidence, the District 
Court held that prior to termination of benefits Eldridge 
must be afforded an evidentiary hearing of the type re-
quired for welfare beneficiaries under Title IV of the 
Social Security Act. ld., at 528.5 Relying entirely upon 
the District Court's opinion, the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the injunction barring termi-
nation of Eldridge's benefits prior to an evidentiary 
hearing. 493 F . 2d 1230 (1974) .6 We reverse. 
II 
At the outset we are confronted by a question as 
5 ThP HEW regulations direct that each state plan under the 
federal categoncal assistance programs must provide for pretermi-
nation hearings contaimng specified procedural safeguards, which 
include all of the Goldberg reqmrements. See 45 CFR § 205.10 (a); 
n 4 supra 
b The Court of Appeals for the Fifth CirCUit, simply noting that 
the issue had been correctly demded by the District Court in this 
case, reached the same conclusion m Williams v. Weinberger, 494 F. 
2d 1191 (per curiam) , petition for cert. filed, 43 U. S. L. W. 
3F5 (U. S., Sept. 8, 1974) (No. 74-205) . 
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to whether the District Court had jurisdiction over 
this suit. The Secretary contends that our decision last 
Term in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), bars 
the District Court from considering Eldridge's action. 
Salfi was an action challenging the Social Security Act's 
duration-of-relationship eligibility requirements for sur-
viving wives and stepchildren of deceased wage earners. 
We there held that 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h)7 precludes fed-
eral question jurisdiction in an action challenging denial 
of claimed benefits. The only avenue for judicial review 
is 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), which requires exhaustion of 
the administrative remedies provided under the Act as 
a jurisdictional prerequisite. 
Section 405 (g) in part provides: 
"Any individual, after any final decision of the 
Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a 
party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, 
may obtain a review of such decision by a civil 
action commenced within sixty days after the mail-
ing to him of notice of such decision or within such 
further time as the Secretary may allow." 8 
7 T1tle 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h) provides in full : 
"Finality of Secretary's decision 
" (h) The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing 
shall be binding upon all mdividuals who were parties to such hear-
ing. No findings of fact or deciSion of the Secreta.ry shall be re-
viewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as 
herem provided. No action against the United States, the Secre-
tary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under 
section 41 of Title 28 to recover on any clrum arising under this 
~ubchapter." 
8 Sect10n 405 (g) further providel:> · 
"Such action shall be brought m the d1stnct court of the United 
States for the judicial district in whiCh the plaintiff resides or has 
h1s prmCJpal place of busmess, or, 1f he does not reside or have his 
principal place of business within any such judicial district, in the 
UmtPd States Distnct Court for the District of Columbia. . . . The 
co11rt ~ha ll hn vc powPr to enter , upon the pleadings and transcript 
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On its face § 405 (g) thus bars judicial review of any 
denial of a claim of disability benefits until after a 
"final decision" by the Secretary after a "hearing." 
It is uncontested that Eldridge could have obtained 
full administrative review of the termination of his 
benefits, yet failed even to seek reconsideration of the 
initial determination . Since the Secretary has not 
"waived" the finality requirement as he had in Salfi, 
supra, at 767, he concludes that Eldridge cannot prop-
erly invoke § 405 (g) as a basis for jurisdiction. We 
·disagree. 
Salfi identified several conditions which must be satis-
fied in order to obtain judicial review under § 405 (g). 
Of these, the requirement that there be a final decision 
by the Secretary after a hearing was regarded as "central 
to the requisite grant of subject matter jurisdiction .... " 
l d., at 764.9 Implicit in Salfi, however, is the principle 
that this condition consists of two elements, only one of 
which is purely "jurisdictional" in the sense that it can-
not be "waived" by the Secretary in a particular case. 
The waivable element is the requirement that the admin-
istrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be ex-
hausted. The nonwaivable element is the requirement 
that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the 
of the record, a judgmE-nt affi rming, modifying, or reversing the de-
cisiOn of the SecrE-tary, with or without remanding the cause for a 
rehearing. The findings of the SecrPtary as to any fact , if supported 
by substantial evidencE>, shall be conclusive .... " 
9 The other two conditions are ( 1) that the civil action be com-
menced w1thm 60 days after the maihng of notice of such decision, 
or withm such add1honal time as the Secretary may permit, and 
(2) that the actiOn be filed m an appropriate district court. These 
two reqmrements spemfy a statute of limitations a.nd appropriate 
venue, and are wa1vable by the parties. Salfi, supra, at 763-764. 
As in Salfi no questiOn as to whether Eldridge satisfied these re-
quirements was timely raised below, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proo. 8 (c) , 
12 (h) (1), and thf'y need not be considered here. 
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Secretary. Absent such a claim there can be no "de-
cision" of any type. And some decision by the Secretary 
is clearly required by the statute. 
That this second requirement is an essential and dis-
tinct precondition for § 405 (g) jurisdiction is evident 
from the different conclusions that we reached in Salfi 
with respect to the named appellees and the unnamed 
members of the class. As to the latter the complaint 
was found to be jurisdictionally deficient since it "con-
tain [ ed] no allegations that they have even filed an 
application with the Secretary . . .. " Ibid. With respect 
to the named appellees, however, we concluded that the 
complaint was sufficient since it alleged that they had 
"fully presented their claims for benefits 'to their district 
Social Security Office, and upon denial, to the Regional 
Office for reconsideration.'" !d., at 764-765. Eldridge 
has fulfilled this crucial prerequisite. Through his an-
swers to the state agency questionnaire, and his letter in 
response to the tentative determination that his dis-
ability had ceased, he specifically presented the claim 
that his benefits should not be terminated because he 
was still disabled. This claim was denied by the state 
agency and its decision was accepted by the SSA. 
The fact that Eldridge failed to raise with the 
Secretary his constitutional claim to a pretermination 
hearing is not controlling.10 As construed in Salfi, § 405 
(g) requires only that there be a "final decision" by the 
Secretary with respect to the claim of entitlement to ben-
efits. Indeed, the named appellees in Salfi did not pre-
ent their constitutional claim to the Secretary. Salfi, 
App. 11, 17-21. The situation here is not identical to 
10 If Eldridge had exhausted the full set of available admin-
istrative review procedures, failure to have raised his constitutional 
claim would not bar hun from asserting it later in a district court 
See, e. g., F/Pmm1ng v. NPstor, :363 U.S 603, 604, 607 (1960). 
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Salfi, for, while the Secretary had no power to amend 
the statute alleged to be unconstitutional in that case, 
he does have authority to determine the timing and 
content of the procedures challenged here. § 405 (a). 
We do not, however, regard this difference as signifi~ 
cant. It is unrealistic to expect that the Secretary 
would consider substantial changes in the current ad-
ministrative review system at the behest of a single 
aid recipient raising a constitutional challenge in an 
adJudwatory context. The Secretary would not be re-
qUired even to consider such a challenge. 
As the nonwa1vable jurisdictional element was satisfied, 
we next consider the waivable element. The question is 
whether the demal of Eldridge's claim to continued bene-
fits was a sufficiently "final decision" with respect to his 
constitutional claim to satisfy the statutory exhaustion 
reqmrement. Eldridge concedes that he did not exhaust 
the full set of internal review procedures provided by the 
Secretary. See 20 CFR §§ 404.910, 404.9,16, 404.940. As 
Salfi recognized, the Secretary may waive the exhaustion 
requirement if he satisfies himself, at any stage of the 
administrative process, that no further review is war-
ranted either because the internal needs of the agency are 
fulfilled or because the relief that is sought is beyond his 
power to confer. Salfi suggested that under§ 405 (g) the 
power to determine when finality has occurred ordinarily 
rests with the Secretary since ultimate responsibility for 
the mtegrity of the administrative program is his. But 
cases may anse where a claimant's mterest in having a 
particular Issue resolved promptly is so great that defer-
ence to the agency's judgment is inappropriate. This 
is such a case. 
Eldridge's const1tut10nal challenge is entirely collateral 
to his substantive claim of entitlement. Moreover, there 
is a cruCial rhstinction betwPen the nature of the consti-
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tutional claim asserted here and that raised in Salfi. A 
claim to a predeprivation hearing as a matter of con-
stitutional right rests on the proposition that full relief 
cannot be obtained at a post-deprivation hearing. See 
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 156 
(1974). In light of the Court's prior decisions, see, e. g., 
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Fuentes v. Shevin, supra, 
Eldridge has raised at least a colorable claim that because 
of his physical condition and dependency upon the dis-
ability benefits, an erroneous termination would damage 
him in a way not recompensable through retroactive pay-
ments.11 Thus, unlike the situation in Salfi, denying: 
Eldridge's substantive claim "for other reasons" or up-
holding it "under other provisions" at the post-termina-
11 Decisions in different contexts have emphasized that the 
nature of t,he clarrn being asserted and the consequences of 
deferment of JUdicial review are important factors in determin-
ing whether a statutory requirement of finality has been satisfied. 
The role these factors may play IS illustrated by the intensely 
"practiCal" approach which the Court has adopted, Cohen v. Bene-
ficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949), when applymg 
the finality requirements of 28 U S. C. § 1291, which grants 
jurisdiction, to courts of appeals to review all "final decisions" 
of the distnct courts, and 28 U. S. C. § 1257, which empowers this 
Court to review only "final Judgments" of state courts. See, e. g., 
Harns v Washmgton, 404 U. S 55 (1971); Local No. 438 Con-
structwn & General Laborers Union v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 549, 
550 (1963), Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 
557-558 (1963), Cohen v Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., supra, 
at 545-546. To be sure, certam of the policy considerations 
1mphcated m § 1257 and § 1291 cases are different from those 
that are relevant here Compare General Laborers Union, supra, 
at 550, Mercantile Natwnal Bank, supra, at 558, with McKart 
v United States, 395 U S. 185, 193-195 (1969); L. Jaffe, Judi-
cial Control of AdministratJve Actwn, 424-426 (1965) But the 
core prmCiple that statutorily created finality requirements should, 
if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims· 
to be lost. and potentially Irreparable miuries to be suffered remams 
J.pl)licahlP. 
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tion stage, 422 U. S., at 762, would not answer his con-
stitutiOnal challenge. 
We conclude that the denial of Eldridge's request for 
benefits constitutes a final decision for purposes of § 405 
(g) Jurisdiction over his constitutional claim. We now 
proceed to the merits of that claim/2 
TTI 
Procedural due process imposes constraints on gov-
ernmental decisions which deprive individuals of "lib-
erty" or "property'' interests within the meaning of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ments. The Secretary does not contend that procedural 
due process IS inapplicable to terminations of social se-
curity disability benefits. He recognizes, as has been 
implicit in our prior decisions, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher, 
404 U. S. 78, 80-81 (1971); Richardson v. Perales, 402 
U.S. 389, 401-402 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 
603, 611 ( 1960), that the interest of an individual in 
continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created 
"property' ' interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. 
Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 166 (PowELL, 
J ., concurnng); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 
576-578 ( 1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S., at 539; 
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 261-262. Rather, the 
Secretary contends that the existing administrative 
procedures, detailed below, provide all the process that is 
constitutionally due before a recipient can be deprived of 
that m to rest 
12 GlVen our conclusiOn that JUnsdJCt!On m the D1strict Court 
was proper under § 405 (g), we find 1t unnecessary to consider 
Eldndge's content10n that notwithstanding § 405 (h) there was 
JUnsdJctwn over his cla1m under the mandamus statute, 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1361, or the AdnumstrahvP Procedure Act. 5 U. S. C. § 701 
P,f snz 
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Th1s Court consistently has held that some form of 
hearing is required before an individual is finally de-
prived of a property interest. Wolf-v. McDonnell, 418 
U. S. 539, 557-558 (1974). See, e. g., Phillips v. 
Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 596-597 (1931). See 
also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 11'4, 124-125 
(1889). The "right to be heard before being condemned 
to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it 
may not involve the stigma and hardships of criminal 
convictwn, is a principle basic to our society." Joint 
Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) . The fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 
'' at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). See 
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 (1914). Eldridge 
agrees that the review procedures available to a claimanV 
before the initial determination of ineligibility becomes 
final would be adequate, if disability benefits were not 
terminated until after the evidentiary hearing stage of 
the administrative process. The dispute centers upon 
what process is due prior to the initial termination of 
benefits, pending review. 
In recent years this Court increasingly has had oc-
casiOn to consider the extent to which due process re-
quires an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of 
some type of property interest even if such a hearing is 
provided thereafter. In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U. S. 254, 266- 271 (1970) , has the Court held that 
a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial is neces-
sary In other cases requiring some type of pretermi-
nation hearmg as a matter of constitutional right the 
Court has spoken sparingly about the requisite proce-
dures. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 
( 196!"-l ), mvolving 11;arnishment of wages, was entirely 
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silent on the matter. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 
96-97 (1972), the Court said only that in a replevin suit 
between two private parties the initial determination re-
quired somethmg more than an ex parte proceeding 
before a court clerk. Similarly, Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 
535, 540 ( 1971), held, in the context of the revocation of 
a state-granted driver's license, that due process required 
only that the prerevocation hearing involve a probable-
cause determination as to the fault of the licensee, noting 
that the hearing "need not take the form of a full adjudi-
cation of the question of liability." See also North 
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 
601, 607 (1975). More recently, in Arnett v. Kennedy, 
416 U. S. 134 (1974), we sustained the validity of pro-
cedures by which a federal employee could be dismissed 
for cause. They mcluded notice of the action sought, a 
copy of the charge, reasonable time for filing a written 
response, and an opportunity for an oral appearance. 
Following dismissal, an evidentiary hearing was pro-
vided. Td., at 142- 146. 
These decisions underscore the truism that " ' [ d] ue 
process, ' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical con-
ceptiOn with a fixed content unrelated to time, place 
and circumstances." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers 
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961). 
" [D] ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands." M or-
nssey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). Accordingly, 
resolution of the issue whether the administrative proce-
dures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires 
analysis of the governmental and private interests that 
are affected. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 167-168 
(PowELL, J., concurring); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 
263-266; Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. 
McElroy, supra, at 895. More precisely, our prior de-
cisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates 
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of due process generally requires consideration of three 
distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the pro-
cedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional 
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the gov-
ernment's interest, including the function involved and 
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional ) 
or substitute procedural requirement would entail. See, 
e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 263-271. 
We turn first to a description of the procedures for 
the termination of Social Security disability benefits, and 
thereafter consider the factors bearing upon the consti-
tutional adequacy of thesE:' procedures. 
B 
The disability insurance program is administered 
jointly by state and federal agencies. State agencies 
make the initial determination whether a disability 
exists, when it began, and when it ceased. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 421.1 3 The standards applied and the procedures fol-
lowed are prescribed by the Secretary, see § 421 (b), 
who has delegated his responsibilities and powers under 
the Act to the SSA. See 40 Fed. Reg. § 44 73. 
In order to establish initial and continued entitle-
13 In all but six States the state vocational rehabilitation agency 
charged with administermg the state plan under the Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act, 41 Stat. 735, as amended, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 
III) § 701 et seq., acts as the "state agency" for purposes of the 
disability insurance program. Staff of the House Comm. on Ways 
and Means, Report on the DISability Insurance Program, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess., p 148 (1974). ThiS assignment of responsibility was 
intended to encourage rehabilitation contacts for disabled workers 
and t<> utilize the well-established relationships of the local re-
habilitatiOn agencies with the medical profession. H. Rep. No.1698, 
83d Cong., 2rl Srss 23-24 (1 954). 
'i 4-204-0PINION 
MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE 
ment to disability benefits a worker must demonstrate 
that he is unable 
uta engage in any substantial gainful activity by 
reason of any medically determinable physical or 
mental impairment which can be expected to result 
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to 
last for a continuous penod of not less than 12 
months, .. ," 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (1) (A) . 
To satisfy this test the worker bears a continuing burden 
of showing, by means of "medically acceptable clinical 
and laboratory diagnostic techniques," § 423 (d) (3), that 
he has a physical or mental rmpamnent of such severity 
that 
"he is not only unable to do his previous work but 
cannot, considering his age, education, and work ex-
penence, engage m any other kind of substantial 
gainful work which exists in the national economy, 
regardless of whether such work exists in the im-
mediate area in which he hves, or whether a specific 
job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be 
hired If he applied for work." § 423 (d) (2) (A).14 
The prinCipal reasons for benefits terminations are that 
the worker is no longer disabled or has returned to work. 
As Eldridge's benefits were terminated because he was 
determmed to be no longer disabled, we consider only 
the suffiClency of the procedures involved in such cases.13 
14 Work which "exists in the national economy" is in turn defined 
a "work whtch ex1sts m significant numbers either in the region 
where such individual lives or in several regions of the country." 
§ 423 (d) (2) (A) . 
15 Because the rontmuing dlsabliity investigation concerning 
whether a cla1mant has returned to work ts usually done directly 
by the SSA Bureau of Disabliity Insurance, without any state agency 
involvement, the admuustmtivc procedurrs pnor to the post-termina-
tion ev1dentlary hearmg differ from those involved in cases of pos-
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The continuing eligibility investigation is made by a 
state agency acting through a "team" consisting of a 
physician and a nonmedical person trained in disability 
evaluation. The agency periodically communicates with 
the disabled worker, usually by mail-in which case he 
is sent a detailed questionnaire-or by telephone, and 
requests information concerning his present condition, 
including current medical restrictions and sources of 
treatment, and any additional information that he con-
siders velevant to his continued entitlement to benefits. 
SSA Claims Manual (CM) § 6705.1; Disability Insurance 
State Manual (DISM) § 353.3.16 
Information regarding the recipient's current condition 
is also obtained from his sources of medical treatment. 
DISM § 353.4. If there is a conflict between the 
information provided by the beneficiary and that ob-
tained from medical sources such as his physician, or 
between two sources of treatment, the agency may 
arrange for an examination by an independent consulting 
physician.17 Ibid. Whenever the agency's tentative 
assessment of the beneficiary's condition differs from his 
sible medical recovery. They are similar, however, in the important 
respect that the process relies principally on written communications 
and there is no provision for an evidentiary hearing prior to the 
cut-off of benefits. Due to the nature of the relevant inquiry in 
certain types of cases, such as those mvolving self-employment and 
agricultural employment, the SSA office nearest the beneficiary 
conducts an oral interview of the beneficiary as part of the pre-
termination process. SSA Claims Manual (CM) § 6705.2 (c). 
16 Information 1s also requested concerning the recipient's belief as 
to whether he can return to work, the nature and extent of his em-
ployment during the past year, and any vocational services he is 
receiving. 
n All medical source evidence used to establish the absence of 
continuing disability must be in writing, with the source pr.operly 
j.d.entifi.ed. DISM § 353.40, 
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own assessment, the beneficiary is informed that benefits 
may be terminated, provided a summary of the evidence 
upon which the proposed determination to terminate is 
based, and afforded an opportunity to review the medical 
reports and other evidence in his case file. 18 He also 
may respond in writing and submit additional evidence. 
Id., § 353.6. 
The state agency then makes its final determination, 
which is reviewed by an examiner in the SSA Bureau 
of Disability Insurance. 42 U. S. C. § 421 (c); CM 
§ § 6701 (b), (c) .19 If, as is usually the case, the SSA 
accepts the agency determination it notifies the recipient 
in writing, informing him of the reasons for the decision, 
and of his right to seek de novo reconsideration by the 
state agency. 20 CFR §§ 404.907, 404.909.w Upon ac-
ceptance by the SSA, benefits are terminated effective 
two months after the month in which medical recovery is 
found to have occurred. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) 
§ 423 (a). 
18 The disability recipient is not permitted personally to examine 
the medical reports contained in his file . This restriction is not 
significant since he is entitled to have any representative of his 
choice, including a lay friend or family member, examine all medical 
evidence. CM § 7314. See also 20 CFR § 401.3 (a) (2). The Sec-
retary informs us that this curious limitation is currently under 
review. 
19 The SSA may not itself revise the state agency's determination 
in a manner more favorable to the beneficiary. If, however, it believes 
that the worker is still disabled, or that the disability lasted longer 
than determined by the state agency, it may return the file to the 
agency for further consideration in light of SSA's views. The 
agency is free to reaffirm its original assessment . 
. w The reconsideration assessment is initially made by the state 
agency, but usually not by the same persons who considered the 
case originally. R. Dixon, Social Security Disability and Mass 
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If the recipient seeks reconsideration by the state 
agency and the determination is adverse, the SSA reviews 
the reconsideration determination and notifies the recipi-
ent of the decision. He then has a right to an eviden-
tiary hearing before an SSA administrative law judge. 
20 CFR §§ 404.917, 404.927. The hearing is nonadver-
sary, and the SSA is not represented by counsel. As 
at all prior and subsequent stages of the administra-
tive process, however, the claimant may be represented 
by counsel or other spokesmen. § 404.934. If this 
hearing results in an adverse decision, the claimant is en-
titled to request discretionary review by the SSA Appeals 
Council, § 404.945, and finally may obtain judicial re-
view. 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g); 20 CFR § 404.951.21 
Should it be determined at any point after termination 
of benefits, that the claimant's disability extended be-
yond the date of cessation initially established, the 
worker is entitled to retroactive payments.. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 404, Cf. id., § 423 (b); 20 CFR §§ 404.501, 404.503, 
404.504. If, on the other hand, a beneficiary receives 
any payments to which he is later determined not to 
be entitled, the statute authorizes the Secretary to 
attempt to recoup these funds in specified circumstances. 
42 u. s. c. § 404.22 
c 
Despite the elaborate character of the administra-
tive procedures provided by the Secretary, the courts 
21 Unlike all prior levels of review, which are de novo, the dis-
trict court is required to treat findings of fact as conclusive if sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 42 U. S. C.§ 405 (g) . 
22 The Secretary may reduce other payments to which the bene-
ficiary is entitled, or seek the payment of a refund, unless the 
beneficiary is "without fault" and such adjustment or recovery would 
defeat the purposes of the Act or be "against equity and good 
conscience." 42 U. S. C. § 404 (b). See generally 20 CFR 
§§ 404.501-404.515. 
74-204-0PINlON 
18 MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE 
below held them to be constitutionally inadequate, con-
cluding that due process requires an evidentiary hearing 
prior to termination. In light of the private and gov-
ernmental interests at stake here and the nature of the 
existing procedures, we think this was error. 
Since a recipient whose benefits are terminated is 
awarded full retroactive relief if he ultimately prevails, 
his sole interest is in the uninterrupted receipt of this 
source of income pending final administrative decision 
on his claim. His potential injury is thus similar in 
nature to that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg, 
see 397 U. S., at 263-264, the nonprobationary federal 
employee in Arnett, see 416 U. S., at 146, and the wage 
earner in Sniadach. See 395 U. S., at 341-342.23 
Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process 
requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary 
deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare 
assistance is given to persons on the very margin of 
subsistence: 
"The crucial factor in this context-a factor not 
present m the case of . .. virtually anyone else whose 
governmental entitlements are ended-is that ter-
mination of aid pending resolution of a controversy 
over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of 
the very means by which to live while he waits." 
397 U.S., at 264 (emphasis in original) . 
Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based 
upon financial need.21 Indeed, it is wholly unrelated to 
23 This, of course, assumes that an employee whose wages are 
garnisheed erroneously is subsequently able to recover his back 
wages. 
24 The level of benefits is detcrmmed by the worker's average 
monthly earmngs dunng the penod prior to disability, his age, 
and other factors not directly related to financial need, specified in 
42 U. S C (Supp III) § 415 See id ., § 423 (a) (2) . 
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the workerrs income or support from many other sources, 
such as earnings of other family members, workmen's 
compensation awards,2 ~ tort claims awards, savings, pri-
vate insurance, public or private pensions, veterans' bene-
fits, food stamps, public assistance, or the "many other 
important programs both public and private, which con-
tain provisions for disability payments affecting a sub-
stantial portion of the work force .. .. " Richardson v. 
Belcher, 404 U. S., at 85-87 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
See Staff of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 
Report on the Disability Insurance Program, 9,3d Cong., 
2d Sess., 9~10, 419-429 (1974) (hereinafter Staff Report). 
As Goldberg illustrates, the degree of potential depri-
vation that may be created by a particular decision is 
a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of 
any administrative decision making process. Cf. M or-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). The potential 
deprivation here is generally likely to be less than in 
Goldberg, although the degree of difference can be over-
stated. As the District Court emphasized, to remain 
eligible for benefits a recipient must be "unable to engage 
in substantial gainful activity." 42 U. S. C. § 423; 361 F. 
Supp., at 523. Thus, in contrast to the discharged fed-
eral employee in Arnett, there is little possibility that 
the terminated recipient will be able to find even tempo-
rary employment to ameliorate the interim loss. 
As we recognized last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg, 
419 U. S. 379, 389 (1975), "the pot3sible length of wrong-
ful deprivation of ... benefits [also] is an important factor 
in assessing the impact of official action on private in-
terests." The Secretary concedes that the delay between 
2~ Workmen's compensation benefits are deducted in part. in 
accordance with a statutory formula. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) 
§ 424a; 20 CFR § 404.408; see Richardson v. Belcher» 404. U. 15. 
18 (1911). 
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a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law 
Judge and a decision on the claim is currently between 
10 and 11 months. Since a terminated recipient must 
first obtain a reconsideration decision as a prerequisite 
to invoking his right to an evidentiary hearing, the 
delay between the actual cut-off of benefits and final 
decision after a hearing exceeds one year, 
In view of the torpidity of this administrative review 
process, cf. id., at 383-384, 386, and the typically modest 
resources of the family unit of the physically disabled 
worker, 26 the hardship imposed upon the erroneously ter-
minated disability recipient may be significant. Still, 
the disabled worker's need is likely to be less than that 
of a welfare recipient. In addition to the possibility of 
access to private resources, other forms of government 
assistance will become available where the termination of 
disability benefits places a worker or his family below the 
subsistence leveP7 See Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, 
26 Amici cite statistics compiled by the Secretary which indi-
cate that in 1965 the mean income of the family unit of a 
disabled worker was $3,803, while the median income for the unit 
was $2,836. The mean liquid assets-i. e., cash, stocks, bonds-of 
these family units was $4,862; the median was $940. These statistics 
do not take mto account the family unit's nonliquid assets-i. e., 
automobile, real estate, and the like. Brief for Amici AFL-
CIOjGreen, at 25 n . 29, App. 4a. 
27 Amw~ emphasize that because an identical definition of disabil-
ity is employed m both the Title II Soe1al Security Program and in 
the compamon welfare system for the disabled, Supplemental Se-
cunty Income (SSI), compare 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (1) with id., 
(Supp. III) § 1382c (a) (3), the terminated disability-benefits recipient 
will be ineligible for the SSI Program. There exist, however, state and 
local welfare programs which may supplement the worker's income. 
In addition, the worker's household unit can qualify for food stamps 
if It meets the financial need requirements. See 7 U. S. C. §§ 2013 
(c) , 2014(b) , 7 CFR §271. Finally, m 1974 480,000 of the ap-
proximately 2,000,000 disabled workers receiving Social Security 
benefits also rPceived ssr benefits Since financial need is a criterion 
74-204-0PINION 
MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE 21 
at 169 (POWELL, J., concurring), id., at 201-202 (WHITE, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In view 
of these potential sources of temporary income, there is 
less reason here than in Goldberg to depart from the ordi-
nary principle, established by our ~ decisions, that 
something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient 
prior to adverse administrative action. 
D 
An additional factor to be considered here is the fair-
ness and reliability of the existing pretermination proce-
dures, and the probable value, if any, of additional 
procedural safeguards. Central to the evaluation of any 
administrative process is the nature of the relevant in-
quiry. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 
617 (1974); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1281 (1975). In order to remain eli-
gible for benefits the disabled worker must demonstrate 
by means of "medically acceptable clinical and diagnostic 
techniques," 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d)(3), that he is unable 
"to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason 
of any medically determinable physical or mental impair-
ment . .. . " § 423 (a)(1)(A) (emphasis supplied). In 
short, a medical assessment of the worker's physical or 
mental condition is required. This is a more sharply 
focused and easily documented decision than the typical 
determination of welfare entitlement. In the latter case, 
a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, 
and issues of witness credibility and veracity often are 
critical to the decisionmaking process. Goldberg noted 
for eligibility under the SSI program, those disabled workers who 
are most in need will m the majority of cases be receiving SSI bene-
fits when disability insurance aid is terminated. And, under the 
SSI program, a pretermmation evidentiary hearing is provided, if 
requested. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 1383 (c) ; 20 CFR § 416.1336 
(c) ; 40 Fed Reg 1512 ; see Staff Report 346. 
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that in such circumstances "written submissions are a 
wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision." 397 U. S., at 
269. 
By contrast, the decision whether to discontinue dis-
ability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon "routine, 
standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician 
specialists," Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S., at 404, 
concerning a subject whom they have personally ex-
amined. 28 In Richardson the Court recognized the 
"reliability and probative worth of written medical re-
ports," emphasizing that while there may be "profes-
sional disagreement with the medical conclusions" the 
(!specter of questionable credibility and veracity is not 
present." I d., at 405, 407. To be sure, credibility and 
veracity may be a factor in the ultimate disability assess-
ment in some cases. But procedural due process rules 
are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-
finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not 
the rare exceptions. The potential value of an eviden-
tiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the decision-
28 The decision is not purely a question of the accuracy of a medi-
cal diagnosis since the ultimate issue which the state agency must 
resolve is whether in hght of the particular worker's "age, education,. 
and work experience" he cannot "engage in any ... substantial 
gainful work which exists in the national economy . .. . " 42 U. S. C. 
§ 423 (d) (2) (A) . Yet information concerning each of these worker 
characteristics is amenable to effective written presentation. The 
value of an evidentiary hearmg, or even a limited oral presentation, 
to an accurate presentation of those factors to the decisionmaker does 
not appear substantial. Similarly, resolution of the inquiry as to 
the types of employment opportunities that exist in the national 
economy for a physically Impaired worker with a particular set of 
~kills would not necessarily be advanced by an evidentiary hear-
ing. Cf. K. Davis, Admmistrative Law Treatise § 7.06, at 429 
(1958) . The statistical mformation relevant to this judgment is, 
more amenable to written than to oral presentation. 
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maker, is substantially less in this context than m 
Goldberg. 
The decision in Goldberg also was based on the Court's 
conclusion that written submissions were an inadequate 
substitute for oral presentation because they did not 
provide an effective means for the recipient to communi-
cate his case to the decisionmaker. Written submissions 
were viewed as an unrealistic option, for most recipients 
lacked the "educational attainment necessary to write 
effectively" and could not afford professional assistance. 
In addition, such submissions would not provide the 
"flexibility of oral presentations" or "permit the recipient 
to mold his argument to the issues the decision maker 
appears to regard as important." 397 U. S., at 269.. In 
the context of the disability-benefits-entitlement asses-
ment the administrative procedures under review here 
fully answer these objections. 
The detailed questionnaire which the state agency 
periodically sends the recipient identifies with particu-
larity the information relevant to the entitlement deci-
sion, and the recipient is invited to obtain assistance 
from the local SSA office in completing the questionnaire. 
More important, the information critical to the entitle-
ment decision usually is derived from medical sources, 
such as the treating physician. Such sources are likely 
to be able to communicate more effectively through writ-
ten documents than are welfare recipients or the lay wit-
nesses supporting their cause. The conclusions of phy-
sicians often are supported by X-rays and the results of 
clinical or laboratory tests, information typically more 
amenable to written than to oral presentation. Cf. 
W. Gellhorn & C. Byse, Administrative Law-Cases and 
Comments 860-863 (6th ed. 1974) . 
A further safeguard against mistake is th~ policy of 
ttllowing the disability recipient or his representative full 
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access to all information relied upon by the state agency. 
In addition, prior to the cut-off of benefits the agency 
informs the recipient of its tentative assessment, the 
reasons therefor, and provides a summary of the evi-
dence that it considers most relevant. Opportunity is 
then afforded the rempient to submit additional evi-
dence or arguments, enabling him to challenge directly 
the accuracy of information in his file as well as the 
correctness of the agency's tentative conclusions. These 
procedures, again as contrasted with those before the 
Court in Goldberg, enable the recipient to "mold" his 
argument to respond to the precise issues which the 
decisionmaker regards as crucial. 
Despite these carefully structured procedures, amici 
point to the significant reversal rate for appealed cases 
as clear evidence that the current process is inadequate. 
Depending upon the base selected and the line of analy-
sis followed, the relevant reversal rates urged by the 
contending parties vary from a high of 58.6% for ap-
pealed reconsideration decisions to an overall reversal 
rate of only 3.3%.29 Bare statistics rarely provide a 
satisfactory measure of the fairness of a decisionmaking 
process. Their adequacy is especially suspect here since 
21l By focusing solely on the reversal rate for appealed recon-
sideratiOn determinations am~c~ overstate the relevant reversal rate. 
As we mdu•.a.ted last Term in Pusan v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 383 
n 6 (1975), in order fuly to assess the rPliability and fairness of a 
system of procedure, one must also consider the overall rate of error 
for all denials of benefits. Here that ovPrall rate is 12.2%. More-
over, about 75% of these reversals occur at the reconsideration stage 
of the adrrumstrative process. Smce the median period between a 
request for reconsideration review and decision is only two months, 
Brief for Amici AFL-CIOjGrcen, App. 4a, the deprivation is 
sigmficantly less than that concomitant m the lengthier delay 
before an evidentiary hearmg. Netting out these reconsideration 
reversals, the overall revprsal rate falls to 3.3% See Supplemental 
and RPplv Bmf for tht> PrtttionPr J4. 
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the administrative review system is operated on an open-
file basis. A recipient may always submit new evidence, 
and such submissions may result in additional medical 
examinations. Such fresh examinations are held in ap-
proximately 30% to 40% of the appealed cases, either at 
the reconsideration or evidentiary hearing stage of the 
administrative process. Staff Report 238. In this con-
text, the value of reversal rate statistics as one means of 
evaluating the adequacy of the pretermination process is 
diminished. Thus, although we view such information 
as relevant, it is certainly not controlling in this case. 
E 
In striking the appropriate due process balance the 
final factor to be assessed is the public interest. This 
includes the administrative burden and other societal 
costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter 
of constitutional right, an evidentiary hearing upon de-
mand in all cases prior to the termination of disability 
benefits. The most visible burden would be the incre-
mental cost resulting from the increased number of hear-
ings and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible 
recipients pending decision. No one can predict the 
extent of the increase, but the fact that full benefits 
would contmue until after such hearings would assure 
the exhaustion in most cases of this attractive option. 
Nor would the theoretical right of the Secretary to re-
cover undeserved benefits result, as a practical matter, 
in any substantial offset to the added outlay of public 
funds. The parties submit widely varying estimates of 
the probable additional financial cost. We only need say 
that experience with the constitutionalizing of govern-
ment procedures suggests that the ultimate additional 
cost 111 terms of money and administrative burden would 
not be immbstantial. 
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Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in de-
termining whether due process requires a particular pro-
cedural safeguard prior to some administrative decision. 
But the Government's interest, and hence that of the 
public, in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative re-
sources, is a factor that must be weighed. At some point 
the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual 
affected by the administrative action and to society in 
terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may 
be outweighed by the cost. Significantly, the cost of 
protecting those whom the preliminary administrative 
process has identified as likely to be found undeserving 
may in the end come out of the pockets of the deserving 
since resources available for any particular program of 
social welfare are not unlimited. See Friendly, supra, at 
1276, 1303. 
But more is implicated in cases of this type than ad hoc 
weighing of fiscal and administrative burdens against the I 
interests of a particular category of claimants. The ulti-
mate balance involves a determination as to when, under 
our constitutional system, judicial-type procedures must 
be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness. 
We reiterate the wise admonishment of Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter that differences in the origin and function of 
administrative agencies "preclude wholesale transplanta-
tion of the rules of procedure, trial, and review which 
have evolved from the history and experience of the 
courts." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309' U. S. 
134, 143 (1940). The judicial model of an evidentiary 
hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective, 
method of decisionmaking in all circumstances. The es-
sence of due process is the requirement that "a person in 
Jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case 
against him and opportunity to meet it." Joint Anti-Fa-
cist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S., at 171-
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172. (Frankfurter, J., concurring.) All that is necessary 
is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision 
to be made, to "the capacities and circumstances of those 
who are to be heard," Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 268-
269 (footnote omitted), to insure that they are given a 
meaningful opportunity to present their case. In assess-
ing what process is due in this case, substantial weight 
must be given to the good-faith judgments of the indi-
viduals charged by Congress with the administration of 
the social welfare system that the procedures they have 
provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement 
claims of individuals. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S., 
at 202 (WHITE, J .. concurring and dissenting in part). 
This is especially so where, as here, the prescribed proce-
dures not only provide the claimant with an effective 
process for asserting his claim prior to any administrative 
action, but also assure a right to an evidentiary hearing, 
as well as to subsequent judicial review, before the denial 
of his claim becomes final. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971). 
We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not re-
quired prior to the termination of disability benefits and 
that the present administrative procedures fully comport 
with due process. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 
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The issue in this case is whether the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to 
~he termination of Social Security disability benefit pay-: 
ments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
I 
Cash benefits are provided to workers during periods 
in which they are completely disabled under the dis-
ability insurance benefits program created by the 1956 
amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act. 70 
Stat. 815, 42 U. S. C. § 423.1 Respondent Eldridge was 
I The program is financed by revenues derived from employee 
and employer payroll taxes. 26 U. S. C. §§ 3101 (a), 3111 (a); 42 
U, S. C. § 401 (b). It provides monthly benefits to disabled per-
sons who have worked sufficiently long to have an insured 
status, id., §423 (c)(1)(A), and who have had substantial work ex-
perience in a specified interval directly preceding the onset of dis-
ability. I d., § 423 (c) ( 1) (B). Benefits also are provided to the 
worker's dependents under specified circumstances. !d., §§ 402 (b)-
(d). When the recipient reaches age 65 his disability benefits are 
automatically converted to retirement benefits, !d., §§ 416 (2) (D); 
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first awarded benefits in June 1968. In March 1972, he 
received a questionnaire from the state agency charged 
with monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge com-
pleted the questionnaire, indicating that his condition 
had not improved and identifying the medical sources, 
including physicians, from whom he had received treat-
ment recently. The state agency then obtained re-
ports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant. 
After considering these reports and other information 
in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter that it 
had made a tentative determination that his disability 
had ceased in May 1972. The letter included a state-
ment of reasons for the proposed termination of benefits, 
and advised Eldridge that he might request reasonable 
time in which to obtain and submit additional informa-
tion pertaining to his condition. 
In his written response, Eldridge disputed one char-
acterization of his medical condition and indicated that 
the agency already had enough evidence to establish his 
disability.2 The state a.gency then made its final deter-
mination that he had ceased to be disabled in May 1972. 
This determination was accepted by the Social Security 
Administration (SSA), which notified Eldridge in July 
that his benefits would terminate after that month. 
423 (a) (1). In fiscal 1974 approximately 3,700,000 persons received 
assistance under the program. Social Security Administration, The 
Year in Review 21 (1974). 
2 Eldridge originally was disabled due to chronic anxiety and 
back strain. He subsequently was found to have diabetes. The 
tentative determination letter indicated that aid would be termi-
nated because available medical evidence indicated that his diabetes 
was under control, that there existed no limitations on his back 
movements which would impose severe functional restrictions, 
and that he no longer suffered emotional problems that would 
preclude him from all work for which he was qualified. App. 12-13. 
In his reply letter he claimed to have arthritis of the spine rather 
than a strained back, 
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The notification also advised him of his right to seek 
reconsideration by the state agency of this initial deter-
mination within six months. 
Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge com-
menced this action challenging the constitutional valid-
ity of the administrative procedures established by the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for assessing 
whether there exists a continuing disability. He sought 
an immediate reinstatement of benefits pending a 
hearing on the issue of his disability.8 361 F. Supp. 
520 (WD Va. 1973). The Secretary moved to dismiss on 
the grounds that Eldridge's benefits had been terminated 
in accordance with valid administrative regulations and 
procedures and that he had failed to exhaust available 
remedies. In support of his contention that due process 
requires a pretermination hearing, Eldridge relied exclu-
sively upon this Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U. S. 254 (1970), which established a right to an 
"evidentiary hearing" prior to termination of welfare 
benefits.4 The Secretary contended that Goldberg was 
not controlling since eligibility for disability benefits, un-
like eligibility for welfare benefits, is not based on finan-
cial need and since issues of credibility and veracity do 
8 The District Court ordered reinstatement of Eldridge's benefits 
pending its final disposition on the merits. 
4 In Goldberg the Court held that the pretermination hearing must 
include the iollowing elements: (1) "timely and adequate notice de-
tailing the reasons for the proposed termination"; (2) "an effective 
opportunity [for the recipient] to defend by confronting any ad-
verse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence 
orally"; (3) retained counsel, if desired; ( 4) an "impartial" 
decisionmaker; (5) a decision resting "solely on the legal rules and 
evidence adduced at the hearing"; ( 6) a statement of reasons for 
the decision and the evidence relied on. 397 U. S., at 266-271. In 
this opinion the term "evidentiary hearing" refers to a hearing 
generally of the type required in Goldberg. 
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not play a significant role in the disability entitlement 
decision, which turns primarily on medical evidence. 
The District Court concluded that the administrative 
procedures pursuant to which the Secretary had termi-
nated Eldridge's benefits abridged his right to procedural 
due process. The court viewed the interest of the dis-
ability recipient in uninterrupted benefits as indistin-
guishable from that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg. 
It further noted that decisions subsequent to Goldberg 
demonstrated that the due process requirement of pre-
termination hearings is not limited to situations involv-
ing the deprivation of vital necessities. See Fuentes v. 
Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 88-89 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 
U. S. 535 ( 1971). Reasoning that disability determina-
tions may involve subjective judgments based on con-
flicting medical and nonmedical evidence, the District 
Court held that prior to termination of benefits Eldridge 
must be afforded an evidentiary hearing of the type re-
quired for welfare beneficiaries under Title IV of the 
Social Security Act. !d., at 528.5 Relying entirely upon 
the District Court's opinion, the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the injunction barring termi-
nation of Eldridge's benefits prior to an evidentiary 
hearing. 493 F. 2d 1230 (1974).6 We reverse. 
II 
At the outset we are confronted by a question as 
5 The HEW regulations direct that each state plan under the 
federal categorical assistance programs must provide for pretcrmi-
nation hearings containing specified procedural safeguards, which 
include all of the Goldberg requirements. See 45 CFR § 205.10 (a); 
n. 4 supra. 
6 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, simply noting that 
the issue had been correctly decided by the District Court in this 
case, reached the same conclusion in Williams v. Weinberger, 494 F. 
2d 1191 (per curiam), petition for cert. filed, 43 U. S. L. W. 
3175 (U. S., Sept. 8, 1974) (No. 74-205). 
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to whether the District Court had jurisdiction over 
this suit. The Secretary contends that our decision last 
Term in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), bars 
the District Court from considering Eldridge's action. 
Salfi was an action challenging the Social Security Act's 
duration-of-relationship eligibility requirements for sur-
viving wives and stepchildren of deceased wage earners. 
We there held that 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h) 7 precludes fed-
eral question jurisdiction in an action challenging denial 
of claimed benefits. The only avenue for judicial review 
is 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), which requires exhaustion of 
the administrative remedies provided under the Act as 
a jurisdictional prerequisite. 
Section 405 (g) in part provides: 
"Any individual, after any final decision of the 
Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a 
party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, 
may obtain a review of such decision by a civil 
action commenced within sixty days after the mail-
ing to him of notice of such decision or within such 
further time as the Secretary may allow." 8 
7 Title 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h) provides in full: 
"Finality of Secretary's decision 
"(h) The finclings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing 
shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hear-
ing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secreta.ry shall be re-
viewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as 
herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secre-
tary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under 
section 41 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this 
subchapter." 
8 Section 405 (g) further provides: 
"Such action shall be brought in the district court of the United 
States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides or has 
his principal place of business, or, if he does not reside or have his 
principal place of business within any such judicial district, in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. . . . The 
court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript 
7 4-204-0PINION 
6 MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE 
On its face § 405 (g) thus bars judicial review of any 
denial of a claim of disability benefits until after a 
"final decision" by the Secretary after a "hearing." 
It is uncontested that Eldridge could have obtained 
full administrative review of the termination of his 
benefits, yet failed even to seek reconsideration of the 
initial determination. Since the Secretary has not 
"waived" the finality requirement as he had in Salfi, 
supra, at 767, he concludes that Eldridge cannot prop~ 
erly invoke § 405 (g) as a basis for jurisdiction. We 
disagree. 
Salfi identified several conditions which must be satis-
fied in order to obtain judicial review under § 405 (g). 
Of these, the requirement that there be a final decision 
by the Secretary after a hearing was regarded as "central 
to the requisite grant of subject matter jurisdiction .... " 
Id., at 764.9 Implicit in Salfi, however, is the principle 
that this condition consists of two elements, only one of 
which is purely "jurisdictional" in the sense that it can-
not be "waived" by the Secretary in a particular case. 
The waivable element is the requirement that the admin-
istrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be ex-
hausted. The nonwaivable element is the requirement 
that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the 
of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the de-
cision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a 
rehearing. The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported 
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive .... " 
9 The other two conditions are (1) that the civil action be com-
menced within 60 days after the mailing of notice of such decision, 
or withln such additional time as the Secretary may permit, and 
(2) that the action be filed in an appropriate district court. These 
two requirements specify a statute of limitations and appropriate 
venue, and are waivable by the parties. Salfi, supra, at 763-764. 
As in Salfi no question as to whether Eldridge satisfied these re-
quirements was timely raised below, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proo. 8 (c), 
12 (h)(l), and they need not be considered here. 
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Secretary. Absent such a claim there can be no "de-
cision" of any type. And some decision by the Secretary 
is clearly required by the statute. 
That this second requirement is an essential and dis-
tinct precondition for § 405 (g) jurisdiction is evident 
from the different conclusions that we reached in Salfi 
with respect to the named appellees and the unnamed 
members of the class. As to the latter the complaint 
was found to be jurisdictionally deficient since it "con-
tain [ ed] no allegations that they have even filed an 
application with the Secretary .... " Ibid. With respect 
to the named appellees, however, we concluded that the 
complaint was sufficient since it alleged that they had 
"fully presented their claims for benefits 'to their district 
Social Security Office, and upon denial, to the Regional 
Office for reconsideration.' " I d., at 764-765. Eldridge 
has fulfilled this crucial prerequisite. Through his an-
swers to the state agency questionnaire, and his letter in 
response to the tentative determination that his dis-
ability had ceased, he specifically presented the claim 
that his benefits should not be terminated because he 
was still disabled. This claim was denied by the state 
agency and its decision was accepted by the SSA. 
The fact that Eldridge failed to raise with the 
Secretary his constitutional claim to a pretermination 
hearing is not controlling.10 As construed in Salfi, § 405 
(g) requires only that there be a "final decision" by the 
Secretary with respect to the claim of entitlement to ben-
efits. Indeed, the named appellees in Salfi did not pre-
sent their constitutional claim to the Secretary. Salfi, 
App. 11, 17-21. The situation here is not identical to 
10 If Eldridge had exhausted the full set of available admin-
istrative review procedures, failure to have raised his constitutional 
claim would not bar him from asserting it later in a district court 
See, e. g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 604, 607 (1960). 
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Salfi, for, while the Secretary had no power to amend 
the statute alleged to be unconstitutional in that case, 
he does have authority to determine the timing and 
content of the procedures challenged here. § 405 (a). 
We do not, however, regard this difference as signifi-
cant. It is unrealistic to expect that the Secretary 
would consider substantial changes in the current ad-
ministrative review system at the behest of a single 
aid recipient raising a constitutional challenge in an 
adjudicatory context. The Secretary would not be re-
quired even to consider such a challenge. 
As the nonwaivable jurisdictional element was satisfied, 
we next consider the waivable element. The question is 
whether the denial of Eldridge's claim to continued bene-
fits was a sufficiently "final decision" with respect to his 
constitutional claim to satisfy the statutory exhaustion 
requirement. Eldridge concedes that he did not exhaust 
the full set of internal review procedures provided by the 
Secretary. See 20 CFR §§ 404.910, 404.916, 404.940. As 
Salfi recognized, the Secretary may waive the exhaustion 
requirement if he satisfies himself, at any stage of the 
administrative process, that no further review is war-
ranted either because the internal needs of the agency are 
fulfilled or because the relief that is sought is beyond his 
power to confer. Salfi suggested that under§ 405 (g) the 
power to determine when finality has occurred ordinarily 
rests with the Secretary since ultimate responsibility for 
the integrity of the administrative program is his. But 
cases may arise where a claimant's interest in having a 
particular issue resolved promptly is so great that defer-
ence to the agency's judgment is inappropriate. This 
is such a case. 
Eldridge's constitutional challenge is entirely collateral 
to his substantive claim of entitlement. Moreover, there 
is a crucial distinction between the nature of the consti-
, 
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tutional claim asserted here and that raised in Salfi. A 
claim to a predeprivation hearing as a matter of con-
stitutional right rests on the proposition that full relief 
cannot be obtained at a post-deprivation hearing. See 
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 156 
(1974). In light of the Court's prior decisions, see, e. g., 
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Fuentes v. Shevin, supra, 
Eldridge has raised at least a colorable claim that because 
of his physical condition and dependency upon the dis-
ability benefits, an erroneous termination would damage 
him in a way not recompensable through retroactive pay-
ments.11 Thus, unlike the situation in Salfi, denying 
Eldridge's substantive claim "for other reasons" or up-
holding it "under other provisions" at the post-termina-
11 Decisions in different contexts have emphasized that the 
nature of the claim being asserted and the consequences of 
deferment of judicial review are important factors in determin-
ing whether a statutory requirement of finality has been satisfied. 
The role these factors may play is illustrated by the intensely 
"practical" approach which the Court has adopted, Cohen v. Bene-
ficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949), when applying 
the finality requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 1291, which grants 
jurisdiction to courts of appeals to review all "final decisions" 
of the district courts, and 28 U. S. C. § 1257, which empowers this 
Court to review only "final judgments" of state courts. See, e. g., 
Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55 (1971); Local No. 4-88 Con-
struction & General Laborers Union v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 549, 
550 (1963); Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 
557-558 (1963); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus . Loan Corp., supra, 
at 545-546. To be sure, certain of the policy considerations 
implicated in § 1257 and § 1291 cases are different from those 
that arc relevant here. Compare General Laborers Union, supra, 
at 550; Mercantile National Bank, supra, at 558, with McKart 
v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193-195 (1969); L. Jaffe, Judi-
cial Control of Administrative Action, 424--426 ( 1965). But the 
core principle that statutorily created finality requirements should, 
if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims 
to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered remains 
applicable. 
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tion stage, 422 U. S., at 762, would not answer his con-
stitutional challenge. 
We conclude that the denial of Eldridge's request for 
benefits constitutes a final decision for purposes of § 405 
(g) jurisdiction over his constitutional claim. We now 
proceed to the merits of that claim.12 
III 
A 
Procedural due process imposes constraints on gov-
ernmental decisions which deprive individuals of "lib-
erty" or "property" interests within the meaning of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ments. The Secretary does not contend that procedural 
due process is inapplicable to terminations of social se-
curity disability benefits. He recognizes, as has been 
implicit in our prior decisions, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher, 
404 U. S. 78, 80-81 (1971); Richardson v. Perales, 402 
U.S. 389, 401-402 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 
603, 611 ( 1960), that the interest of an individual in 
continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created 
"property" interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. 
Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 166 (PowELL, 
J., concurring); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 
576-578 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S., at 539; 
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 261-262. Rather, the 
Secretary contends that the existing administrative 
procedures, detailed below, provide all the process that is 
constitutionally due before a recipient can be deprived of 
that interest. 
12 Given our conclusion that jurisdiction in the District Court 
was proper under § 405 (g), we find it unnecessary to consider 
Eldridge's contention that notwithstanding § 405 (h) there was 
jurisdiction over his claim under the mandamus statute, 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1361, or the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U. S. C. § 701 
et seq. 
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This Court consistently has held that some form of 
hearing is required before an individual is finally de-
prived of a propery interest. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 
U. S. 539, 557-558 (1974). See, e. g., Phillips v. 
Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 596- 597 (1931). See 
also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 124-125 
( 1889). The "right to be heard before being condemned 
to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it 
may not involve the stigma and hardships of criminal 
conviction, is a principle basic to our society." Joint 
Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 
"at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). See 
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 (1914). Eldridge 
agrees that the review procedures available to a claimant 
before the initial determination of ineligibility becomes 
final would be adequate, if disability benefits were not 
terminated until after the evidentiary hearing stage of 
the administrative process. The dispute centers upon 
what process is due prior to the initial termination of 
benefits, pending review. 
In recent years this Court increasingly has had oc-
casion to consider the extent to which due process re-
quires an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of 
some typo of property interest even if such a hearing is 
provided thereafter. In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U. S. 254, 266- 271 ( 1970), has the Court held that 
a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial is neces-
sary. In other cases requiring some type of pretermi-
nation hearing as a matter of constitutional right the 
Court has spoken sparingly about the requisite proce-
dures. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 
(1969), involving garnishment of wages, was entirely 
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silent on the matter. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 
96-97 ( 1972), the Court said only that in a replevin suit 
between two private parties the initial determination re-
quired something more than an ex parte proceeding 
before a court clerk. Similarly, Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 
535, 540 (1971), held, in the context of the revocation of 
a state-granted driver's license, that due process required 
only that the prerevocation hearing involve a probable-
cause determination as to the fault of the licensee, noting 
that the hearing "need not take the form of a full adjudi-
cation of the question of liability." See also North 
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 
601, 607 (1975). More recently, in Arnett v. Kennedy, 
416 U. S. 134 (1974), we sustained the validity of pro-
cedures by which a federal employee could be dismissed 
for cause. They included notice of the action sought, a 
copy of the charge, reasonable time for filing a written 
response, and an opportunity for an oral appearance. 
Following dismissal, an evidentiary hearing was pro-
vided. Id., at 142-146. 
These decisions underscore the truism that "'[d]ue 
process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical con-
ception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place 
and circumstances." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers 
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961). 
"[D] ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands." M or-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). Accordingly, 
resolution of the issue whether the administrative proce-
dures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires 
analysis of the governmental and private interests that 
are affected. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 167-168 
(PowELL, J., concurring); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 
263-266; Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. 
McElroy, supra, at 895. More precisely, our prior de-
cisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates 
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f}f due process generally requires consideration of three 
distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the pro-
cedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional 
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the gov-
ernment's interest, including the function involved and 
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional 
or substitute procedural requirement would entail. See, 
e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 263-271. 
We turn first to a description of the procedures for 
the termination of Social Security disability benefits, and 
thereafter consider the factors bearing upon the consti-
tutional adequacy of these procedures. 
B 
The disability insurance program is administered 
jointly by state and federal agencies. State agencies 
make the initial determination whether a disability 
exists, when it began, and when it ceased. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 421,13 The standards applied and the procedures fol-
lowed are prescribed by the Secretary, see § 421 (b), 
who has delegated his responsibilities and powers under 
the Act to the SSA. See 40 Fed. Reg. § 4473. 
In order to establish initial and continued entitle-
J.s In all but six States the state vocational rehabilitation agency 
charged with administering the state plan under the Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act, 41 Stat. 735, as amended, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 
III) § 701 et seq., acts as the "state agency" for purposes of the 
disability insurance program. Staff of the House Comm. on Ways 
and Means, Report on the Disability Insurance Program, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess., p. 148 (1974). This assignment of responsibility was 
intended to encourage rehabilitation contacts for disabled workers 
and to utilize the well-established relationships of the local re~ 
habilitation agencies with the medical profession. H. Rep. No.1698, 
83d Cong., 2d Sess., 23-24 ( 1954). 
, 
74-204-0PINION 
14 MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE 
ment to disability benefits a worker must demonstrate 
that he is unable 
"to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 
reason of any medically determinable physical or 
mental impairment which can be expected to result 
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to 
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 
months, ... " 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (1) (A). 
To satisfy this test the worker bears a continuing burden 
of showing, by means of "medically acceptable clinical 
and laboratory diagnostic techniques,"§ 423 (d)(3), that 
he has a physical or mental impairment of such severity 
that 
"he is not only unable to do his previous work but 
cannot, considering his age, education, and work ex-
perience, engage in any other kind of substantial 
gainful work which exists in the national economy, 
regardless of whether such work exists in the im-
mediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific 
job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be 
hired if he applied for work." § 423 (d) (2)(A) .14 
The principal reasons for benefits terminations are that 
the worker is no longer disabled or has returned to work. 
As Eldridge's benefits were terminated because he was 
determined to be no longer disabled, we consider only 
the sufficiency of the procedures involved in such cases.u 
14 Work which "exists in the national economy" is in turn defined 
as "work which exists in significant numbers either in the region 
where such individual lives or in several regions of the country." 
§423 (d)(2)(A). 
15 Because the continuing disability investigation concerning 
whether a claimant has returned to work is usually done directly 
by the SSA Bureau of Disability Insurance, without any state agency 
involvement, the administrative procedures prior to the post-termina-
tion evidentiary hearing differ from those involved in cases of pos-
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The continuing eligibility investigation is made by a 
state agency acting through a "team" consisting of a 
physician and a nonmedical person trained in disability 
~valuati0n. 'The agency periodically communicates with 
the disabled worker, usually by mail-in which case he 
is sent a detailed questionnaire-or by telephone, and 
requests information concerning his present condition, 
including current medical restrictions and sources of 
t:t;"eatment, and any additional information that he con-
·. ~iders r:elevant to his continued entitlement to benefits. 
SSA Claims Manual (CM) § 6705.1; Disability Insurance 
State Manual (DISM) § 353.3.16 
Information regarding the recipient's current condition 
is also obtained from his sources of medical treatment. 
DISM § 353.4. If there is a conflict between the 
infor:mation provided by the beneficiary and that ob-
tained from medical sources such as his physician, or 
between two sources of treatment, the agency may 
arrange for an examination by an independent consulting 
physician.17 Ibid. Whenever the agency's tentative 
assessment of the beneficiary's condition differs from his 
sible medical 'recovery. They are similar, however, in the important 
respect that the process relies principally on written communications 
and there is no provision for an evidentiary hearing prior to the 
cut-off of benefits. Due to the nature of the relevant inquiry in 
~rtain types of cases, such as those involving self-employment and 
~gr'icultural employment, the SSA office nearest the beneficiary 
~onducts an oral interview of the beneficiary as part of the pre-
termination process. SSA Claims Manual (CM) § 6705.2 (c). 
16 Information is also requested concerning the recipient's belief as 
to whether he can return to work, the nature and extent of his em-
ployment during the past year, and any vocational services he is 
receiving. 
H All medical source evidence used to establish the absence of 
continuing disability must be in writing, with the source properly 
identified. DISM § 353.4C. 
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own assessment, the beneficiary is informed that benefits 
may be terminated, provided a summary of the evidence 
upon which the proposed determination to terminate is 
based, and afforded an opportunity to review the medical 
reports and other evidence in his case file.18 He also 
may respond in writing and submit additional evidence. 
Id., § 353.6. 
The state agency then makes its final determination, 
which is reviewed by an examiner in the SSA Bureau 
of Disability Insurance. 42 U. S. C. § 421 (c); CM 
§§ 6701 (b), (c).19 If, as is usually the case, the SSA 
accepts the agency determination it notifies the recipient 
in writing, informing him of the reasons for the decision, 
and of his right to seek de novo reconsideration by the 
state agency. 20 CFR §§ 404.907, 404.909.20 Upon ac-
ceptance by the SSA, benefits are terminated effective 
two months after the month in which medical recovery is 
found to have occurred. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) 
§ 423 (a). 
18 The disability recipient is not permitted personally to examine 
the medical reports contained in his file. This restriction is not 
significant since he is entitled to have any representative of his 
choice, including a lay friend or family member, examine all medical 
evidence. CM § 7314. See also 20 CFR § 401.3 (a) (2). The Sec-
retary informs us that this curious limitation is currently under 
review. 
19 The SSA may not itself revise the state agency's determination 
in a manner more favorable to the beneficiary. If, however, it believes 
that the worker is still disabled, or that the disability lasted longer 
than determined by the state agency, it may return the file to the 
agency for further consideration in light of SSA's views. The 
agency is free to reaffirm its original assessment. 
20 The reconsideration assessment is initially made by the state 
agency, but usually not by the same persons who considered the 
case originally. R. Dixon, Social Security Disability and Mass 
Justice 32 (1973). Both the recipient and the agency may adduce 
new evidence. 
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If the recipient seeks reconsideration by the state 
agency and the determination is adverse, the SSA reviews 
the reconsideration determination and notifies the recipi-
ent of the decision ., He then has a right to an eviden-
tiary hearing before an SSA administrative law judge. 
20 CFR §§ 404.917, 404.927. The hearing is nonadver-
sary, and the SSA is not represented by counsel. As 
at all prior and subsequent stages of the administra-
tive process, however, the claimant may be represented 
by counsel or other spokesmen. § 404.934. If this 
hearing results in an adverse decision, the claimant is en-
titled to request discretionary review by the SSA Appeals 
Council, § 404.945, and finally may obtain judicial re-
view. 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g); 20 CFR § 404.951.21 
Should it be determined at any point after termination 
of benefits, that the claimant's disability extended be-
yond the date of cessation initially established, the 
worker is entitled to retroactive payments. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 404. Cf. id., § 423 (b); 20 CFR §§ 404.501, 404.503, 
404.504. If, on the other hand, a beneficiary receives 
any payments to which he is later determined not to 
be entitled, the statute authorizes the Secretary to 
attempt to recoup these funds in specified circumstances. 
42 u. s. c. § 404.22 
c 
Despite the elaborate character of the administra-
tive procedures provided by the Secretary, the courts 
21 Unlike all prior levels of review, which are de novo, the dis-
trict court is required to treat findings of fact as conclusive if sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g). 
22 The Secretary may reduce other payments to which the bene-
ficiary is entitled, or seek the payment of a refund, unless the 
beneficiary is "without fault" and such adjustment or recovery would 
defeat the purposes of the Act or be "against equity and good 
conscience." 42 U. S. C. § 404 (b). See generally 20 CFR 
§§ 404.501-404.515. 
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below held them to be constitutionally inadequate, con-
cluding that due process requires an evidentiary hearing 
prior to termination. In light of the private and gov-
ernmental interests at stake here and the nature of the 
existing procedures, we think this was error. 
Since a recipient whose benefits are terminated is 
awarded full retroactive relief if he ultimately prevails, 
his sole interest is in the uninterrupted receipt of this 
source of income pending final administrative decision 
on his claim. His potential injury is thus similar in 
nature to that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg, 
see 397 U. S., at 263- 264, the nonprobationary federal 
employee in Arnett, see 416 U. S., at 146, and the wage 
earner in Sniadach. See 395 U. S., at 341-342.23 
Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process 
requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary 
deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare 
assistance is given to persons on the very margin of 
subsistence: 
"The crucial factor in this context-a factor not 
present in the case of ... virtually anyone else whose 
governmental entitlements are ended-is that ter-
mination of aid pending resolution of a controversy 
over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of 
the very means by which to live while he waits." 
397 U.S., at 264 (emphasis in original). 
Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based 
upon financial need. 24 Indeed, it is wholly unrelated to 
23 This, of course, assumes that an employee whose wages are 
garnisheed erroneously is subsequently able to recover his back 
wages. 
24 The level of benefits is determined by the worker's average 
monthly earnings during the period prior to disability, his age, 
and other factors not directly related to financial need, specified in 
42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 415. See id., § 423 (a) (2). 
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the worker's income or support from many other sources, 
such as earnings of other family members, workmen's 
compensation awards/5 tort claims awards, savings, pri-
vate insurance, public or private pensions, veterans' bene-
fits, food stamps, public assistance, or the "many other 
important programs both public and private, which con-
tain provisions for disability payments affecting a sub-
stantial portion of the work force .... " Richardson v. 
Belcher, 404 U. S., at 85-87 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
See Staff of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 
Report on the Disability Insurance Program, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess., 9~10, 419-429 (1974) (hereinafter Staff Report). 
As Goldberg illustrates, the degree of potential depri-
vation that may be created by a particular decision is 
a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of 
.any administrative decisionmaking process. Cf. M or-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). The potential 
deprivation here is generally likely to be less than in 
Goldberg, although the degree of difference can be over-
stated. As the District Court emphasized, to remain 
eligible for benefits a recipient must be "unable to engage 
in substantial gainful activity." 42 U.S. C.§ 423; 361 F. 
Supp., at 523. Thus, in contrast to the discharged fed-
eral employee in Arnett, there is little possibility that 
the terminated recipient will be able to find even tempo-
rary employment to ameliorate the interim loss. 
As we recognized last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg, 
419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975), "the possible length of wrong-
ful deprivation of ... benefits [also] is an important factor 
in assessing the impact of official action on private in-
terests." The Secretary concedes that the delay between 
25 Workmen's compensation benefits are deducted in part in 
accordance with a statutory formula . 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) 
§ 424a; 20 CFR § 404.408; see Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 
78 (1971). 
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a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law 
Judge and a decision on the claim is currently between 
10 and 11 months. Since a terminated recipient must 
first obtain a reconsideration decision as a prerequisite 
'to invoking his right to an evidentiary hearing, the 
delay between the actual cut-off of benefits and final 
decision after a hearing exceeds one year., 
In view of the torpidity of this administrative review 
process, cf. id., at 383-384, 386, and the typically modest 
resources of the family unit of the physically disabled 
worker,26 the hardship imposed upon the erroneously ter-
minated disability recipient may be significant. Still, 
the disabled worker's need is likely to be less than that 
of a welfare recipient. In addition to the possibility of 
access to private resources, other forms of government 
assistance will become available where the termination of 
disability benefits places a worker or his family below the 
subsistence leveP7 See Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, 
26 Amici cite statistics compiled by the Secretary which indi-
cate that in 1965 the mean income of the family unit of a 
disabled worker was $3,803, while the median income for the unit 
was $2,836. The mean liquid assets-i. e., cash, stocks, bonds-of 
these family units was $4,862; the median was $940. These statistics 
do not take into account the family unit's nonliquid assets-i. e., 
automobile, real estate, and the like. Brief for Amici AFL-
CIOjGreen, at 25 n. 29, App. 4a. 
27 Amici emphasize that became an identical definition of disabil-
ity is employed in both the Title II Social Security Program and in 
the companion welfare system for the disabled, Supplemental Se-
curity Income (SSI), compare 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (1) with id., 
(Supp. III) § 1382c (a) (3), the terminated disability-benefits recipient 
will be ineligible for the SSI Program. There exist, however, state and 
local welfare programs which may supplement the worker's income. 
In addition, the worker's household unit can qualify for food stamps 
if it meets the financial need requirements. See 7 U. S. C. §§ 2013 
(c), 2014 (b); 7 CFR § 271. Finally, in 1974 480,000 of the ap-
proximately 2,000,000 disabled workers receiving Social Security 
benefits also received SSI benefits. Since financial need is a criterion 
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at 169 (POWELL, J., concurring), id., at 201-202 (WHITE, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In view 
of these potential sources of temporary income, there is 
less reason here than in Goldberg to depart from the ordi-
nary principle, established by our decisions, that some-
thing less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior 
to adverse administrative action. 
D 
An additional factor to be considered here is the fair-
ness and reliability of the existing pretermination proce-
dures, and the probable value, if any, of additional 
procedural safeguards. Central to the evaluation of any 
administrative process is the nature of the relevant in-
quiry. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 
617 (1974); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1281 (1975). In order to remain eli-
gible for benefits the disabled worker must demonstrate 
by means of "medically acceptable clinical and diagnostic 
techniques," 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (3), that he is unable 
"to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason 
of any medically determinable physical or mental impair-
ment .... " § 423 (a) (1) (A) (emphasis supplied). In 
short, a medical assessment of the worker's physical or 
mental condition is required. This is a more sharply 
focused and easily documented decision than the typical 
determination of welfare entitlement. In the latter case, 
a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, 
and issues of witness credibility and veracity often are 
critical to the decisionmaking process. Goldberg noted 
for eligibility under the SSI program, those disabled workers who 
are most in need will in the majority of cases be receiving SSI bene-
fits when disability insurance aid is terminated. And, under the 
SSI program, a pretermination evidentiary hearing is provided, if 
requested. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 1383 (c); 20 CFR § 416.1336 
(c); 40 Fed. Reg. 1512; see Staff Report 346. 
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that in such circumstances "written submissions are a 
wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision." 397 U. S., at 
269. 
By contrast, the decision whether to discontinue dis-
ability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon "routine, 
standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician 
specialists," Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S., at 404, 
concerning a subject whom they have personally ex-
amined.28 In Richardson the Court recognized the 
"reliability and probative worth of written medical re-
ports," emphasizing that while there may be "profes-
sional disagreement with the medical conclusions" the 
"specter of questionable credibility and veracity is not 
present." I d., at 405, 407. To be sure, credibility and 
veracity may be a factor in the ultimate disability assess-
ment in some cases. But procedural due process rules 
are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-
finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not 
the rare exceptions. The potential value of an eviden-
tiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the decision-
28 The decision is not purely a question of the accuracy of a medi-
cal diagnosis since the ultimate issue which the state agency must 
resolve is whether in light of the particular worker's "age, education, 
and work experience" he cannot "engage in any . . . substantial 
gainful work which exists in the national economy .... " 42 U. S. C. 
§423 (d)(2)(A). Yet information concerning each of these worker 
characteristics is amenable to effective written presentation. The 
value of an evidentiary hearing, or even a limited oral presentation, 
to an accurate presentation of those factors to the decisionmaker does 
not appear substantial. Similarly, resolution of the inquiry as to 
the types of employment opportunities that exist in the national 
economy for a physically impaired worker with a particular set of 
skills would not necessarily be advanced by an evidentiary hear-
ing. Cf. K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.06, at 429 
(1958) . The statistical information relevant to this judgment is 
more amenable to written than to oral presentation. 
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maker, is substantially less in this context than m 
Goldberg. 
The decision in Goldberg also was based on the Court's 
conclusion that written submissions were an inadequate 
substitute for oral presentation because they did not 
provide an effective means for the recipient to communi-
cate his case to the decisionmaker. Written submissions 
were viewed as an unrealistic option, for most recipients 
lacked the "educational attainment necessary to write 
effectively" and could not afford professional assistance. 
In addition, such submissions would not provide the 
"flexibility of oral presentations" or "permit the recipient 
to mold his argument to the issues the decision maker 
appears to regard as important." 397 U. 8., at 269. In 
the context of the disability-benefits-entitlement asses-
ment the administrative procedures under review here 
fully answer these objections. 
The detailed questionnaire which the state agency 
periodically sends the recipient identifies with particu-
larity the information relevant to the entitlement deci-
sion, and the recipient is invited to obtain assistance 
from the local SSA office in completing the questionnaire. 
More important, the information critical to the entitle-
ment decision usually is derived from medical sources, 
such as the treating physician. Such sources are likely 
to be able to communicate more effectively through writ-
ten documents than are welfare recipients or the lay wit-
. nesses supporting their cause. The conclusions of phy-
sicians often are supported by X-rays and the results of 
clinical or laboratory tests, information typically more 
amenable to written than to oral presentation. Cf. 
W. Gellhorn & C. Byse, Administrative Law-Cases and 
Comments 860-863 (6th ed. 1974). 
A further safeguard against mistake is the policy of 
allowing the disability recipient or his representative full 
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access to all information relied upon by the state agency. 
In addition, prior to the cut-off of benefits the agency 
informs the recipient of its tentative assessment, the 
reasons therefor, and provides a summary of the evi-
dence that it considers most relevant. Opportunity is 
then afforded the recipient to submit additional evi-
dence or arguments, enabling him to challenge directly 
the accuracy of information in his file as well as the 
correctness of the agency's tentative conclusions. 1These 
procedures, again as contrasted with those before the 
Court in Goldberg, enable the recipient to "inold" his 
argument to respond to the precise issues which the 
decisionmaker regards as crucial. 
Despite these carefully structured procedures, amici 
point to the significant reversal rate for appealed cases 
as clear evidence that the current process is inadequate. 
Depending upon the base selected and the line of analy-
sis followed, the relevant reversal rates urged by the 
contending parties vary from a high of 58.6% for ap-
pealed reconsideration decisions to an overall reversal 
rate of only 3.3o/o.29 Bare statistics rarely provide a 
satisfactory measure of the fairness of a decisionmaking 
process. Their adequacy is especially suspect here since 
211 By focusing solely on the reversal rate for appealed recon-
sideration determinations amici overstate the relevant reversal rate. 
As we indicated last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379, 383 
n. 6 (1975), in order fuly to assess the reliability and fairness of a 
system of procedure, one must also consider the overall rate of error 
for all denials of benefits. Here that overall rate is 12.2%. More-
over, about 75% of these reversals occur at the reconsideration stage 
of the administrative process. Since the median period between a 
request for reconsideration review and decision is only two months, 
Brief for Amici AFL-CIO /Green, App. 4a, the deprivation is 
significantly less than that concomitant in the lengthier delay 
before an evidentiary hearing. Netting out these reconsideration 
reversals, the overall reversal rate falls to 3.3%. See Supplemental 
a.nd Reply Brief for the Petitioner 14. 
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the administrative review system is operated on an open-
file basis. A recipient may always submit new evidence, 
and such submissions may result in additional medical 
examinations, Such fresh examinations are held in ap-
proximately 30% to 40% of the appealed cases, either at 
the reconsideration or evidentiary hearing stage of the 
administrative process. Staff Report 238. In this con-
text, the value of reversal rate statistics as one means of 
evaluating the adequacy of the pretermination process is 
diminished. Thus, although we view such information 
as relevant, it is certainly not controlling in this case. 
E 
In striking the appropriate due process balance the 
final factor to be assessed is the public interest. This 
includes the administrative burden and other societal 
costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter 
of constitutional right, an evidentiary hearing upon de-
mand in all cases prior to the termination of disability 
benefits. The most visible burden would be the incre-
mental cost resulting from the increased number of hear-
ings and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible 
recipients pending decision. No one can predict the 
extent of the increase, but the fact that full benefits 
would continue until after such hearings would assure 
the exhaustion in most cases of this attractive option. 
Nor would the theoretical right of the Secretary to re-
cover undeserved benefits result, as a practical matter, 
in any substantial offset to the added outlay of public 
funds. The parties submit widely varying estimates of 
the probable additional financial cost. We only need say 
that experience with the constitutionalizing of govern-
ment procedures suggests that the ultimate additional 
cost in terms of money and administrative burden would 
not be insubstantial. 
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Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in de-
termining whether due process requires a particular pro-
cedural safeguard prior to some administrative decision. 
But the Government's interest, and hence that of the 
public, in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative re-
sources, is a factor that must be weighed. At some point 
the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual 
affected by the administrative action and to society in 
terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may 
be outweighed by the cost. Significantly, the cost of 
protecting those whom the preliminary administrative 
process has identified as likely to be found undeserving 
may in the end come out of the pockets of the deserving 
since resources available for any particular program of 
social welfare are not unlimited. See Friendly, supra, at 
1276, 1303. 
But more is implicated in cases of this type than ad hoc 
weighing of fiscal and administrative burdens against the 
interests of a particular category of claimants. The ulti-
mate balance involves a determination as to when, under 
our constitutional system, judicial-type procedures must 
be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness. 
We reiterate the wise admonishment of Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter that differences in the origin and function of 
administrative agencies "preclude wholesale transplanta-
tion of the rules of procedure, trial, and review which 
have evolved from the history and experience of the 
courts." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 
134, 143 ( 1940) . The judicial model of an evidentiary 
hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective, 
method of decisionmaking in all circumstances. The es-
sence of due process is the requirement that "a person in 
jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case 
against him and opportunity to meet it." Joint Anti-Fa-
cist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S., at 171-
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172. (Frankfurter, J., concurring.) All that is necessary 
is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision 
to be made, to "the capacities and circumstances of those 
who are to be heard," Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 268-
269 (footnote omitted), to insure that they are given a 
meaningful opportunity to present their case. In assess-
ing what process is due in this case, substantial weight 
must be given to the good-faith judgments of the indi-
viduals charged by Congress with the administration of 
the social welfare system that the procedures they have 
provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement 
· claims of individuals. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S., 
at 202 (WHITE, J. , concurring and dissenting in part). 
This is especially so where, as here, the prescribed proce-
dures not only provide the claimant with an effective 
process for asserting his claim prior to any administrative 
' action, but also assure a right to an evidentiary hearing, 
as well as to subsequent judicial' review, before the denial 
of his claim becomes final. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971). 
We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not re-
quired prior to the termination of disability benefits and 
that the present administrative procedures fully comport 
with due process. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 
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MATHEWS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCA-
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THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
No. 74--204. Argued October 6, 1975-Decided February -, 1976 
In order to establish initial and continued entitlement to disability 
benefits under the Social Security Act (Act), a worker must 
demonstrate that, inter alia, he is unable "to engage in any sub-
stantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment . . . ." The worker bears the 
continuing burden of showing, by means of "medically accept-
able ... techniques" that his impairment is of such severity that 
he cannot perform his previous work or any other kind of gainful 
work A state agency makes the continuing assessment of the 
worker's eligibility for benefits, obtaining information from the 
worker and his sources of medical treatment, The agency may 
arrange for an independent medical examination to resolve con-
flicting information. If the agency's tentative assessment of the 
beneficiary's condition differs from his own, the beneficiary is 
informed that his benefits may be terminated, is provided a 
summary of the evidence, and afforded an opportunity to review 
the agency's evidence. The state agency then makes a final 
determination, which is reviewed by the Social Security Agency 
(SSA). If the SSA accepts the agency determination it gives 
written notification to the beneficiary of the reasons for the deci-
sion and of his right to de novo state agency reconsideration. 
Upon acceptance by the SSA, benefits are terminated effective 
two months after the month in which recovery is found to have 
occurred. If, after reconsideration by the state agency and SSA 
review, the decision remains adverse to the recipient, he is notified 
of his right to an evidentiary hearing before an SSA administra-
tive law judge. If an adverse decision results, the recipient may 
I 
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request discretionary review by the SSA Appeals Council, and 
finally may obtain judicial review. If it is determined after 
benefits arc terminated that the claimant's disability extended 
beyond the date of cessation initially established, he is entitled 
to retroactive payments. Retroactive adjustments are also made 
for overpayments. A few years after respondent was first 
awarded disability benefits he received and completed a question-
naire from the monitoring state agency. After considering the 
information contained therein and obtaining reports from hi · doctor 
and an independent medical consultant, the agency wrote respondent 
that it had tentatively determined that his disability had ceased in 
May 1972 and advised him that he might request a reasonable 
time to furnish additional information. In a reply letter respond-
ent disputed one characterization of his medical condition and 
indicated that the agency had enough evidence to establish his 
disability. The agency then made its final determination reaffirm-
ing its tentative decision. This determination was accepted by 
the SSA, which notified respondent in July that his benefits would 
end after that month and that he had a right to state agency 
reconsideration within six months. Instead of requesting such 
reconsideration respondent brought this action challenging the 
constitutionality of the procedures for terminating disability bene-
fits and seeking reinstatement of benefits pending a hearing. The 
District Court, relying in part on Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 
254, held that the termination procedures violated procedural due 
process and concluded that prior to termination of benefits re-
spondent was entitled to an evidentiary hearing of the type 
provided welfare beneficiaries under Title IV of the Act. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioner contends, inter alia, that 
the District Court is barred from considering respondent's action 
by Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, which held that district 
courts are precluded from exercising jurisdiction over an action 
seeking a review of a decision of the Secretary of HEW regarding 
benefits under the Act except as provided in 42 U.S. C.§ 405 (g), 
which grants jurisdiction only to review a "final" decision of the 
Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party. Held: 
1. The District Court had jurisdiction over respondent's con-
stitutional claint, since the denial of his request for benefits was 
a final decision with respect to that claim for purposes of § 405 (g) 
jurisdiction. Pp. 4-10. 
(a) The § 405 (g) finality requirement consists of the waiv-
able requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by 
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the Secretary be exhausted and the nonwaivable requirement that 
a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary. 
Respondent's answers to the questionnaire and his letter to the 
state agency specifically presented the claim that his benefits 
should not be terminated because he was still disabled, and thus 
satisfied the nonwaivable requirement. Pp. 6-8. 
(b) Although respondent concededly did not exhaust the 
Secretary's internal-review procedures and ordinarily only the 
Secretary has the power to waive exhaustion, this is a case where 
the claimant's interest in having a particular issue promptly 
resolved is so great that deference to the Secretary's judgment 
is inappropriate. The facts that respondent's constitutional chal-
lenge was collateral to his substantive claim of entitlement and 
that (contrary to the situation in Salfi) he colorably claimed that 
an erroneous termination would damage him in a way not com-
pensable through retroactive payments warrant the conclusion 
that the denial of his claim to continued benefits was a sufficiently 
"final decision" with respect to his constitutional claim to satisfy 
the statutory exhaustion requirement. Pp. 8-10. 
2. An evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termina-
tion of Social Security disability payments and the administrative 
procedures prescribed under the Act fully comport with due 
process. Pp. 10-27. 
(a) "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands," Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481, Resolution of the issue here involv-
ing the constitutional sufficiency of administrative procedures prior 
to the initial termination of benefits and pending review, requires 
consideration of three factors: ( 1) the private interest that will 
be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 
probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and 
(3) the Government's interest, including the fiscal and administra-
tive burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would 
entail. Pp. 10-13. 
(b) The private interest that will be adversely affected by 
an erroneous termination of benefits is likely to be less in the 
case of a disabled worker than in the case of a welfare recipient, 
like the claimants in Goldberg, supra. Eligibility for disability 
payments is not based on financial need, and although hardship 
may be imposed upon the erroneously terminated disability recipi-
ent, his need is likely less than the welfare recipient. In view 
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of other forms of government assistance available to the termi-
nated disability recipient, there is less reason than in Goldberg 
to depart from the ordinary principle that something less than 
an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative 
action. Pp. 17-21. 
(c) The medical assessment of the worker's condition impli-
cates a more sharply focused and easily documented decision than 
the typical determination of welfa.re entitlement. The decision 
whether to discontinue disability benefits will normally turn upon 
"routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician 
specialists," Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 404. In a 
disability situation the potential value of an evidentiary hearing 
is thus substantially less than in the welfare context. Pp. 21-23. 
(d) Written submissions provide the disability recipient with 
an effective means of communicating his case to the decision-
maker. The detailed questionnaire identifies with particularity 
the information relevant to the entitlement decision. Informa-
tion critical to the decision is derived directly from medical 
sources. Finally, prior to termination of benefits, the disability 
recipient or his representative is afforded full access to the in-
formation relied on by the state agency, is provided the reasons 
underlying its tentative assessment, and is given an opportunity to 
submit additional arguments and evidence. Pp. 23-24. 
(e) Requiring an evidentiary hearing upon demand in all 
cases prior to the termination of disability benefits would entail 
fiscal and administrative burdens out of proportion to any counter-
vailing benefits The judicial model of an evidentiary hearing is 
neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of 
decisionmaking in all circumstances, and here where the prescribed 
procedures not only provide the claimant with an effective process 
for asserting his claim prior to any administrative action but also 
a right to an evidentiary hearing as well as subsequent judicial 
review before the denial of his claim becomes final, there is no 
deprivation of procedural due process, Pp. 26-27. 
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In order to establish initial and continued entitlement to disability 
benefits under the Social Security Act (Act), a worker must 
demonstrate that, inter alia, he is unable "to engage in any sub· 
stantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment • • . ." The worker bears the 
continuing burden of showing, by means of "medically accept-
able ... techmques" that his impairment is of such severity that 
he cannot perform his previous work or any other kind of gainful 
work. A state agency makes the continumg assessment of the 
worker's eligibility for benefits, obtaining information from the 
worker and his sources of medical treatment. The agency may 
arrange for an independent medical examination to resolve con-
flicting information. If the agency's tentative assessment of the 
beneficiary's conditiOn differs from his own, the beneficiary is 
informed that his benefits ma,y be terminated, is provided a 
summary of the evidence, and afforded an opportunity to review 
the agency's evidence. The state agency then makes a final 
. determination, which is reviewed by the Social Security Agency 
(SSA) . If the SSA accepts the agency determination it gives 
written notification to the beneficiary of the reasons for the deci-
sion and of his nght to de novo state agency reconsideration. 
Upon acceptance by the SSA, benefits are terminated effective 
two months after the month in which recovery is found to have 
occurred. If, after reconsideration by the state agency and SSA 
review, the decision remains adverse to the recipient, he is notifie9 
. of his right to an evidentiary hearmg before an SSA administra~ 
,tive law judge. If .an adverse decision results, the recipient may 
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request discretionary review by the SSA Appeals Council, and 
finally may obtam JUdiCial review. If it is determined after 
benefits arc termmated that the claimant's disability extended 
beyond the date of cessation mitially established, he is entitled 
to retroactive payments. Retroactive adJustments are also made 
for overpayments. A few years after respondent was first 
awarded disability benefits he received and completed a question-
naire from the monitoring state agency. After considering the 
informatiOn contmncd therem and obtaining reports from his doctor 
and an independPnt medical consultant, the agency wrote respondent 
that it had tentatively determined that his disability had ceased in 
May 1972 and advised him that he might request a reasonable 
time to furnish additional mformation. In a reply letter respond-
ent disputed one characterization of his medical condition and 
indicated that the agency had enough evidence to establish his 
disability. The agency then made its final determination reaffirm-
ing its tentative decis10n. This determmation was accepted by 
the SSA, which notified respondent in July that his benefits would 
end after that month and that he had a right to state agency 
reconsideratiOn within six months. Instead of requesting such 
reconsideration respondent brought this action challenging the 
constitutionality of the procedures for terminating disability bene-
fits and seeking remstatement of benefits pending a hearing. The 
District Court, relying in part on Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 
254, held that the terminatiOn procedures violated procedural due 
process and concluded that prior to termination of benefits re-
spondent was entitled to an evidentiary hearing of the type 
provided welfare beneficianes under Title IV of the Act. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner contends, inter alia, that 
the District Court is barred from considering respondent's action 
by Wemberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, which held that district 
courts are precluded from exercising jurisdiction over an action 
seeking a review of a decision of the Secretary of HEW regarding 
benefits under the Act except as provided in 42 U.S. C. § 405 (g), 
which grants JunsdictJOn only to review a "final" decision of the 
Secretary made after a hearmg to which he was a party. Held: 
1. The District Court had jurisdiction over respondent's con-
stitutional clalffi, smce the denial of his request for benefits was 
a final decis10n with respect to that claim for purposes of § 405 (g) 
jurisdiction. Pp. 4-10. 
(a) The § 405 (g) finality requirement consists of the waiv-
able reqmrement that the adm.Jmstrative remedies prescribed by 
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the Secretary be exhausted and the nonwaivable requirement that 
a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary. 
Respondent's answers to the questionnaire and his letter to the 
state agency specifically presented the claim that his benefits 
should not be terminated because he was still disabled, and thus 
satisfied the nonwaivable requirement. Pp. 6-8. 
(b) Although respondent concededly did not exhaust the 
Secretary's internal-review procedures and ordinarily only the 
Secretary has the power to waive exhaustion, this is a case where 
the claimant's interest in having a particular issue promptly 
resolved is so great that deference to the Secretary's judgment 
is inappropriate. The facts that respondent's constitutional chal-
lenge was collateral to his substantive claim of entitlement and 
that (contrary to the situatiOn in Salfi) he colorably claimed that 
an erroneous terminatiOn would damage him in a way not com-
pensable through retroactive payments warrant the conclusion 
that the denial of his claun to continued benefits was a sufficiently 
"final decision" with respect to his constitutional claim to satisfy 
the statutory exhaustion requirement. .Pp. 8-10. 
2. An evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termina-
tion of Social Security disability payments and the administrative 
procedures prescribed under the Act fully comport with due 
process. Pp. 10-27. 
(a) "[D]ue process IS flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands," Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481. Resolution of the issue here involv-
ing the constitutional sufficiency of administrative procedures prior 
to the initial termination of benefits and pending review, requires 
consideratiOn of three factors: ( 1) the pnvate interest that will 
be affected by the offiCial actwn, (2) t1w risk of an erroneous 
deprivatiOn of such interest through the procedures used, and 
probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and 
(3) the Government's interest, includmg the fiscal and administra-
tive burdens that the additiOnal or substitute procedures would 
entail. Pp. 10-13. 
(b) The private interest that will be adversely affected by 
an erroneous termination of benefits is likely to be less in the 
case of a cli&-ibled worker than in the case of a welfare recipient, 
like the claunants m Goldberg, supra. Eligibility for disability 
payments is not based on finanCial need, and although hardship 
may be imposed upon the erroneously terminated disability recipi-
·ent, his need is hkely less tha.n the welfare reCipient. In view 
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of other forms of government assistance available to the termi-
nated disability recipient, there is less reason than in Goldberg 
to depart from the ordinary principle that something less than 
an evidentiary hearmg IS sufficient prwr to adverse administrative 
action. Pp. 17-21. 
(c) The medical assessment of the worker's condition impli-
cates a more sharply focused and easily documented decision than 
the typical determination of welfare entitlement. The decision 
whether to discontinue disability benefits will normally turn upon 
"routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician 
specialists," Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 404. In a 
disability situation the potential value of an evidentiary hearing 
is thus substantially less than m the welfare context. Pp. 21-23. 
(d) Written submiSSIOns provide the disability recipient with 
an effective means of commumcatmg his case to the decision-
maker. The detailed questionnaire identifies with particularity 
the information relevant to the entitlement decision. Informa-
tion critical to the decision is denved directly from medical 
sources. Finally, prior to termination of benefits, the disability 
recipient or his representative IS afforded full access to the in-
formation rehed on by the state agency, IS provided the reasons 
underlying its tentative assessment, and is given an opportunity to 
submit additional arguments and evidence. Pp. 23-24. 
(e) Requirmg an evidentiary hearing upon demand in all 
cases prior to the termination of disability benefits would entail 
fiscal and administrative burdens out of proportion to any counter-
vailing benefits The JUdrcial model of an evidentiary hearing is 
neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of 
decisionmaking m all circumstances, and here where the prescribed 
procedures not only provide the claimant with an effective process 
for asserting his claim prior to any admmistratlVe action but also 
a right to an evidentiary hearing as well as subsequent judicial 
review before the demal of his claim becomes final, there is no 
deprivation of procedural due process. Pp 26-27. 
493 F . 2d 1230, reversed. 
PowELL, J., ddivcred the opmwn of the Court, m which BunGER, 
C. J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUI::>T, JJ., 
joined. BRENNAN, .J. , filed a dissenting opimon, in which MAR::>HALL,. 
J ., joined. STEVENl:l, J , took no part in t.hr considrration or decision. 
·<ll the cas&. 
NOTICE : This opinion Is subject to formal revision before pub!lcatioll 
In the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are re-
quested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the 
United Sttttes, Wttshlngton, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other 
formal errors, In order that corrections may be made before the pre-
liminary prln t goes to press 
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The issue in th1s case is whether the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to 
the termination of Social Security disability benefit pay-
ments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
I 
Cash benefits are provided to workers during periods 
in which they are completely disabled under the dis-
ability insurance benefits program created by the 1956 
amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act. 70 
Stat. 815, 42 U. S. C. § 423.1 Respondent Eldridge was 
1 The program is financed by revenues derived from employee 
and employer payroll taxes. 26 U. S. C. §§ 3101 (a), 3111 (a); 42 
U. S. C. § 401 (b) . It provides monthly benefits to disabled per-
sons who have worked sufficiently long to have an insured 
status, id., § 423 (c)(1)(A), and who have had substantial work ex-
perience in a specified mterval directly preccdmg the onset of dis-
ability. !d., § 423 (c) (1) (B). Benefits also are provided to the 
worker's dependents under specified cirCumstances. !d., §§ 402 (b)~ 
(d) . When the recipient reaches age 65 his disability benefits are 
automatically converted to ret1rement benefits, !d., §§ 416 (2) (D) , 
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first awarded benefits in June 1968. In March 1972, he 
received a questionnaire from the state agency charged 
with monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge com.; 
pleted the questionnaire, indicating that his condition 
had not improved and identifying the medical sources, 
including physicians, from whom he had received treat.; 
ment recently. The state agency then obtained re-
ports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant. 
After considering these reports and other information 
in his file the agency informed Eldridge by letter that it 
had made a tentative determination that his disability 
had ceased in May 1972. The letter included a state-
ment of reasons for the proposed termination of benefits, 
and advised Eldridge that he might request reasonable 
time in which to obtain and submit additional informa-
tion pertaining to his condition. 
In his written response, Eldridge disputed one char-
acterization of his medical condition and indicated that 
the agency already had enough evidence to establish his 
disability.2 The state agency then made its final deter-
mination that he had ceased to be disabled in May 1972. 
This determination was accepted by the Social Security 
Administration (SSA), which notified Eldridge in July 
that his benefits would terminate after that month. 
423 (a) (1) . In fiscal1974 approximately 3,700,000 persons received 
assistance under the program. SoCial Security Administration, The 
Year in Review 21 (1974) . 
2 Eldridge originally was disabled due to chronic 8Jl.Xiety and 
back strain. He subsequently was found to have diabetes. The 
tentative determination letter indicated t.hat aid would be termi-
nated because available medical evidence indicated that his diabet~ 
was under control, that there existed no limitations on his back 
movements which would impose severe functional restrictions, 
and that he no longer suffered emotional problems that would 
preclude him from all work for which he was qualified. App. 12-13. 
In his reply letter he claimed to have arthritis of the spine rather 
rthan a stramed back. 
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The notification also advised him of his right to seek 
reconsideration by the state agency of this initial deter-
mination within six months. 
Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge com-
menced this action challenging the constitutional valid-
ity of the administrative procedures established by the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for assessing 
whether there exists a continuing disability. He sought 
an immediate reinstatement of benefits pending a 
hearing on the issue of his disability.8 361 F. Supp. 
520 (WD Va. 1973). The Secretary moved to dismiss on 
the grounds that Eldridge's benefits had been terminated 
in accordance with valid administrative regulations and 
procedures and that he had failed to exhaust available 
remedies. In support of his contention that due process 
requires a pretermination hearing, Eldridge relied exclu-
sively upon this Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U. S. 254 (1970), which established a right to an 
"evidentiary hearing" prior to termination of welfare 
benefits.4 The Secretary contended that Goldberg was 
not controlling since eligibility for disability benefits, un-
like eligibility for welfare benefits, is not based on finan-
cial need and since issues of credibility and veracity do 
8 The District Court ordered reinstatement of Eldridge's benefits 
pending its final disposition on the merits. 
4 In Goldberg the Court held that the pretermination hearing must 
include the following elements: (1) "timely and adequate notice de-
tailing the reasons for the proposed termmation"; (2) "an effective 
opportunity [for the recipient] to defend by confronting any ad-
verse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence 
orally"; (3) retained counsel, if desired ; (4) an "impartial"' 
decisionmaker ; (5) a decision resting "solely on the legal rules and 
evidence adduced at the hearing"; (6) a statement of reasons for 
the decision and the evidence relied on . 397 U. S., at 266-271. In 
this opinion the term "evidentiary hearing" refers to a hearing: 
1 generally of the type required in Goldberg. 
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not play a significant role in the disability entitlement 
decision, which turns primarily on medical evidence. 
The District Court concluded that the administrative 
procedures pursuant to which the Secretary had termi• 
nated Eldridge's benefits abridged his right to procedural 
due process. The court viewed the interest of the dis-
ability recipient in uninterrupted benefits as indistin-
guishable from that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg, 
It further noted that decisions subsequent to Goldberg 
·demonstrated that the due process requirement of pre-
termination hearings is not limited to situations involv-
ing the deprivation of vital necessities. See Fuentes v. 
Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 88-89 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 
U. S. 535 (1971). Reasoning that disability determina-
tions may involve subjective judgments based on con-
flicting medical and nonmedical evidence, the District 
Court held that prior to termination of benefits Eldridge 
must be afforded an evidentiary hearing of the type re-
quired for welfare beneficiaries under Title IV of the 
Social Security Act. !d., at 528.5 Relying entirely upon 
the District Court's opinion, the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the injunction barring termi-
nation of Eldridge's benefits prior to an evidentiary 
hearing. 493 F. 2d 1230 (1974) .6 We reverse. 
II 
At the outset we are confronted by a question as 
5 The HEW regulations direct that each state plan under the 
federal categorical assistance programs must provide for pretermi-
nation hea.rings containmg specified procedural safeguards, which 
include [l!l of the Goldberg re(]uirements. See 45 CFR § 205.10 (a); 
n . 4 supra. 
6 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, simply noting that 
the issue had bem correctly derided by the District Court in this 
case, reached the same conrlusion in Williarns v. Weinberger, 494 F. 
2d 1191 (per curiam) , petition for cert. filed, 43 U. S. L. W. 
'3175 (U S., Sept. 8, '1974) (No. 74-205) 
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to whether the D1stnct Court had JUrisdiction over 
this suit. The Secretary contends that our decision last 
Term in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), bars 
the District Court from considering Eldridge's action. 
Salfi was an action challenging the Social Security Act's 
duration-of-relationship eligibility requirements for sur-
viving wives and stepchildren of deceased wage earners. 
We there held that 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h) 7 precludes fed-
eral question JUrisdiction in an action challenging denial 
of claimed benefits. The only avenue for judicial review 
is 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), which requires exhaustion of 
the admimstrative remedies provided under the Act as 
:a jurisdictional prerequisite. 
Section 405 (g) m part provides : 
"Any individual, after any final decision of the 
Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a 
party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, 
may obtaiu a review of such decision by a civil 
action commenced within sixty days after the mail-
ing to him of notice of such decisiOn or within such 
further time as the Secretary may allow." 8 
7 Title 42 U S.C. § 405 (h) provides m full 
"Fmahty of Secretary's dectsion 
"(h) The :findmgs and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing 
shall br bmdmg upon nil mdividuals who wrre parties to such hear-
. in g. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be re-
viewed by any person, tnbunaJ, or governmentnl agency except as 
'herem provided. No actiOn agamiit the Umtcd States, the Secre-
tary, or any officrr or employee thereof shall be brought under 
section 41 of Titlo 28 to recover on any claim arising under this 
subchapter " 
8 RectJon 405 (g) further prov1de::, 
''Such act JOn shall hr brought m the d1strict conrt of the United 
Statt's for the juctl('Jal <hstnct in whJCh the plaintiff resides or has 
· hts prmc1pal phcc of busme.:;s, or, tf he does not reside or have his 
prinr1pal plrtre of buHmess withm any such JUdicial district, m the 
Umted Statrs D1stnct Court for the Distnct of Columbia. . . . The 
.('0\11'( shall have powrr to mt('r, upon. !he pleadings an_d transcnpt 
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On its face 405 (g) thus bars judicial review of any 
denial of a claun of disability benefits until after a 
"final decision" by the Secretary after a "hearing.'1 
It is uncontested that Eldridge could have obtained 
full administrative review of the termination of his 
benefits, yet failed even to seek reconsideration of the 
initial determmat10n, mce the ecretary has not 
"waived" the finality requirement as he had in Salfi, 
supra, at 767, he concludes that Eldridge cannot prop-
erly invoke § 405 (g) as a basis for jurisdiction. We 
disagree. 
Salfi identified several conditions which must be satis-
fied in order to obtain judicial review under § 405 (g). 
Of these, the requirement that there be a final decision 
by the Secretary after a hearing was regarded as "central 
to the requisite grant of subJect matter jurisdiction .... " 
Id., at 764.9 Implicit m Salfi, however, is the principle 
that this condition consists of two elements, only one of 
which is purely "jurisdiCtiOnal" in the sense that it can· 
not be "waived" by the Secretary in a particular case. 
The waivable element IS the requirement that the admin-
istrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be ex-
hausted. The nonwaivable element is the requirement 
that a claim for benefits shall have been presented to the 
of the record, a JUdgment aiJmning, modifying, or reversing the de-
cisiOn of the Secretary, with or without remandmg the cause for a 
rehearmg. The findmg~ of the Secretary as to any fact, tf supported 
by substantial ev1dence, shall be conclusive " 
9 The other two conditiOns are (1) that the ctvil action be com-
menced withm 60 days after the mmlmg of notice of such decision, 
or withm such addttional t1me as the Secretary may permit, and 
(2) that the action be filed m an appropriate district court. These 
two reqmrements specify a statute of bm1tations and appropriate 
venue, and arc> wa~vable by the parties. Salfi, supra, at 763-764. 
As in Salfi no questiOn as to whether Eldridge satisfied these re-
quirements was timely rmsed below, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8 (c) , 
'12 (h) (1) , and they nc>Pn not be consHlered her . 
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Secretary. Absent such a claim there can be no 11de"' 
cision" of any type. And some decision by the Secretary 
is clearly required by the statute, 
That this second requirement is an essential and dis-
tinct precondition for § 405 (g) jurisdiction is evident 
from the different conclusions that we reached in Salfi 
with respect to the named appellees and the unnamed 
members of the class. As to the latter the complaint 
was found to be jurisdictionally deficient since it "con-
tain [ ed] no allegations that they have even filed an 
application with the Secretary , , . ,'' Ibid. With respect 
to the named appellees, however, we concluded that the 
complaint was sufficient since it alleged that they had 
"fully presented their claims for benefits 'to their district 
Social Security Office, and upon denial, to the Regional 
Office for reconsideration.' " I d., at 764-765. Eldridge 
has fulfilled this crucial prerequisite. Through his an-
swers to the state agency questionnaire, and his letter in 
response to the tentative determination that his dis-
ltbility had ceased, he specifically presented the claim 
that his benefits should not be terminated because he 
was still disabled, This claim was denied by the state 
ltgency and its decision was accepted by the SSA. 
The fact that Eldridge failed to raise with the 
Secretary his constitutional claim to a pretermination 
hearing is not controlling.10 As construed in Salfi, § 405 
(g) requires only that there be a "final decision" by the 
Secretary with respect to the claim of entitlement to ben-
efits. Indeed, the named appellees in Salfi did not pre-
sent their constitutional claim to the Secretary. Salfi, 
App. 11, 17-21. The situation here is not identical to' 
10 If Eldridge had exhausted the full set of available admin-
istrative review procedures, failure to have raised his constitutional 
claim would not bar him from asserting it later in a district court 
See, e. g., Flemming v. Nestor,. 363 U. S. 603, 604, 607 (1960). 
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Salfi, for, while the Secretary had no power to amend 
the statute alleged to be unconstitutional in that case, 
he does have authority to determine the timing and 
content of the procedures challenged here. § 405 (a). 
We do not, however, regard this difference as signifi~ 
cant. It is unrealistic to expect that the Secretary 
would consider substantial changes in the current ad-
ministrative review system at the behest of a single 
aid recipient raising a constitutional challenge in an 
adjudicatory context. The Secretary would not be re-
quired even to consider such a challenge. 
As the nonwaivable jurisdictional element was satisfied, 
we next consider the waivable element. The question is 
whether the denial of Eldridge's claim to continued bene-
fits was a sufficiently "final decision" with respect to his 
constitutional claim to satisfy the statutory exhaustion 
requirement. Eldridge concedes that he did not exhaust 
the full set of internal review procedures provided by the 
Secretary. See 20 CFR §§ 404.910, 404.916, 404.940. As 
Salfi recognized, the Secretary may waive the exhaustion 
requirement if he satisfies himself, at any stage of the 
administrative process, that no further review is war-
ranted either because the internal needs of the agency are 
fulfilled or because the relief that is sought is beyond his 
power to confer. Salfi suggested that under§ 405 (g) the 
power to determine when finality has occurred ordinarily 
rests with the Secretary since ultimate responsibility for 
the integrity of the administrative· program is his. But 
cases may arise where a claimant's interest in having a 
particular issue resolved promptly is so great that defer-
ence to the agency's judgment is inappropriate. This 
is such a case. 
Eldridge's constitutional challenge is entirely collatera!l 
'to his substantive claim of entitlement. Moreover, there 
is a 0rucial distinction between the nature of the consti-
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tutional claim asserted here and that raised in Salfi. A 
claim to a predeprivation hearing as a matter of con-
stitutional right rests on the proposition that full relief 
cannot be obtained at a post-deprivation hearing. See 
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 156 
(1974). In light of the Court's prior decisions, see, e. g., 
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Fuentes v. Shevin, supra, 
Eldridge has raised at least a colorable claim that because 
of his physical condition and dependency upon the dis-
ability benefits, an erroneous termination would damage 
him in a way not recompensable through retroactive pay-
ments.11 Thus, unlike the situation in Salfi, denying 
Eldridge's substantive claim "for other reasons" or up-
holding it "under other provisions" at the post-termina-
11 Decisions in d1fferent contexts have emphasized that the 
nature of the claim being asserted and the consequences of 
deferment of judic1al review are important factors in determin-
ing whether a statutory requirement of finality has been satisfied. 
The role these factors may play is illustrated by the intensely 
"practical" approach which the Court has adopted, Cohen v. Bene-
ficial Indus. Loan Corp., '337 U. S. 541, "5413 (1949), when applying 
the finality requirements of 28 U. S. 'C. § 1291, which grants 
jurisdiction to courts of appeals to review all "final decisions" 
of the district courts, and 28 U. S. C. §1257, which empowers this 
Court to review only "final judgments" of state courts. See, e. g., 
Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55 (1971); Local No. 438 Con-
struction & Genetal 'Laborers Unwn v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542, 549, 
550 (1963); Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 
557-558 (1963); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., supra, 
at 545-546. To be sure, certain of the policy considerations 
implicated in § 1257 and § 1291 cases are different from those 
that are relevant here. Compare General Laborers Union, supra, 
at 550; Mercantile Natwnal Bank, supra, at 558, with McKart 
v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193-195 (1969); L. Jaffe, Judi-
cial Control of Admimstmtive Action, 424-426 ( 1965). But the 
core principle that statutorily created finality requirements should, 
if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims 
to be lost and potentially irreparable injunes to be suffered remai11s 
·applicable. 
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tion stage, 422 U. S., at 762, would not answer his con .. 
stitutional challenge. 
We conclude that the denial of Eldridge's request for 
benefits constitutes a final decision for purposes of § 405 
(g) jurisdiction over his constitutional claim. We now 
proceed to the merits of that claim.12 
III 
Procedural due process imposes constraints on gov-
ernmental decisions which deprive individuals of "lib-
erty" or "property" interests within the meaning of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ments. The Secretary does not contend that procedural 
due process is inapplicable to terminations of social se-
curity disability benefits. He recognizes, as has been 
implicit in our prior decisions, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher, 
404 U. S. 78, 80-81 ( 1971); Richardson v. Perales, 402 
U.S. 389, 401-402 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 
603, 611 ( 1960), that the interest of an individual in 
continued receipt of these benefits is a statutorily created 
"property" interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. 
Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 166 (PowELL, 
J., concurring); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 
576-578 ( 1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S., at 539; 
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 261-262. Rather, the 
Secretary contends that the existing administrative 
procedures, detailed below, provide all the process that is 
constitutionally due before a recipient can be deprived of 
that interest. 
12 Given our conclusiOn that Jtmsdiction in the District Court 
was proper under § 405 (g), we find it unnecessary to consider 
Eldridge's contention that notwithstc'tnding § 405 (h) there was 
jurisdiction over his clmm under the mandamus statute, 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1361, or the AdmimstratJvc Procedure Act. 5 U. S. C. § 701 
et seq. 
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This Court consistently has held that some form of 
hearing is required before an individual is finally de-
prived of a propery interest. liVolff v. McDonnell, 418 
U. S. 539, 557-558 (1974). See, e. g., Phillips v. 
Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 596-597 (1931). See 
also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 124-125 
(1889). The "right to be heard before being condemned 
to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it 
may not involve the stigma and hardships of criminal 
conviction, is a principle basic to our society." Joint 
Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 
. (19.51) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The fundamental 
. requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 
"at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). See 
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 (1914). Eldridge 
agrees that the review procedures available to a claimant 
before the initial determination of ineligibility becomes 
final would be adequate if disability benefits were not 
terminated until after the evidentiary hearing stage of 
the administrative process. The dispute centers upon 
what process is due prior to the initial termination of 
benefits, pending review. 
In recent years this Court increasingly has had oc-
casion to consider the extent to which due process re-
quires an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of 
some type of property interest even if such a hearing is 
provided thereafter. In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U. S. 254, 266- 271 (1970), has the Court held that 
a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial is neces-
sary. In other cases requiring some type of pretermi-
nation hearing as a matter of constitutional right the 
Court has spoken sparingly about the requisite proce-
dures. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 
1 (1969), involving garnishment of wages, was entirely 
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silent on the matter. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 61, 
96-97 (1972), the Court said only that in a replevin suit 
between two private parties the initial determination re-
quired something more than an ex parte proceeding 
before a court clerk. Similarly, Ben v. Burson, 402 U. S. 
535, 540 (1971), held, in the context of the revocation of 
a state-granted driver's license, that due process required 
only that the prerevocation hearing involve a probable-
cause determination as to the fault of the licensee, noting 
that the hearing "need not take the form of a full adjudi-
cation of the question of liability." See also North 
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 
601, 607 (1975). More recently, in Arnett v. Kennedy, 
416 U. S. 134 (1974), we sustained the validity of pro-
cedures by which a federal employee could be dismissed 
for cause. They included notice of the action sought, a 
· copy of the charge, reasonable time for filing a written 
response, and an opportunity for an oral appearance. 
Following dismissal, an evidentiary hearing was pro~ 
vided. I d., at 142-146. 
These decisions underscore the truism that " ' [ d] ue 
process, ' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical con-
. ception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place 
and circumstances." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers 
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961). 
·" [D] ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands." M or-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). Accordingly, 
resolution of the issue whether the administrative proce-
,dures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires 
analysis of the governmental and private interests that 
are affected. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 167-168 
(PowELL, J., concurring); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 
263-266; Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. 
McElroy, supra, at 895. More precisely, our prior de,. 
•cisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates 
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of due process generally reqmres consideration of three 
distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the pro-
cedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional 
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the gov-
ernment's interest, including the function involved and 
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional 
or substitute procedural requirement would entail. See, 
e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 263-271. 
We turn first to a description of the procedures for 
the termination of Social Security disability benefits, and 
thereafter consider the factors bearing upon the consti-
tutional adequacy of these procedures. 
B 
· The disabihty insurance program is administered 
jointly by state and federal agencies. State agencies 
make the imtial determination whether a disability 
exists, when it began, and when it ceased. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 421,18 The standards applied and the procedures fol-
lowed are prescribed by the Secretary, see § 421 (b), 
who has delegated his responsibilities and powers under 
the Act to the SSA. See 40 Fed. Reg. § 4473. 
In order to establish initial and continued entitle-
18 In all but six t,1te the state vocational rehabilitation agency 
charged with admmistermg the state plan under the Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act, 41 Stat. 735, as amended, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 
III) § 701 et seq., acts as the "state agency" for purposes of the 
disability insurance program. Staff of the House Comm. on Ways· 
and Means, Report on the DISability Insurance Program, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess., p. 148 (1974) Tlu;; assignment of responsibility was 
intended to encourage rehabilitation contacts for disabled workers 
and t{) utilize the well-established relationships of the local re-
habilitation agencies With the medical profession. H. Rep. No.16981, 
.83d Cong., 2d Sess ., 23-24 (1954) 
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ment to disability benefits a worker must demonstrate' 
that he is unable 
"to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 
reason of any medically determinable physical or· 
mental impairment which can be expected to result 
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to 
last for a continuous period of not less than 12' 
months .... " 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (l)(A). 
To satisfy this test the worker bears a continuing burden 
of showing, by means of "medically acceptable clinical 
and laboratory diagnostic techniques," § 423 (d) (3), that·· 
he has a physical or mental impairment of such severity 
that 
"he is not only unable to do his previous work but 
cannot, considering his age, education, and work ex-
perience, engage in any other kind of substantial' 
gainful work which exists in the national economy, 
regardless of whether such work exists in the im .. 
mediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific· 
job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be· 
hired if he applied for work." § 423 (d)(·2) (A).1' 
The principal reasons for benefits terminations are that 
the worker is no longer disabled or has returned to work. 
As Eldridge's benefits were terminated because he waa 
determined to be no longer disabled, we consider only 
the sufficiency of the procedures involved in such cases.1~ 
14 Work which "exists in the national economy" is in turn defined 
as "work whtch exists in significant numbers either in the region 
where such individual lives or in several regions of the country." 
§423 (d)(2)(A) . 
15 Because the continumg disability investigation concerning 
whether a claimant has returned to work is usually done directly 
by the SSA Bureau of Disability Insurance, without any state agency 
involvement, the administrative procedures prior to the post-termina-
tion evidentiary hearmg differ from those involved in cases of pos-
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The continuing eligibility investigation is made by a 
state agency acting through a "team" consisting of a; 
,physician and a nonmedical person trained in disability 
.evaluation. The agency periodically communicates with 
the disabled worker, usually by mail-in which case he 
is sent a detailed questionnaire-or by telephone, and 
requests information concerning his present condition, 
jncluding current medical restrictions and sources of 
treatment, and any additional information that he con-
siders velevant to his continued entitlement to benefits. 
SSA Claims Manual (CM) § 6705.1; Disability Insurance 
State Manual (DISM) § 353.3.1~ . 
Information regarding the recipient's current condition 
is also obtained from his sources of medical treatment. 
DISM § 353.4. If there is ·a canfiict between the 
information. provided by the bet1eficiary and that ob-
tained from medical sources such as his physician, or 
between two sources of treatment, the agency may 
arrange for an examination by an independent consulting 
physician.17 Ibid. Whenever the agency's tentative 
assessment of the beneficiary's condition differs from his 
sible medical recovery. They are similar, however, in the important 
respect that the process relies principally on written communications 
and there is no provision for an evidentiary hearing prior to the 
cut-off of benefits. Due to the nature of the relevant inquiry in 
certain types of cases, such as those invo1ving self-employment and 
agricultural employment, the SSA office nearest the beneficiary 
conducts an oral interview of the beneficiary as part of the pre-
termination process. SSA Clauns Manual (CM) § 6705.2 (c). 
16 Information is also requested concerning the recipient's belief as 
to whether he can return to work, the nature and extent of his em-
ployment during the past year, and any vocational services he is 
receiving. 
17 All medical source evidence used to mrtablish the absence of· 
continuing disability must be in writing, with the source properly 
identified. DISM § 353.4C. 
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own assessment, the beneficiary is informed that benents 
may be terminated, provided a summary of the evidence 
upon which the proposed determination to terminate is 
based, and afforded an opportunity to review the medical 
reports and other evidence in his case file.18 He alsd 
may respond in writing and submit additional evidence. 
!d., § 353.6. 
The state agency then makes its final determination, 
which is reviewed by an examiner in the SSA BureaU' 
of Disability Insurance. 42 U. S. C. § 421 (c); CM 
§§ 6701 (b), (c).19 If, as is usually the case, the SSA 
accepts the agency determination it notifies the recipient 
in writing, informing him of the reasons for the decision, 
and of his right to seek de novo reconsideration by the 
state agency. 20 CFR §§ 404.907, 404.909.:M Upon ac-
ceptance by the SSA, benefits are terminated effective 
two months after the month in which medical recovery is 
found to have occurred. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) 
§ 423 (a) . 
18 The disability recipient is not permitted personally to examiM 
the medical reports contained in his file. This restriction is not 
significant since he is entitled to have any representative of his 
choice, including a lay fnend or fam\ly member, examine all medical 
evidence. CM § 7314. See also 20 CFR § 401.3 (a) (2). The Sec-
retary informs us that this curious limitation is currently under 
review. 
1o The SSA may not itself revise the state agency's determination 
in a manner more favorable to the beneficiary. If, however, it believes 
that the worker is still disabled, or that the disability lasted longer 
than determined by the state agency, it may return the file to the 
agency for further consideration in light of SSA's views. The 
agency is free to reaffirm its original assessment. 
20 The reconsideration n.ssessment is initially made by the state-
agency, but usually not by the same persons who considered the 
case originally. R. Dixon, Social Security Disability and Mass 
Justice 32 (1973) Both the reCipient and the agency may adduce-
llew evidence, 
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Ir the recipient seeks reconsideration by the statEf 
agency and the determination is adverse, the SSA reviews 
the reconsideration determination and notifies the recipi-
ent of the decision. He then has a right to an eviden-
tiary hearing before an SSA administrative law judge. 
20 CFR §§ 404.917, 404.927. The hearing is nonadver-
sary, and the SSA is not represented by counsel. As 
at all prior and subsequent stages of the administra-
tive process, however, the claimant may be represented 
by counsel or other spokesmen. § 404.934. If this 
hearing results in an adverse decision, the claimant is en-
titled to request discretionary review by the SSA Appeals 
Council, § 404.945, and finally may obtain judicial re-
view. 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g); 20 CFR § 404.951.21 
Should it be determined at any point after termination 
of benefits, that the claimant's disability extended be~ 
yond the date of cessation initially established, the 
worker is entitled to retroactive payments. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 404, Cf. id., § 4,23 (b); 20 CFR §§ 404.501, 404.503, 
404.504. If, on the other hand, a beneficiary receives 
any payments to which he is later determined not to 
be entitled, the statute authorizes the Secretary to· 
attempt to recoup these funds in specified circumstances. 
42 u. s. c. § 404.22 
c 
Despite the elaborate character of the administra-
tive procedures provided by the Secretary, the courts 
21 Unlike all prior levels of review, which are de novo, the dis~ 
trict court is reqwred to treat findings of fact as conclusive if su~ 
ported by substantial evidence. 42 U. S.C. § 405 (g). 
22 The Secretary may reduce other payments to which the bene:-
ficiary is entitled, or seek the payment of a refund, unless the 
beneficiary is "without fault" and such adjustment or recovery would 
defeat the purposes of the Act or be "against equity and good 
c0nscience." 42 U S. C. § 404 (b) . See generally 20 CFR 
:§'§ 404.501-404.515. 
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below held them to be constitutionally inadequate, con:J 
eluding that due process requires an evidentiary hearing 
prior to termination. In light of the private and gov-
ernmental interests at stake here and the nature of the 
existing procedures, we think this was error. 
Since a recipient whose benefits are terminated is 
awarded full retroactive relief if he ultimately prevails, 
his sole interest is in the uninterrupted receipt of this 
source of income pending final administrative decision 
on his claim. His potential injury is thus similar in 
nature to that of the welfare recipient in Goldbergr 
see 397 U. S., at 263-264, the nonprobationary federal 
employee in Arnett, see 416 U. S., at 146, and the wage 
earner in Sniadach. See 395 U. S., at 341-342.23 
Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process 
requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary 
deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare 
assistance is given to persons on the very margin of 
subsistence : 
"The crucial factor in this context-a factor not 
present in the case of ... virtually anyone else whose 
governmental entitlements are ended-is that ter--
mination of aid pending resolution of a controversy 
over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of 
the very means by which to live while he waits." 
397 U.S., at 264 (emphasis in original). 
Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based' 
upon financial need.24 Indeed, it is wholly unrelated to 
28 This, of course, assumes that an employee whose wages are 
·garnisheed erroneously IS subsequently able to recover his back 
wages. 
24 The level of benefits 1s dctermmed by the worker's average· 
monthly earmngs dunng the penocl prior to disability, his age, 
·and other factors not d1rectly related to financial need, specified i~ 
42. U. S C (Supp III) §415 See id ·., § 423 (a) (2) 
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the worker's income or support from many other sources, 
such as earnings of other family members, workmen's 
compensation awards/5 tort claims awards, savings, pri-
vate insurance, public or private pensions, veterans' bene-
fits, food stamps, public assistance, or the umany other 
important programs both public and private, which con~ 
tain provisions for disability payments affecting a sub-
stantial portion of the work force ... . " Richardson v. 
Belcher, 404 U. S., at 85-87 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
See Staff of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 
Report on the Disability Insurance Program, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess., 9~10, 419-429 (1974) (hereinafter Staff Report). 
As Goldberg illustrates, the degree of potential depri-
vation that may be created by a particular decision is 
a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of 
any administrative decisionmaking process. Cf. M or-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). The potential 
deprivation here is generally likely to be less than in 
Goldberg, although the degree of difference can be over-
stated. As the District Court emphasized, to remain 
eligible for benefits a recipient must be uunable to engage 
in substantial gainful activity." 42 U.S. C. § 423; 361 F. 
Supp., at 523. Thus, in contrast to the discharged fed-
eral employee in Arnett, there is little possibility that 
the terminated recipient will be able to find even tempo-
rary employment to ameliorate the interim loss. 
As we recognized last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg, 
419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975), uthe possible length of wrong-
ful deprivation of ... benefits [also] is an important factor 
in assessing the impact of official action on private in-
terests." The Secretary concedes that the delay between 
25 Workmen's compensatiOn benefits are deducted in pa.rt in 
accordance with a statutory formula. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. III) 
§ 424a; 20 CFR § 404.408; see Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 
18 (1971) , 
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a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law 
Judge and a decision on the claim is currently between 
10 and 11 months. Since a terminated recipient must 
first obtain a reconsideration decision as a prerequisite 
to invoking his right to an evidentiary hearing, the 
delay between the actual cut-off of benefits and final 
decision after a hearing exceeds one year. 
In view of the torpidity of this administrative review 
process, cf. id., at 383-384, 386, and the typically modest 
resources of the family unit of the physically disabled 
worker/6 the hardship imposed upon the erroneously ter-
minated disability recipient may be significant. Still, 
the disabled worker's need is likely to be less than that 
of a welfare recipient. In addition to the possibility of 
access to private resources, other forms of government 
assistance will become available where the termination of 
disability benefits places a worker or his family below the 
subsistence level_27 See Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, 
26 Amici cite stat1shcs compiled by the Secretary which indi-
cate that in 1965 the mean income of the family unit of a 
disabled worker was $3,803, while the median income for the unit 
was $2,836. The mean liquid assets-i. e., cash, stocks, bonds-of 
these family units was $4,862; the median was $940. These statistics 
do not take mto account the family umt's nonliquid assets-i. e., 
automobile, real estate, and the like. Brief for Amici AFL-
CIOj Green, at 25 n. 29, App. 4a. 
27 Amici emphasize that because an 1dcntical definition of disabil-
ity is employed in both the Title II Social Security Program and in 
the companion welfare system for the disabled, Supplemental Se-
curity Income (S~I), compare 42 U. S. C. § 423 (d) (1) with id., 
(Supp. III) § 1382c (a) ('3), the terminated disability-benefits recipient 
will be ineligible for the SSI Program. There exist, however, state ancl 
local welfare programs which may supplement the worker's income. 
In addition, the worker's household unit can qualify for food stamps 
if it meets the financial need reqmrements. See 7 U. S. C. §§ 2013 
(c), 2014 (b); 7 CFR § 271. Fmally, m 1974 480,000 of the ap-
proximately 2,000,000 disabled workers receiving Social Security 
'b..enefits also recm.ved SSI benefits Sincfl financial need is a criterio~ 
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at 169 (POWELL, J., concurring), id., at 201-202 (WHITE, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In view 
of these potential sources of temporary income, there is 
less reason here than in Goldberg to depart from the ordi-
nary principle, established by our decisions, that some-
thing less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient priot 
to adverse administrative action. 
D 
An additional factor to be considered here is the fair-
ness and reliability of the existing pretermination proce-
dures, and the probable value, if any, of additional 
procedural safeguards. Central to the evaluation of any 
administrative process is the nature of the relevant in-
quiry. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 
617 (1974); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1281 (1975). In order to remain eli-
gible for benefits the disabled worker must demonstrate 
by means of "medically acceptable clinical and diagnostic' 
techniques," 42 U.S. C.§ 423 (d)(3), that he is unable 
"to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason 
of any medically determinable physical or mental impair-
ment .. .. " § 423 (a)(1)(A) (emphasis supplied). In 
short, a medical assessment of the worker's physical or 
mental condition is required. This is a more sharply 
focused and easily documented decision than the typical 
determination of welfare entitlement. In the latter case, 
a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, 
and issues of witness credibility and veracity often are 
critical to the decisionmaking process. Goldberg noted 
for eligibility under the SSI program, those disabled workers who 
are most in need will in the majority of cases be receiving SSI bene-
fits when disability insurance aid is terminated. And, under the 
ssr program, a pretcrminatwn evidentiary hearing is provided, if 
requested. 42 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 1383 (c); 20 CFR § 416.13361 
tel ;: 40 Fed. Reg. 1512;, sec Staff Report 346 
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that in such circumstances 11written submissions are ar 
wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision." 397 U. S., atr 
269. 
By contrast, the decision whether to discontinue dis-
ability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon 11routine, 
standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician 
specialists," Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S., at 404, 
concerning a subject whom they have p€rsonally ex-
amined.28 In Richardson the Court recognized the 
11reliability and probative worth of written medical re-
ports," emphasizing that while there may be "profes-
sional disagreement with the medical conclusions" the 
Nspecter of questionable credibility and veracity is not 
present." I d., at 405, 407. To be sure, credibility and 
veracity may be a factor in the ultimate disability assess-
ment in some cases. But procedural due process rules 
are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-
finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not 
the rare exceptions. The potential value of an eviden-
tiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the decision-
28 Tl1e decisiOn is not purely a question of the accuracy of a medi .. 
cal diagnosis since the ultimate issue which the state agency must 
resolve is whether in light of the particular worker's "age, education, 
and work experience" he cannot "engage in any . . . substantial 
gainful work which exists in the national economy ... . " 42 U.S. C. 
§ 423 (d) (2) (A) . Yet information concerning each of these worker 
characteristics is amenable to effective written presentation. The 
value of an evidentiary hearmg, or even a limited oral presentation, 
to an accurate presentat10n of those factors to the decisionmaker does 
not appear substantial. Similarly, resolution of the inquiry as to 
the types of employment opportumties that exist in the national 
economy for a physiCally impaired worker with a particular set of 
skills would not neccssanly be advanced by an evidentiary hear-
ing. Cf. K. Davis, Admmistrative Law Treatise § 7.06, at 429 
(1958) . The statistiCal mformation relevant to this judgment ia 
inore amenable to wntten than to oral presentation. 
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maker, is substantially less in this context than in 
Goldberg. 
The decision in Goldberg also was based on the Court's 
conclusion that written submissions were an inadequate 
substitute for oral presentation because they did not 
provide an effective means for the recipient to communi-
cate his case to the decisionmaker. Written submissions 
were viewed as an unrealistic option, for most recipient& 
lacked the "educational attainment necessary to write 
effectively" and could not afford professional assistance .. 
In addition, such submissions would not provide the 
"flexibility of oral presentations" or "permit the recipient. 
to mold his argument to the issues the decision maker 
appears to regard as important." 397 U. S., at 269.. In 
the context of the disability-benefits-entitlement asses-. 
ment the administrative procedures under review here 
fully answer these objections. 
The detailed .questionnaire which the state agency 
periodically sends the recipient identifies with particu-
larity the information relevant to the entitlement deci-, 
sion, and the recipient is invited to obtain assistance 
from the local SSA office in completing the questionnaire. · 
More important, the information critical to the entitle-
ment decision usually is derived from medical sources, 
such as the treating physician. Such sources are likely 
to be able to communicate more effectively through writ-
ten documents than are welfare recipients or the lay wit-
nesses supporting their cause. The conclusions of phy-
sicians often are supported by X-rays and the results of 
clinical or laboratory tests, information typically more 
amenable to written than to oral presentation. Cf. 
W. Gellhorn & C. Byse, Administrative Law-Cases and 
Comments 860-863 (6th ed. 1974) . 
. A further safeguard against mistake is the policy ofi 
allowing the disability recipient or his representative full 
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access to all information relied upon by the state agency~ 
In addition, prior to the cut-off of benefits the agency 
informs the recipient of its tentative assessment, the 
reasons therefor, and provides a summary of the evi-
dence that it considers most relevant. Opportunity is 
then afforded the recipient to submit additional evi-
dence or arguments, enabling him to challenge directly' 
the accuracy of information in his file as well as the 
correctness of the agency's tentative conclusions. These 
procedures, again as contrasted with those before the 
Court in Goldberg, enable the recipient to "mold" his 
argument to respond to the precise issues which the 
decisionmaker regards as crucial. 
Despite these carefully structured procedures, amici 
point to the significant reversal rate for appealed cases 
as clear evidence that the current process is inadequate. 
Depending upon the base selected and the line of analy-
sis followed, the relevant reversal rates urged by the 
contending parties vary from a high of 58.6% for ap-
pealed reconsideration decisions to an overall reversal 
rate of only 3.3%.w Bare statistics rarely provide a 
satisfactory measure of the fairness of a decisionmaking 
process. Their adequacy is especially suspect here since 
29 By focusing solely on the reversal rate for appealed recon-
sideration determinations amici overstate the relevant reversal rate. 
As we indicated last Term in Fusan v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 38~ 
n. 6 ( 1975), in order fuly to assess the reliability and fairness of a 
system of procedure, one must also consider the overall rate of error 
for all denials of benefits. Here that overall rate is 12.2%. More-
over, about 75% of these reversals occur at the reconsideration stage 
of the administrative process. Since the median period between It 
request for reconsideration review and decision is only two months, 
Brief for Amici AFL-CIO / Green, App. 4a, the deprivation is 
significantly less than that concomitant m the lengthier delay 
before an evidentiary ht>armg. Netting out theRe reconsideration 
reversals, the overall reversal rate falls to 3.3%. Sec Supplemental 
and·Rel)ly Brief for the Pcti!Ionrr 14, 
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the administrative review system is operated on an open-
file basis. A recipient may always submit new evidence, 
and such submissions may result in additional medical 
examinations. Such fresh examinations are held in ap-
proximately 30% to 40% of the appealed cases, either at 
the reconsideration or evidentiary hearing stage of the 
administrative process. Staff Report 238. In this con-
text, the value of reversal rate statistics as one means of 
evaluating the adequacy of the pretermination process is 
diminished. Thus, although we view such information 
as relevant, it is certainly not controlling in this case. 
E 
In striking the appropriate due process balance the 
final factor to be assessed is the public interest. This 
includes the administrative burden and other societal 
costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter 
of constitutional.,right, an evidentiary hearing upon de-
mand in all cases prior to the termination of disability 
benefits. The most visible burden would be the incre-
mental cost resulting from the increased number of hear .. 
ings and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible 
recipients pending decision. No one can predict the 
extent of the increase, but the fact that full benefits 
would continue until after such hearings would assure 
the exhaustion in most cases of this attractive option. 
Nor would the theoretical right of the Secretary to re-
·Cover undeserved benefits result, as a practical matter, 
in any substantial offset to the added outlay of public 
funds. The parties submit widely varying estimates of 
the probable additional financial cost. We only need say 
that experience with the constitutionalizing of govern-
ment procedures suggests that the ultimate additional 
cost in terms of money and administrative burden would 
not be insubstantial. 
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Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in de~ 
termining whether due process requires a particular pro4 
cedural safeguard prior to some administrative decision. 
But the Government's interest, and hence that of the 
public, in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative re-
sources, is a factor that must be weighed. At some point 
the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual 
affected by the administrative action and to society in 
terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may 
be outweighed by the cost. Significantly, the cost of 
protecting those whom the preliminary administrative 
process has identified as likely to be found undeserving 
may in the end come out of the pockets of the deserving 
since resources available for any particular program of 
social welfare are not unlimited. See Friendly, supra, at 
1276, 1303. 
But more is implicated in cases of this type than ad hoc 
weighing of fiscal and administrative burdens against the 
interests of a particular category of claimants. The ulti-
mate balance involves a determination as to when, under 
our constitutional system. judicial-type procedures must 
be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness. 
We reiterate the wise admonishment of Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter that differences in the origin and function of 
administrative agencies "preclude wholesale transplanta-
tion of the rules of procedure, trial, and review which 
have evolved from the history and experience of the 
courts." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 
134, 143 (1940). The judicial model of an evidentiary 
hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective, 
method of decisionmaking in all circumstances. The es-
sence of due process is the requirement that "a person in 
jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case 
against him and opportunity to meet it." Joint Anti-Fa-
tCist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S., at 171-
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172. (Frankfurter, J., concurring.) All that is necessary 
is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision 
to be made, to "the capacities and circumstances of those 
who are to be heard," Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 268-
269 (footnote omitted), to insure that they are given a 
meaningful opportunity to present their case. In assess-
ing what process is due in this case, substantial weight 
must be given to the good-faith judgments of the indi-
viduals charged by Congress with the administration of 
the social welfare system that the procedures they have 
provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement 
claims of individuals. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S., 
at 202 (WHITE, J. , concurring and dissenting in part). 
This is especially so where, as here, the prescribed proce-
dures not only provide the claimant with an effective 
process for asserting his claim prior to any administrative 
action, but also assure a right to an evidentiary hearing, 
as well as to subsequent judicial review, before the denial 
of his claim becomes final. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 u.s. 371, 378 (1971) . 
We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not re-
quired prior to the termination of disability benefits and 
that the present administrative procedures fully comport 
with due process. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 
